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The Supreme Court generally judges servicemen's claimsfor viola-
tions of their constitutional rights under a deferential "separate commu-
nity" standard of review. The Court has failed, however, to supply an
entirely satisfactory rationale for the separate community doctrine. In
this Article, Professor Hirschhorn considers the needs andpurposes of
the military in a democratic society, and develops a theory of service-
men's relationships to the military that is generally supportive of the
separate community doctrine.
The Vietnam War, fought in an unprecedented legal climate, produced
unprecedented legal effects on the armed forces. Most American wars had
been fought against the wishes of a significant moral and political opposition,I
and the conscript armies of the Civil War, the World Wars, and the Korean
War included many unwilling soldiers. But the Vietnam War was the first in
which a combination of the draft2 and a broadly based antiwar movement
brought a significant number of politically hostile individuals into the military.
Other servicemen came to see their personal dissatisfaction with military life
in political terms. 3 For these men and their civilian supporters, resisting mili-
tary authority both obstructed the war and preserved what they considered
their essential personal liberty. They shared the contemporary willingness to
attack entrenched authority in the federal courts. At their disposal was a body
of constitutional doctrine protecting individual rights of expression, associa-
tion, and privacy that had not existed in earlier wars. By the early 1970's,
military practices that had gone without effective judicial scrutiny since the
founding of the Army were subject to serious constitutional challenge.4 Since
the war's end, lower federal courts have continued to rule on the constitutional
t Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. A.B. 1969, Johns Hopkins; J.D. 1974,
Chicago.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 245-48.
2. Since enlistees chose their service and had some choice of training and assignment, it may
be assumed that a substantial number of the voluntary enlistments in the armed forces were moti-
vated primarily by a desire to avoid the consequences of the draft.
3. See generally, D. CORTRIGHT, SOLDIERS IN REVOLT: THE AMERICAN MILITARY TODAY
(1975); W. HAUSER, AMERICA'S ARMY IN CRISIS: A STUDY IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 0973).
4. See, eg., Councilman v. Laird, 481 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1973) (court-martial jurisdiction),
rev'd, 420 U.S. 738 (1975); Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (pun-
ishment for conduct "to the prejudice of good order and discipline"), rev'd, 418 U.S. 676 (1974);
Yahr v. Resor, 431 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1970) (refusal to permit antiwar publication on base); Stolte
v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1392 (D.D.C. 1972) (punishment for conduct "to the prejudice of good
order and discipline"); Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.) (transfer after antiwar
political activity), rev'd, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972); Dash v.
Commanding Gen., 307 F. Supp. 849 (D.S.C. 1969) (refusal to permit antiwar publication on
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limits of congressional and executive power to control the political activity,
sexual orientation, appearance, privacy, and professional opportunities of mil-
itary personnel.
5
These cases raise two general issues: whether military necessity justifies
restrictions that would be unconstitutional in a civilian setting, and, if so, by
what standards the courts should evaluate a legislative or executive decision
that a particular military practice is sufficiently necessary. The opinions typi-
cally concede that some balance must be struck between established individual
rights and military needs,6 but they differ markedly on what military interests
justify unusual restrictions, how clearly the government must show them to be
affected, and how precisely the controls must further them.
7
Cases raising these issues began reaching the Supreme Court in 1974. In
eight decisions since then, a stable majority of the Court has accepted the
proposition that the armed forces are a "separate community"8 in which
greater than usual restrictions on individual liberty are required. In practice,
the Court has given considerable, though not clearly delineated, deference to
decisions by Congress or the military authorities that restrict the political ex-
pression, access to political activity, and right to counsel of servicemen and
that impose gender-based restrictions on military career prospects. It has justi-
fied its relatively uncritical approach only in very general terms, asserting
without explanation that the function of the armed forces practically requires
the Court to accept the judgment of Congress and the military authorities on
the relation of the serviceman to the armed forces.9 By 1980 the majority opin-
ions on point repeated the standard phrases by rote.10
Dissenting opinions and commentators have vigorously criticized the sep-
arate community doctrine on several levels. It has been attacked as based on a
base), aft'd, 429 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1970). Cf. Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1970)
(barring access to post for political activity).
5. See, eg., Curry v. Secretary of the Army, 595 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (appointment of
court-martial by commanding officer); West v. Brown, 558 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1977) (enlistment
restriction for unwed mothers); Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1976) (discharge for
pregnancy); Campbell v. Beaughler, 519 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1975) (hair length); Committee for
G.I. Rights v. Calloway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (antidrug inspections and urine tests);
Hough v. Seamans, 493 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1974) (hair length); benShalom v. Secretary of the
Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (discharge for homosexuality); Owens v. Brown, 455 F.
Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978) (gender restriction on sea duty).
6. E.g., Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1121 (2d Cir. 1976); Hough v. Seamans, 493
F.2d 298, 299 (4th Cir. 1974).
7. Compare Curry v. Secretary of the Army, 595 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1979) and Committee
for G.I. Rights v. Calloway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975) with Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d
1114 (2d Cir. 1976) and benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
8. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Mid-
dendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Schlesinger v. Council-
man, 420 U.S. 738 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1974); Secretary of the Navy v.
Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist have been in the major-
ity in every case. They were joined by Justice White in all except Ballard and Rosiker, both of
which involved gender-based discrimination; in those cases they were joined by Justice Stewart.
9. See infra notes 152-74 and accompanying text.
10. See Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2364, 2365-66 (1983); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57, 66 (1981); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354-61 (1980).
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historically obsolete model of the relation of the armed forces to society and
the duties of modem military personnel." A more fundamental criticism is
that the majority's approach is rhetorical and superficial and does not demon-
strate that the judiciary is any less competent to consider individual rights in a
military context than in connection with prisons, government employment, or
national security.' 2 In this view, the armed forces have not been shown to be
fundamentally different from other government agencies whose actions the
courts review.
Generally, an individual claiming a constitutional right against the fed-
eral government asserts that the agency involved may not take the action it
desires despite an executive or legislative determination that the action serves
a legitimate government function. In the separate community cases, the two
factions of the Court have disputed whether the peculiar function of the armed
forces justifies denying protection to an individual interest that would be
granted against any other government agency. Both factions of the Court
have employed a balancing analysis, but neither the majority of the Court nor
its critics address the basic questions of the relation between the courts and the
military. While purporting to balance the needs of the armed forces against
individual rights, neither faction draws on the social science literature that
describes the basis for military discipline. Neither examines the distinctive
nature of war as a government activity or its effect on the armed forces' rela-
tion to the Constitution. In arguing the competence of the courts to balance
individual and military interests, neither faction explains how the judiciary's
ability to balance between the individual and other government agencies ap-
plies to the armed forces. Finally, neither faction clearly distinguishes be-
tween judicial attitudes toward military practices based on a statute as
opposed to those originated within the armed forces. The purpose of this Arti-
cle is to analyze these factors.
When an individual asserts a right against a federal agency, he claims
either a liberty or an entitlement with which he contends the organization has
no authority to interfere. The right, and the corresponding limit on the
agency's authority, may derive from a regulation, statute, or the Constitution,
which is to say that the agency's authority may have been limited by its own
decision, by Congress, or by principles developed judicially from a text that
cannot be altered by the normal legislative process. 13 When a court holds that
a practice is contrary to regulation, it requires the agency to act consistently
with its previously announced intentions. When it finds a practice contrary to
statute, it vindicates the authority of Congress over the agency. In both in-
stances the court interprets and applies restrictions derived from a text created
11. See, ag., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 851-57 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Zillman &
Imwinkelried, Constitutional Rights and Military Necessity: Rflections on the Society Apart, 51
NOTRE DAME LAW. 397, 400 (1976). See also infra text accompanying notes 175-87.
12. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 368-70 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also
infra text accompanying notes 189-93.
13. A common law right, though judicially created, can be overridden by the legislature just
as can an unwanted construction of a statute.
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by other bodies. If the originator of the text believes that judicial interpreta-
tion will produce undesirable results in subsequent cases, it is legally free to
change the text to preclude the unwanted interpretation.' 4 When a court finds
that the Constitution prohibits a particular practice, neither the agency nor
Congress has the power to alter the text on which the conclusion rests. The
decision therefore denies the agency power to infringe on an individual inter-
est in pursuit of its own purposes, even if authorized to do so by statute, and
vests in the courts the final say on what circumstances, if any, warrant in-
fringement of the interest.
Judicial review of servicemen's claims of constitutional rights against the
armed forces therefore differs fundamentally from judicial review of claims
that the military has violated its own regulations or a statute. In the latter,
victory for the serviceman frustrates the organizational will in the immediate
case, but leaves the organization free to achieve its purpose in the future.
When Congress declines to amend a statute held to limit military authority,
any resulting frustration of the armed force's desires merely reinforces the su-
perior authority of Congress to decide military powers and duties. A decision
that a practice is unconstitutional, however, prevents the armed forces from
exercising a particular power over their members despite their own or Con-
gress' conclusion that it furthers the performance of their legitimate functions.
In the separate community cases an individual, usually a member of the
armed forces claiming a liberty or entitlement, is met with the government's
argument that the functioning of the armed forces justifies its denial even if it
would be granted against another agency or for a person not subject to mili-
tary law.15 Both factions of the Court resolve the question by balancing the
benefit to the individual or his interest in autonomy against the potential frus-
tration of military purpose that would result from granting the liberty. Once
the Justices have derived the individual interest claimed from precedent in-
volving nonmilitary agencies, a well-reasoned balancing analysis would re-
quire a judicial consideration of ends, means, and consequences.
It is impossible to decide whether a practice is useful or essential to the
proper functions of the armed forces without some idea of what those func-
tions are.16 The typical majority opinion speaks only briefly of the primary
function of the armed forces as "fighting wars," along with a secondary, nega-
tive function of remaining subordinate to civilian authority.' 7 A fully devel-
oped concept of these functions would include a more or less explicit analysis
of the distinctive place of war in the constitutional system and the problems
caused by active or passive military insubordination to civilian authority.
14. There may be, of course, political constraints that prevent the legislative or administra-
tive authorities from overriding the courts.
15. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
16. It is highly unlikely, for instance, that the Court would consider a restriction on expres-
sion by servicemen to be justified by the military's power to inculcate "desirable" political atti-
tudes for their return to civilian life. Cf. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 580-82 (1958)
(dishonorable discharge based on preinduction activities); id at 585-86 (Clark, J., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-39 (1976).
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Once equipped with a concept of effective performance in war and polit-
ical subordination at home, the Court must decide whether and how far the
practice in question contributes to those ends. Conversely, how well will the
armed forces be able to achieve their legitimate purposes if they may not use
the practice? This requires some understanding of the demands that an effec-
tive military organization must make on its members, the resistance to those
demands caused by the serviceman's personality, the range of legal and psy-
chological techniques available to overcome that resistance, and the relative
efficacy of different methods as applied to individuals whose attitudes have
been formed by American society. It demands, in short, some knowledge of
how military organizations work.
Although there are military practices that are completely useless, or even
harmful to military effectiveness,' 8 it must be assumed that there will be cases
in which a practice makes some contribution to the organization's proper func-
tioning. Balancing requires the Court to decide how much decrease in mili-
tary efficacy is tolerable to sustain the individual interests involved, or how
much sacrifice of individual interest is acceptable to maintain the present state
of efficiency. Disagreement, as in Rosiker v. Goldberg,19 over whether a prac-
tice is militarily "necessary" is a dispute over the required directness of the
relation between the means and the end-whether the practice is "necessary"
in the McCulloch v. Maryland sense of "useful,"20 or in the sense of "essential"
rejected in McCulloch but normally used when fundamental individual rights
are involved.2' Since the individual rights claimed against the armed forces
are generally fundamental, 22 or, in the case of gender discrimination, semi-
fundamental,23 the Court needs a concept of what, if any, distinctive features
of the military function justify acceptance of a less direct connection between
means and ends than that required of a civilian agency.
Given concepts of proper military functions, military utility, and the rela-
tive importance of military utility and individual interests, a court is in a posi-
tion to decide whether the practice in question is sufficiently related to military
functioning that it must be accepted even though it infringes individual rights
that would otherwise be protected. In reaching that decision, however, the
court must consider the likelihood that it will be mistaken and the conse-
quences of error. There are two possible sources of error; one inherent in the
18. See infra notes 350-64 and accompanying text.
19. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). Compare the majority opinion id at 79-83 with Justice Marshalrs
dissent, id. at 102-06.
20. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-21 (1819).
21. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,407-10 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1969). See also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 852-
56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (speech and association); Middendorf v.
Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (counsel and procedural due process); Committee for G.I. Rights v.
Calloway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (freedom from unreasonable search). But cf. Campbell v.
Beaughler, 519 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1975) (hair style); Hough v. Seamans, 493 F.2d 298 (4th Cir.
1974) (hair style).
23. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 87-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976).
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adversary system and one peculiar to balancing individual interests against
institutional needs. The first is the problem of party presentation: the court's
sources of information are to some extent limited to that which is presented by
the parties and amici curiae, and the possibility always exists that significant
data will not be presented. The second is the problem of expertise. It is possi-
ble that the court will overvalue or undervalue a practice because it does not
understand information about its utility. Consequently, the court may either
permit an infringement of individual interests that is not in fact required to
meet military needs, or it may uphold the individual interests at a cost of im-
paired military efficiency that it would not knowingly impose. By exercising
its own judgment to balance the interests, a court necessarily concludes that
the risk of error is acceptable, either because the likelihood of error is low or
because the direction provided will still produce more good than harm. While
the first aspect of judicial self-confidence is purely a matter of technical com-
petence, the second derives from the relative importance the court is willing to
give the individual and organizational interests.
Finally, by exercising its own judgment on behalf of the individual, the
court sets aside the conclusion reached on the same problem by either the
executive authorities or Congress. This decision requires not only sufficient
confidence by the court that its decision will produce an acceptable balance of
individual rights and organizational needs, but also the conclusion that the
court is more likely to have done so than the institutions whose decision is
under review.
Thus the balancing process in the separate community cases raises the
following questions:
1. What are the purposes of the armed forces and the social interest
in their fulfillment?
2. What is useful to the government in fulfilling these purposes?
3. What is the acceptable amount and direction of error in ac-
comodating these purposes to individual rights?
4. Which organs of government are least likely to commit unac-
ceptable error in making the accomodation?
The answer to the first question depends on the position of the United
States in the international system and the dangers to civilian society from the
creation of an armed instrument to protect that position. The second is a ques-
tion of legislative fact for the historian, the social scientist, and the military
theorist. The third depends on the relation between the environment in which
the armed forces act and the legal system which gives rise to individual consti-
tutional rights, and the fourth calls for an understanding of the respective deci-
sion making processes of the courts, the political branches of government, and
the military authorities.
This Article resolves these questions in a way generally sympathetic to the
results of the separate community cases. The analysis involves four tasks: to
establish the uniqueness of war as a government activity and the consequent
uniqueness of the armed forces' functions; to describe the relation of the indi-
[Vol. 62
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vidual serviceman to the armed forces that arises from these functions; to ar-
ticulate the basis of judicial competence to determine the constitutional limits
on government action against individuals; and, finally, to examine the relative
ability of the judicial, executive, and legislative branches to reconcile the ordi-
nary constitutional rights of the individual with an acceptable level of per-
formance by the armed forces. In doing so, this Article presupposes that a
theory of servicemen's constitutional rights should satisfy two conditions. The
first is that it must leave the civilian political system of the country completely
free to determine when and why the United States will use or threaten to use
force in international relations. The Constitution, in this view, places no sub-
stantive limits on the United States' power to make war; it merely allocates the
decision between the President and Congress. 24 Any such decision made ac-
cording to constitutional procedures is, as a matter of domestic law, lawful.
25
The only check on, and the ultimate source of legitimacy for, these decisions,
is the responsibility of the President and the two Houses to the electorate.
Within that limit, the Constitution permits the United States to act with the
unfettered egotism of any national state, and the relation of the serviceman to
the armed forces must reflect that freedom.
Two subordinate consequences follow. First, a satisfactory doctrine must
permit continued political debate in the country at large over the desirability
of beginning or continuing any use of force. Second, it must preserve the
supremacy of the civilian political process over the armed forces by preventing
military authorities from obstructing decisions, not yet reversed, with which
they disagree. A constitutional doctrine is not acceptable if it freezes public
debate in the name of national unity or if it protects the collective efforts of
servicemen to impose their own view of the propriety of any war on the civil-
ian authorities.
26
The second condition is that the rationale for denying civilian constitu-
tional rights to servicemen must be clearly limited to persons in the armed
forces. This Article takes the position that effective performance of military
functions requires the individual to be subordinated to his organization in a
way that is inconsistent with ordinary civilian liberties.27 The military rela-
tionship is clearly distinguishable from the normal relation of the citizen to the
state. Nevertheless, the relation of civilians who are pervasively regulated,
subject to paternalistic authority, or part of strongly goal-directed organiza-
tions-students, policemen, and government employees, for example-to their
superiors superficially resembles the serviceman's relation to the armed forces.
Their superiors may want to reduce them to the same level of subordination.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 207-22.
25. See infra note 203.
26. This position is, of course, inconsistent with the assumptions underlying either a claimed
constitutional right of conscientious objection or with a so-called "Nuremburg" defense based on
norms of international law to which the political authorities have decided not to adhere. The first
has never been recognized by the Supreme Court. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,
461-62 (1971). With respect to the second, see infra note 202.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 138-96.
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Unless constitutional doctrine clearly defines and strongly emphasizes the uni-
queness of the military situation, it is possible that a false analogy with the
armed forces will be used to limit the rights of others against organizations
that do not share these qualities.
28
In sum, the Article proceeds from the assumption that the United States
exists in an environment in which the use of force among states is limited only
by each state's calculation of its own advantage. The Article therefore accepts
the complete legal freedom of the elected authorities to act toward other states
as this environment appears to require, using the members of the armed forces
as their instruments. At the same time, it attempts to segregate the fundamen-
tally lawless international sphere from a domestic society that places legal re-
straints on government authority in order to preserve the primary values of
individual dignity.
I. THE SEPARATE COMMUNITY; PRECURSORS, THESIS, AND ANTITHESIS
A. Precursors
The Supreme Court had no precedent dealing with servicemen's constitu-
tional rights on which to draw when it decided Parker v. Levy 29 in 1974. A
number of earlier Supreme Court opinions contained general statements to the
effect that the armed forces were necessarily authoritarian organizations,
whose proper functioning entailed some loss of the ordinary rights of the indi-
vidual, and which had wide, nonreviewable discretion to develop their internal
law and procedure under the general supervision of the political branches of
the government. While these earlier cases have been cited by the majority
since 1974 as authority for this restrictive view of individual rights, 30 only one
of the earlier cases directly addressed the substance of constitutional claims by
individual servicemen.
The early decisions fall into four substantive groups. The first, typified by
U.S. ex rel Toth v. Quarles,31 involves the constitutional limits on Congress'
authority to subject civilians, or military personnel who commit crimes not
related to the military community, to court-martial jurisdiction. In Toth the
Court reasoned that courts-martial provided fewer procedural protections to
an accused than civilian courts, that this was justified only by military neces-
sity, and that the power to subject an accused to the inferior procedure should
therefore be limited to cases directly related to military discipline. The consti-
tutional adequacy of court-martial procedure for persons within the narrowed
28. Compare United States Postal Ser. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)
with Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836-37 (1976). See also Zillman & Jmwinkelried, The Legacy
of Greer v. Spock." The Public Forum Doctrine and the Princple of Military Poliical Neutrality, 65
GEO. LJ. 773 (1977).
29. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
30. See, eg., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 349 (1980); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25,
46 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 827, 937-38 (1976); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510
(1975); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-45 (1974).
31. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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jurisdiction was not at issue.32 Similar reasoning was applied to the civilian
spouses of military personnel,33 civilian employees, 34 and the off post, off duty
civilian-type crimes of servicemen within the United States.35 While these
cases narrowly restrict the personal and functional borders of the military
community, they do not determine the rights of individuals within its limits.
A second group of cases involves the review of nonconstitutional errors of
courts-martial. From the 1857 decision of Dynes v. Hoover36 it was settled that
nonconstitutional errors are reviewable in the federal civilian courts only to
the extent that they affect jurisdiction over the person or offense. To the extent
that review involved the construction of the military criminal statutes, the civil
courts were held not competent to review the armed forces' common law inter-
pretations based on military needs and experience. 37 Similarly, the Court con-
ceded to the services as early as 1827 the unreviewable power to develop their
own common law of procedure in cases not provided for by Congress.38 These
cases did not involve substantive or procedural constitutional rights.
A third group involved the review by habeas corpus of constitutional
claims of court-martial defendants. In Burns v. Wilson 39 a plurality of the
Court ruled that, although constitutional claims could be heard by civilian
courts, they were bound by the factual findings of the military courts if based
on a fair hearing of the defendant's assertions. Petitioners' claims that their
confessions had been coerced were rejected, not because the fifth amendent
did not apply to the military, but because the court-martial's findings of fact
were that the confessions were voluntary. The decision is not inconsistent with
the limited scope of review of state court fact findings in federal habeas corpus
proceedings that prevailed at the time.40
Finally, in Orloff v. Willoughby Justice Jackson uttered the oft-quoted
statement:
[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army. The responsi-
bility for setting up the channels through which such grievances can
be considered and fairly settled rests with the President of the United
32. Id. at 14-18.
33. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
34. See, e.g., Gresham v. Hagen, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. United States ex rel Guag-
liardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
35. See, e.g., Relford v. Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U.S. 355
(1971); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
36. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
37. See Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897); United States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84
(1893); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886).
38. See Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
39. 346 U.S. 137 (1953). Chief Justice Vinson wrote the plurality opinion, joined by three
other justices. Justice Jackson concurred in the result without opinion. Id. at 146. Justice Minton
concurred in the result on the theory that the constitutional claim could not be heard in the civil-
ian courts. Id. at 146-48. Justice Frankfurter, in a separate opinion, stated that the case should be
reargued. Justices Douglas and Black dissented. Id. at 148-55.
40. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458, 463-65 (1953); id. at 506-07 (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring). See generally, Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Pris-
oners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441, 493-98, 501-03 (1963); Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Review o/State
Convictions, 68 YALE L.J. 98 (1958).
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States and his subordinates. The military constitutes a specialized
community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civil-
ian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous
not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be
scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.
41
The case involved a drafted doctor, overage for the regular draft, who had
been denied a commission because he claimed a constitutional privilege not to
disclose whether he had belonged to any group on the Attorney General's list
of subversive organizations. After holding that he had no statutory right to
either a commission or a discharge, the Court concluded that the Army's de-
termination of his rank and duties could not be judicially reviewed for abuse
of discretion.42 It rejected Orloffs first amendment argument that he could
not be denied a commission in retaliation for refusing to disclose his political
associations.43 Neither the majority nor Justice Black's dissent discussed the
point at length or cited any authority.
B. The Majority Position
With the exception of Orloff, then, the earlier decisions of the Supreme
Court had asserted the essentially separate nature of the military community
without having to determine the constitutional rights of individuals plainly
within it. Orloff, although an exception, rejected a constitutional claim that
probably would have failed also if raised by a civilian government employee
at that date.44 Despite the dicta the Court had uttered, there was little or no
precedent in either direction for the question raised in Parker v. Levy 45 in
1974.
Levy, a doctor, was drafted and commissioned a captain in the Army
Medical Corps in 1966. When assigned to train Special Forces medical
corpsmen, he refused, saying that he considered Special Forces personnel to be
"liars and thieves and killers of peasants and murderers of women and chil-
dren."46 When Levy's superior directly ordered him to train Special Forces
personnel, he refused to obey the order. During this time, Levy made several
statements to enlisted men to the effect that he would refuse orders to go to
Vietnam, that black soldiers should disobey such orders, and that he had dis-
obeyed orders to train Special Forces members.47 For his statements to en-
listed men, Levy was convicted by court-martial of "conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman" in violation of article 133 of the Uniform Code of
41. 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953).
42. Id. at 88-90.
43. Id. at 89-92.
44. See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341
U.S. 716 (1951); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 (1951); Bailey v. Rich-
ardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Washington v. Clark, 84 F. Supp. 964 (D.D.C. 1949), a ffd
sub nom. Washington v. McGrath, 182 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
45. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
46. Id. at 736-37.
47. Id. at 736-37, 738 n.5.
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Military Justice (U.C.M.J.)4 8 and "conduct prejudicial to good order and dis-
cipline in the Armed Forces" in violation of article 134 of the U.C.M.J.49 The
Third Circuit overturned Levy's convictions under articles 133 and 134 on the
ground that the excessively vague language and overbroad sweep of the "Gen-
eral Articles," as they are known, violated the fifth and first amendents. 50 The
Supreme Court reversed.
To uphold Levy's conviction, the court first had to determine that articles
133 and 134 were neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. Once the
Court decided that the General Articles were not defective in form, it then had
to determine whether the substance of Levy's remarks were protected by the
first amendment. The majority of the Court ruled against Levy on all three
points, expressly applying different constitutional standards than it would
have used to review a civilian conviction.
In the same Term as Levy, the Court's opinion in Smith v. Gougen51 had
restated the principles underlying the void for vagueness doctrine. Generally
speaking, the opinion stated that an unduly vague statute denies due process
of law in two ways: it leaves the individual without reasonably clear notice of
the line between permitted and forbidden conduct, and it leaves the authorities
with discretion to enforce it for arbitrary or invidious reasons. 52 These vices
are especially harmful when the statute can be applied to expression possibly
protected by the first amendment, for the unclear legal standard both deters
protected expression and permits selective enforcement based on content.
Therefore, the Smith court concluded, more precise language is required when
the statute relates to expression than when it merely regulates non-expressive
conduct. 5
3
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Levy, rejected this standard.
The opinion did not discuss the problem of selective enforcement and did not
denounce deterrence of expression. Instead, it stated that the peculiar charac-
teristics of military society require that its criminal law have only the degree of
precision of statutes regulating civilian economic affairs, which is to say that a
defendant be reasonably able to know that the conduct in question was pro-
hibited. In light of the well understood distinctive mores of military society,
48. Id. at 737-38 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1982), which provides: "Any commissioned of-
ficer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.").
49. Id. at 137-38. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1982), quoted therein, provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces... of which persons subject
to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or sum-
mary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be pun-
ished at the discretion of that court.
50. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973). Levy was also convicted of refusal to obey a
direct order, in violation of article 90(2) of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 890(2) (1976). This convic-
tion was upheld by both the court of appeals, Levy, 478 F.2d at 797, and the Supreme Court, Levy,
417 U.S. at 761.
51. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
52. Id. at 572-76, 578.
53. Id. at 573.
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the majority opinion concluded that the General Articles provided a reason-
ably clear standard of conduct to an officer in Levy's position and were not
unconstitutionally vague.
54
Overbreadth, like vagueness, is a defect of statutory form. Briefly, a stat-
ute is overbroad on its face when its language prohibits both behavior that is
not protected by the first amendment and behavior that is. Any individual
prosecuted under an overbroad statute may invoke the doctrine as a defense,
even though his behavior is not protected by the first amendment, thereby
raising the rights of other, possibly hypothetical, persons, in his defense. This
departure from the normal principle that a party may assert only his own con-
stitutional rights has been justified by the value to society of free expession and
the concomitant need to obtain prompt judicial review of statutes that may
have successfully deterred other potential defendants from engaging in it.55
The majority opinion in Levy stated that the General Articles govern a
"wide range" of activity that is clearly not protected by the first amendment
and affect only a "fringe" of arguably protected expression. In the light of that
disparity, the Court concluded that the distinctive nature of military society
precludes the use of the overbreadth doctrine.56 In other words, the majority
did not consider free expression in the military community sufficiently impor-
tant to allow a soldier prosecuted under the General Articles to raise the first
amendment rights of others in his defense. Any incidental chilling effect of the
General Articles on protected expression is apparently tolerable in the light of
their other applications.
There remained only the question whether Levy's remarks were them-
selves protected by the first amendment. Without discussion, the majority
opinion stated that "a commissioned officer publicly urging enlisted personnel
to disobey orders which might send them into combat" is "unprotected under
the most expansive notions of the First Amendment."57 The opinion did not
directly consider whether Levy's remarks created any particular degree of dan-
ger to military discipline. Instead, it cited with approval the Court of Military
Appeals' doctrine that speech which would be protected in the civilian com-
munity is not protected in the military if it "may undermine the effectiveness
of response to command."
58
The majority opinion is based on two descriptive propositions about the
54. Levy, 417 U.S. at 756-57.
55. See generally Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972) (setting aside conviction
under state statute prohibiting "fighting words"); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87
(1965) (enjoining prosecutions under state subversive activities and communist control laws); Im-
winkehied & Zillman,An Evolution in the First Amendment. Overbreadth Analysis and Free Speech
Within the Military Community, 54 TEx. L. REv. 42, 50-57 (1975).
56. Levy, 417 U.S. at 758-61.
57. Id. at 761.
58. Id. at 760-61 (emphasis added). See United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 570 (1971)
("Speech that is protected in the civil population may nonetheless undermine the effectiveness of
response to command," and, consequently, is not protected.). In the civilian context, of course,
Levy's statements could not be penalized unless they created danger of imminent disorder. See
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969);
Imwinkelried & Zillman, supra note 55, at 78-81.
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nature of the military as separate society. The first is that, as a matter of his-
tory and practice, there is a fairly clear body of social norms peculiar to the
military and known to all reasonable personnel. These known principles, the
majority believed, define the prohibitions of the General Articles with suffi-
cient precision that Levy could not have reasonably doubted that his state-
ments violated them.5
9
The second proposition is that a military organization is a hierarchy
based on response to command, that the successful performance of its mission
depends on effective response to command, and that this requires more perva-
sive regulation of the individual than is found in civilian society.60 The indi-
vidual's relation to the military organization is comprehensive since it is his
"employer, landlord, provisioner, and lawgiver in one." 61 The majority noted
that Congress, through the U.C.M.J. and its predecessors, has established
crimes with respect to obedience and job performance that have no civilian
counterpart.62 In addition, the enforcement procedures of the U.C.M.J. in-
clude nonjudicial administrative sanctions that permit paternalistic supervi-
sion of the details of the serviceman's behavior with no parallel in civilian
life.63
In Levy the Court defined the separateness of the military community in
terms of cultural norms and individual subordination to institutional goals.
The next Term, in Schlesinger v. Councilman,64 the Court treated the armed
forces' courts as separate legal entities whose relations with the federal courts
were analogous, if not equivalent, to the relation between state and federal
courts.
Councilman arose from a court-martial of an Army captain for selling
marijuana to an enlisted man off post and off duty. Before trial, defendant
moved to dismiss the charge for lack of jurisdiction because the offense was
not "service connected" as required by O'Callahan v. Parker65 and Relford v.
Commandant. 66 The motion was denied by the military judge. Rather than
submit to trial, defendant sued in the federal district court for an injunction
against any further military proceedings. The injunction was granted on the
ground that the offense was not service connected, that the court-martial there-
fore lacked jurisdiction, and that trial by the court-martial would inflict irrepa-
rable injury on defendant. The court of appeals affirmed,67 but the Supreme
Court reversed.68 The majority opinion, written by Justice Powell, held that
59. Le'y, 417 U.S. at 745-49, 757.
60. Id. at 743-45, 749-51.
61. Id. at 751.
62. Id. at 749-51.
63. Id. at 749-50. See U.C.M.J. art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1982); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MAR-
TIAL §§ 128, 129b (1969) [hereinafter cited as MCM 1969]. See also Note, The Unconstitutional
Burden of Article 15, 82 YALE L.J. 1481, 1481-82 (1973).
64. 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
65. 395 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1969).
66. 401 U.S. 355, 369 (1971).
67. Councilman v. Laird, 481 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1973).
68. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 739-40.
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the district court lacked "equitable jurisdiction" to enjoin the court martial on
the basis of defendant's jurisdictional defense. Because defendant could raise
his jurisdictional defense in the military courts and on postconviction habeas
corpus, 69 the opinion concluded, the same principles that preclude federal in-
junctions of state criminal prosecutions prohibited an injunction against the
court martial.
70
The Court had recently reiterated these principles in Younger v. Harris.71
Younger had held that a federal district court lacked authority to enjoin a
pending state criminal prosecution on the basis of the defendant's claim that
conviction would violate his first amendment rights.72 In the Councilman ma-
jority's view, this decision rested on the premise that defendant could assert his
constitutional claims as part of his defense in state court, where they would
receive a meaningful hearing.73 Considerations of comity between the federal
and state authorities in the federal system required the federal courts to con-
clusively presume, in advance of trial, that their state judicial counterparts
would correctly find the facts and sympathetically and faithfully interpret and
apply the Constitution. The need for "respect for coordinate judicial systems"
justified the continued use of the traditional restrictions on equitable interfer-
ence in criminal proceedings. 74 In addition, the opinion continued, the re-
sources of the federal courts are more efficiently used if defendants must
exhaust state remedies before raising their federal claims in federal courts.
Only state courts can correct errors of state law. They also bear the primary
burden of fact finding. It is alway possible that the defendant will prevail at
some point in the state system, and if the federal courts ever have to decide the
case at all, they will have a fully developed state court record at their
disposal.
75
Unlike the state courts, courts-martial are not agents of a separate sover-
eign, but creations of Congress. Nevertheless, the majority concluded, consid-
erations of both efficiency and respect applied equally to federal court
injunctions against prosecutions in courts-martial. Whether an offense is serv-
69. Id. at 754. If defendant did not prevail at trial, the jurisdictional issue would be reviewed
by the convening authority for the court-martial, a military officer, before he approved its result.
See 10 U.S.C. §§ 860-861 (1976); MCM 1969, supra note 63, at §§ 484-85. Defendant then had an
appeal of right to the Army Court of Military Review and the U.S. Court of Military Appeals,
both established under article I of the Constitution. The Court of Military Appeals is composed of
civilian judges. 10 U.S.C. §§ 866-867 (1976). After exhausting his military appeals, defendant
then could raise the jurisdictional defense in the district court by application for habeas corpus.
See, e.g., Re/ford, 401 U.S. at 366; Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 130-32 (1950).
70. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 753-61. In the majority's view, defendant's only injury was the
cost of defending the court-martial proceeding and the risk that the military courts would not
accept his jurisdictional defense. id. at 755-56. Under traditional equity principles, these were
not sufficiently irreparable injuries to justify enjoining the criminal proceeding. SeeYounger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-47 (1971); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1943); Beal
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 47-50 (1941). See generally Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J.
1101 (1971).
71. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
72. Id. at 45-54.
73. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 755-56.
74. Id. at 756-57.
75. See id at 756.
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ice connected turns on the facts of the particular case and the relation of the
conduct to military functions, issues on which the informed judgment of the
courts-martial and specialized civilian courts of review are particularly useful
to the federal courts. 76 But comity, not efficiency, is the most important con-
sideration to the majority. The system of courts established by the Uniform
Code of Military Justice is a system of separate and equal dignity. The mili-
tary is, as stated in Levy, a "specialized society" requiring a distinctive disci-
pline to achieve its essential purpose-victory in war.77 The court system
established under the U.C.M.J. is Congress' attempt to balance the rights of
servicemen against military necessities. Congress' judgment must be respected,
and it must be assumed that the U.C.M.J. system will protect servicemen's
rights. Therefore, the nonintervention principles of Younger apply.78 Con-
gress' power to regulate the armed forces, in short, is presented as analogous to
the rights of the states in the federal system.
The next year, in Greer v. Spock, 79 the Court considered whether the sep-
arate constitutional status of the military community justified the exclusion of
civilian activity normally protected by the first amendment from areas of an
army post otherwise open to the public. It held, reversing the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals,80 that a post commander could, on a neutral basis, prohibit
76. Id at 759-60. Under Relford v. Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks, 401
U.S. 355, 365 (1971), a court must balance the following 12 factors in determining whether an
offense is sufficiently "service connected" to give a court-martial jurisdiction:
1. The defendant's proper absence from the base;
2. Whether the crime was committed on or off base;
3. Whether the crime was committed at a place under military control;
4. Whether it was committed in the United States or abroad;
5. Whether it was committed in war or peace time;
6. Whether it was connected with the defendant's military duties;
7. Whether the victim was performing a duty related to the military;
8. Whether a civilian court is available for prosecution;
9. Whether military authority has been flouted;
10. Whether a threat to a military post is involved;
11. Whether a threat to military property is involved; and
12. Whether the crime is traditionally subject to civilian prosecution.
Re/ford requires the court to consider in detail the facts of the alleged crime and its effect on
military discipline and efficiency. See United States v. Conn, 6 M.J. 351, 353 (C.M.A. 1979);
United States v. Hedlund, 2 M.J. 11, 13-14 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v. Moore, 1 M.J. 448,
449-50 (C.M.A. 1976). This is especially true in cases like Councilman that involve the off-post use
of drugs with other servicemen. Compare United States v. Graham, 9 M.J. 554, 558-60 (N.C.M.R.
1980) (military jurisdiction found over officer charged with smoking marijuana off-base with jun-
ior enlisted men) and United States v. Mackey, 7 M.J. 649, 651-53 (A.C.M.R. 1979) (military has
"paramount interest" in prosecuting servicemen who used on base contacts to sell marijuana off
base) with United States v. Saulter, 5 M.J. 281, 284 (C.M.A. 1978) (military jurisdiction not found
over sergeant who sold marijuana while off base and out of uniform).
77. Levy, U.S. at 743.
78. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 757-58. The majority opinion also distinguished the case from
several in which habeas corpus had been granted without exhaustion of military remedies. These
cases involved civilians in peacetime, who could not be subject to military law under any circum-
stances. See, e.g., McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284 (1960); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 (1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 (1955).
79. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
80. See Spock v. David, 502 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1974) (permanent injunction); Spock v. David,
469 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1972) (preliminary injunction).
1984]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
all speeches by political candidates in publicly accessible areas of the base.81
It also held that the commander could prohibit in those areas the distribution
of any publication not submitted to him for review or which he determined on
review to present "a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale" of
troops on the base.
82
The case arose from post regulations of Fort Dix, New Jersey, an "open
post."'8 3 Although the commanding general permitted certain nonpolitical
first amendment activities on the base, partisan political speeches were abso-
lutely prohibited by Fort Dix Regulation 210-26.84 Post regulation 210-27
prohibited the distribution of any publication on the base unless first approved
by the post adjutant general. Permission could be withheld if the publication
presented a "clear danger" to military loyalty, discipline, or morale.85
Four plaintiffs, minor party candidates for President and Vice-President
in 1972, requested the commanding general's consent to hold a political rally
on the base, subject to any reasonable restrictions on time and place. The
request was denied as contrary to Fort Dix Regulation 210-26 and as inconsis-
tent with Army regulations and the military mission of the post. The remain-
ing plaintiffs had been excluded from the post on several occasions for
distributing literature without having obtained the post commander's ap-
proval. Each was told that returning to Fort Dix could result in criminal pros-
ecution.86 The courts below had enjoined enforcement of the two regulations
on the ground that the nonrestricted areas of the post were public forums
under the Supreme Court's decision in Flower v. United States.
87
Justice Stewart, for the majority in Greer, distinguished Flower as being
based on the understanding that the earlier case involved "a public thorough-
fare in San Antonio no different from all other public thoroughfares in that
city," in which the military had abandoned not only the right to exclude civil-
ian traffic, but also the right to exclude leafleteers.88 Justice Stewart continued,
however, that not all public property is a "public thoroughfare" for first
81. Greer, 424 U.S. at 834-38.
82. Id. at 840.
83. Though Fort Dix is within the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the United States mili-
tary, civilian vehicular and foot traffic moves freely through it on public highways and foot paths.
The gates of the post are not guarded, and civilians may visit any area not marked as restricted.
Id. at 830.
84. Id. at 831.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 832-33. Entering a military base with intent to violate a regulation or after having
been expelled is a felony. 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976).
87. Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1053 (3d Cir. 1972) (citing Flower v. United States, 407
U.S. 197 (1972)). Fower had reversed, without argument, a criminal conviction for distributing
unauthorized leaflets on New Braunfels Avenue, Fort Sam Houston, Texas. This street, although
it ran through the base, was a major traffic artery connecting parts of San Antonio. The civilian
public used it in the same manner as any other downtown street. In those circumstances, stated
the opinion, the Army had "abandoned" any special claim to control access to the area, and
defendant, therefore, had the same first amendment right to distribute leaflets there as he would
on any other "public street." Flower, 407 U.S. at 197-98. See Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note
28, at 779.
88. Greer, 424 U.S. at 835.
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amendment purposes. While the Court has historically protected political ex-
pression as an appropriate use of such areas, it has also upheld the govern-
ment's right to prevent outsiders from engaging in political expression on
other government property where their activities would interfere with the gov-
ernment's use of the property. Civilian political speech is so inconsistent with
the use of a military base that, in the absence of express or implied waiver of
the right, the United States may exclude it.
8 9
The opinion does not discuss the inconsistency of political speech and
military activity in any detail. It simply states that the military has a "special
constitutional function" and that the purpose of the base is "to train soldiers,
not to provide a public forum." 90 Why these purposes are necessarily irrecon-
cilable is not explained. The majority opinion also states that regulation 210-
26 has been impartially applied to exclude all political speakers from the base,
which practice it considers consistent with "the American constitutional tradi-
tion of a politically neutral military establishment under civilian control." 91
Moreover, it continues, the military authorities did not waive their right to
exclude political activity from the base by consenting to through traffic and
nonpolitical first amendment activity.92 Finally, the opinion states, without
citing any authority, that regulation 210-27 is constitutional on its face because
"nothing in the Constitution. . .disables a military commander from acting
to avert what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or
morale of the troops under his command." 93 Since none of the leafletting
plaintiffs had submitted their material for approval under the regulation, they
could not complain that it was unconstitutionally applied.
The majority opinion in Greer is remarkable for its silence on three points
raised by the dissent. Despite plaintiffs offer to submit to reasonable time and
place restrictions, the majority did not find it necessary to consider the possible
effects that a political rally held in any particular part of the base during non-
duty hours would have on particular military functions.94 In upholding regu-
lation 210-27, the majority ignored the fact that a system of licensing
publications based on content and enforced by administrative and criminal
penalties for not submitting the material for review is the paradigm of uncon-
stitutional prior restraint on expression.95 Nor did the majority explain why
the commander may exclude publications on grounds even more tenuous than
the obsolete "clear and present danger" test.
96
In the same Term, Middendorf v. Henry97 applied the separate commu-
89. Id. at 836-37. See Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559
(1965). See generally Ziliman & Imwinkelried, supra note 28, at 775-82.
90. Greer, 424 U.S. at 837-38.
91. Id. at 838-39.
92. Id. at 838 n.10.
93. Id. at 840,
94. Id. at 857-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 865-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 863-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. 425 U.S. 25 (1976).
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nity doctrine to the question whether the fifth or sixth amendments required
counsel to be provided for servicemen tried at summary courts-martial. The
case was a class action by enlisted Marines, seeking habeas corpus review of
their individual convictions and an injunction against future imprisonment af-
ter conviction by summary court-martial without benefit of counsel.98 In
Argersinger v. Hamlin99 the Court had held that the sixth amendment requires
the appointment of counsel in all civilian criminal proceedings in which any
sentence of imprisonment could be imposed. The plaintiffs contended that
this rule applied equally to courts-martial.
Writing for the majority in Henry, Justice Rehnquist first stated that the
Court had never resolved whether the sixth amendment's right to counsel ap-
plied to courts-martial. It would not do so in this case, he continued, because
a summary court-martial was not in any event a "criminal proceeding" within
the meaning of the sixth amendment. This conclusion rests on the premise
that, even in the context of civilian proceedings, the Court had not applied the
sixth amendment to imprisonment through probation revocation or juvenile
court conviction. The summary court-martial was analogized to these civilian
proceedings rather than the misdemeanor prosection ofArgersinger.'t °
The majority opinion concedes that the critical analogy is with the juve-
nile court prosecution. Probation is revoked only after being imposed by con-
viction in a criminal proceeding that conformed to the sixth amendment,
whereas juvenile proceedings, like the summary court-martial, are original de-
terminations of guilt.101 The opinion states that when In re Gault t02 required
appointment of counsel in prosecutions in juvenile court, the Court "based its
conclusion . . . on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
rather than on any determination that the hearing was a 'criminal prosecution'
within the meaning of the sixth amendment."' 0 3 Therefore, the majority opin-
98. Id. at 28-30. A summary court-martial consists of one officer who acts as judge, prosecu-
tor, and defense counsel, and who examines all witnesses. It may try any offense under the
U.C.M.J. but may impose sentences of no more than one month's confinement at hard labor. The
defendant may cross-examine prosecution witnesses or have this done by the summary court of-
ficer, and he may call any witnesses of his own. Retained defense counsel is permitted, but in the
Navy and Marine Corps, no defense counsel is appointed. See Henry, 425 at 31-33; id. at 65 n. 17
(Marshall, J., dissenting); 10 U.S.C. §§ 820, 827(a) (1982); MCM 1969, supra note 63, at §§ 6c, 48a.
A serviceman must consent to trial by summary court-martial, or he will be tried before a special
court-martial, in which defense counsel is appointed. See 10 U.S.C § 820 (1982); MCM 1969,
supra note 63, at § 169. A special court-martial, however, may impose substantially more severe
sentences for the same offense. 10 U.S.C § 819 (1982); MCM 1969, Supra note 63, at §§ 15b, 16b.
99. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
100. Henry, 425 U.S. at 33-37. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783-91; In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 34-42 (1967).
101. Henry, 425 U.S. at 37.
102. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
103. Henry, 425 U.S. at 37. The majority's conclusion misstates the basis for the decision in
Gault. Since Gault involved a state proceeding, the right to counsel must have been derived im-
mediately from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41
(1967). However, the Gault opinion specifically states that a juvenile proceeding that can result in
imprisonment for delinquency is "comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution," and it con-
cludes that the juvenile's need for counsel is identical to the felony defendant's need identified in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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ion continues, not every civilian proceeding that results in a guilt-based loss of
liberty is a criminal proceeding under the sixth amendment.
The opinion then states that the summary court-martial's occurrence in
the military community is as significant as the special nature of juvenile pro-
ceedings in determining that it is not criminal prosection. 1°4 The noncriminal
nature of the summary court-martial lies in three facts. First, citing Levy, the
relationship of the serviceman to military authority is unlike the civilian's situ-
ation.105 Second, a summary court-martial conviction of a minor offense
against military discipline with no civilian counterpart, such as absence with-
out leave, lacks the stigmatic effect of a civilian conviction, and most summary
courts-martial involve such offenses.1°6 Finally, a summary court-martial, un-
like a criminal trial, is not an adversary proceeding, since the summary court
officer is obliged to act as prosecutor, defense counsel, and fact finder. 107 The
combination of these elements plus the unspecified details of the "distinctive
nature of military life and discipline" satisfied the majority that the summary
court-martial is not a criminal proceeding.' 0 8
The second part of Henry rejects the contention that the due process
clause of the fifth amendment requires appointment of counsel in summary
courts-martial either in general or in particular cases. The majority uses a
conventional balancing analysis, weighing the relatively light punishment
against what it considers the military interest in avoiding the delay, complex-
ity, and expense caused by the participation of counsel. This additional time
and expense is seen as a diversion of resources from the Marine Corps' main
mission.' °9 The opinion is significant for the way in which the military neces-
sity is inferred. It does not consider whether nonjudicial punishment under
the U.C.M.J. provides an alternative form of swift, convenient disciplinary
action without the stigmatic effects of a summary court-martial,' 10 and it does
104. Henry, 425 U.S. at 34-40.
105. Id. at 3 (citing Levy, 417 U.S. at 749).
106. Id at 39-40.
107. Id. at 40-42.
108. Id. at 42. This argument is defective on several points. That summary courts-martial
have different procedures from criminal trials begs the question whether this is permissible. The
asserted lack of stigma is a misstatement of fact. As the dissent points put, a substantial minority
of summary courts-martial, including one involved in Henry, are for "civilian" crimes such as
theft and assault. Id. at 58 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In addition, the armed forces do not distin-
guish between a summary court-martial conviction and other courts-martial in counting prior
convictions for sentencing in a subsequent case for awarding punitive discharge. Id. at 58-59. See
MCM 1969, supra note 63, at §§ 76, 88b. In this it differs from military nonjudicial punishment,
which is also mposed without counsel. Henry, 425 U.S. at 58; MCM 1969, supra note 63, at
§ 133c. Finally, the majority is completely silent about the characteristics of "military life and
discipline" which tip the balance in favor of its conclusion that no summary court-martial is a
criminal proceeding.
109. Henry, 425 U.S. at 42-48.
110. See id. at 63-65. Under article 15 of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 815(b)(2) (1982), an en-
listed serviceman's commanding officer may, in a non-adversary proceeding, punish him for viola-
tion of the U.C.M.J. with custody of 7 days or less, forfeiture of 7 days pay, reduction in rank, 14
days extra duties, 14 days restriction to limits, and/or detention of 14 days pay. If the command-
ing officer is a major or lieutenant commander or above, he may impose 30 days custody, forfei-
ture of one-half month's pay for 2 months, 45 days extra duty, and 60 days restriction. The
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not discuss in detail the burdens of providing appointed counsel. 11' Instead, it
states that the constitutional power of Congress over the armed forces requires
the Court to give "particular deference" to the legislative balancing of individ-
ual rights and military necessity. Since Congress has twice refused to abolish
the summary court-martial in its present form, only "extra-ordinarily weighty"
factors, which are not present, could overcome its decision that counsel need
not be provided."1
2
In its most recent decision in the area, Brown v. Glines,"13 the Court rou-
tinely disposed of a claim that an Air Force regulation prohibiting any person
from soliciting signatures for a petition on a base and any serviceman from
soliciting signatures in uniform without prior approval violates the first
amendment on its face. Justice Powell, for the majority, amplified the portion
of Greer that upheld prior restraint on distributing publications. 1 4 Because
the unit commander is responsible for the morale, discipline, and loyalty of his
unit, he has the authority to control distribution of materials that endanger
them. This authority derives from the nature of military subordination and
not from the special exigencies of combat or overseas service. The military has
substantial discretion to make regulations that assure an "unquestioned" right
to command and duty to obey. Both the prior approval regulations of Greer
and the antipetitioning regulations in Greer served this purpose, and both were
facially valid under the first amendment." 5 The opinion was novel in only
two respects. While the Court had previously spoken of the need for "effec-
tive" response to command,1 16 the use of "unquestioned" obedience was a
new departure.1 17 Unlike Greer, the opinion omitted any discussion of the
mitigating effect of servicemen's access to first amendment activity in the civil-
ian community. Otherwise, it merely summarized and restated the doctrine of
the earlier cases. The same is true of the unanimous opinion in Chappell v.
Wallace, which refused to recognize an implied constitutional cause of action
for damages by servicemen against their commanding officer for intentional
constitutional torts." i8
Levy and its progeny involve the constitutional power of the military to
prevent or control individual activity inconsistent with its functions and the
conflicting constitutional right of the individual to be free of organizational
serviceman may refuse to accept nonjudicial punishment and elect to be tried by court-martial. 10
U.S.C. § 815(a) (1982). See generally MCM 1969, supra note 63, at §§ 128-29, 133.
111. See Henry, 425 U.S. at 65-67 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 44.
113. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
114. Greer, 424 U.S. 828, 832-40.
115. Glines, 444 U.S. at 353-58.
116. See, e.g., Parker, 417 U.S. at 760-61.
117. Cf. Glines, 444 U.S. at 357.
118. 103 S. Ct. 2364, 2365 (1983). But f. Davis v. Passman, 444 U.S. 228 (1977) (private cause
of action for damages under fifth amendment for intentional sexual discrimination); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (private cause of action against federal narcotics
agents for intentional violation of fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure). The Chappel opinion curtly noted that the right to sue military superiors would be both
harmful to discipline and inconsistent with congressional authority. Chappel, 103 S. Ct. at 2366.
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constraints and penalties. Since 1974 the Supreme Court has also had two
occasions to consider the converse problem: the constitutional right of the in-
dividual member to professional rewards and opportunities and the conflicting
power of the organization to retain and promote in accord with its own con-
cept of its needs. In Schlesinger v. Ballard' 19 the Court rejected a contention
that the Navy promotion system, which guaranteed female junior officers a
longer period of service than their male couterparts, denied the male officers
equal protection of the laws. The opinion expressly held that the disparate
treatment was rationally related to the more restricted duties available to fe-
male officers, and it implicitly approved Congress' power to deny female of-
ficers certain duty assignments open to men.
120
The statutes then governing promotion of male line officers in the Navy
provided for a pyramidal distribution of rank in which officers competed for
promotion against their contemporaries.1 2' Those who were twice considered
and rejected for promotion had to leave the Navy. 122 A male lieutenant twice
passed over for lieutenant commander was dischared after nine to eleven years
of service.123 Female line officers were then subject to a separate statutory "up
or out" promotion system identical in all respects but one:' 24 a female lieuten-
ant twice passed over for lieutenant commander had the statutory right to re-
main in the Navy until she had served for thirteen years.125
The intended effect of an "up or out" promotion system was to create
promotion vacancies for the most able junior officers by removing those of
119. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
120. Id. at 508.
121. The number of positions in each officer grade is a percentage of the Navy's enlisted
strength. See Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 297 (repealed 1980); Act of Aug. 10, 1956,
ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 307 (amended 1968) (repealed 1980); 10 U.S.C. § 5442 (1982).
Male line officers were placed in a "promotion zone" after being in their existing rank for a
certain time, which was established by the Secretary of the Navy. See Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch.
1041, 70A Stat. 353 (amended 1967 and repealed 1980); Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat.
356 (repealed 1980). At least once a year, all officers in a promotion zone are considered by a
selection board, and those chosen by merit are placed on a promotion list from which promotions
are made as vacancies occur. See Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 336 (amended 1970)
(repealed 1980); Act of Aug. 10 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 347 (amended 1957, 1967) (repealed
1980); Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 356 (amended 1961, 1970) (repealed 1980). Be-
cause of the pyramidal distribution of rank, there are fewer places on the promotion list than there
are officers in the promotion zone. See Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 354 (amended
1961, 1967) (repealed 1980).
122. See Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 399-405 (repealed 1980). Officers at the
grade of lieutenant commander or above who were twice passed over were retired and received.
retirement pay for life. Id. at 404. Officers at the grade of lieutenant or below who were twice
passed over were honorably discharged and received a lump sum payment of up to two years
salary. Id. at 405.
123. See generally Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 356 (repealed 1980).
124. See Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 327 (repealed 1980); Act of Aug. 10, 1956,
ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 339 (repealed 1980); Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 413 (amended
1958) (repealed 1980); Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 414 (amended 1958) (repealed
1980); Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 415 (repealed 1980).
These provisions were replaced in 1980 with a gender-neutral promotion system for the entire
armed forces. See infra note 374.
125. Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 415 (repealed 1980). In addition, a female
lieutenant commander could serve for 20 years even if twice passed over. Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch.
1041, 70A Stat. 414 (amended 1958) (repealed 1980).
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their seniors who are not as capable as their own contemporaries. Were this
not done, the upper ranks would be clogged with older officers and energetic
subordinates would be encouraged to leave the Navy by the lack of hope for
advancement. The system had the additional effect of encouraging vigorous
performance by all officers, who knew that their retention depended on how
they compared to their peers.126 For female line officers, however, the full
rigor of the system was mitigated by the statutory assurance of thirteen years
service.
Lieutenant Ballard, having been twice passed over for promotion, sued to
enjoin his discharge on the ground that the longer tenure of a female lieuten-
ant in his situation denied him equal protection of the laws under the fifth
amendment. 127 The district court granted the injunction, 128 relying on Fron-
iero v. Richardson.129 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart,
reversed.
Frontiero had involved a statute that automatically gave a married male
officer extra pay and allowances to support his wife but withheld these benefits
from a female officer unless she proved that her husband actually depended on
her for support. 130 The Court held that the gender-based disparate treatment
denied female officers equal protection because it was established solely to
achieve administrative convenience and rested on overbroad, irrational gener-
alizations about sex roles. The decision applied the prevailing standard of
equal protection formulated for gender-based discrimination in the civilian
community.1
31
The majority opinion in Ballard used the same standard but found that
the difference in promotion systems was justified by "the demonstrable fact
that male and female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with
respect to opportunities for professional service in the Navy.' 1 32 Specifically,
female officers were at that time barred by statute from serving on combat
aircraft or aboard vessels other than hospital ships and transports. 133 Since
the operation of warships and combat aircraft are the central functions of the
Navy,134 female officers were effectively precluded from its most desirable
126. See Ballard, 419 U.S. at 502-03.
127. Id. at 500.
128. Ballard v. Laird, 360 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. Cal. 1973), rev'dsub nam. Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975).
129. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
130. See Act of Sept. 7, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-649, 76 Stat. 469 (current version codified at 37
U.S.C. § 401 (1976)).
131. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690-91.
132. Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508.
133. Id. at 508; see Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 375 (amended 1978 & 1980)
(current version codified at 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1982)).
In 1978 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that 10 U.S.C.
§ 6015 denied female Navy personnel equal protection of the laws. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp.
291 (D.D.C. 1978). The statute was amended, and the current version prohibits assignment of
women to vessels and aircraft engaged in combat missions and permits sea duty in vessels other
than transports or hospital ships only on a temporary basis. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
485, § 808, 92 Stat. 1623 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1982)).
134. "The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in general, naval combat and
[Vol. 62
SER VICEMEN S RIGHTS
professional positions, including the highest commands. Accordingly, the
Navy needed fewer senior female line officers, and it was rational for Congress
to provide female junior officers with longer tenure in recompense for their
more limited prospects. 135 Congress, in the majority's view, had considered
this problem and specifically foresaw that the statutory promotion system
would give female officers longer tenure. 136 The rationality of Congress' deci-
sion is highlighted, in this view, by the fact that male and female officers in the
technical specialist branches of the Navy, in which women's duties are not
circumscribed by law, were subject to gender-neutral "up or out" statutes.'
37
Justice Stewart's opinion is remarkable chiefly for what it does not do.
The separate statutory promotion and attrition systems for male and female
officers do not deny equal protection, it concludes, because they produce "a
flow of promotions commensurate with the Navy's current needs. '138 Those
disparate needs are formed by the statutory exclusion of women from sea duty
and combat aviation. It would be immaterial that the dual promotion system
meets the needs of the dual career pattern unless Congress could restrict mili-
tary duties by gender without denying equal protection. The majority opinion
does not discuss officers' duties, however. Its final paragraph merely cites the
often-quoted generalities of U.S. ex rel Toth v. Quarles139 and Orloff v. Wil-
loughby ' 40 on combat readiness and judicial deference, proclaiming that the
Court "cannot say" that Congress, exercising its "broad constitutional power"
to organize the armed forces, has denied either male or female officers equal
protection of the laws. 14'
service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Navy shall be organized, trained,
and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea . 10
U.S.C. § 5012(a) (1982).
135. Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508.
136. Id. at 508 n.12.
137. Id. at 509.
In 1975, officers in the Medical, Dental, Judge Advocate General's, Medical Service and
Nurse Corps were appointed without regard to gender. See Act of Aug. 10, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-
1028, §§ 5574 (amended 1958), 5578 (amended 1958), 5579 (amended 1966), 5580 (amended
1966), 70A Stat. 1, 321-323 (repealed 1980); Act of Dec. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-179, § 5(1), 81
Stat. 547 (repealed 1980). Male and female officers in these corps competed against each other for
promotion without regard to gender. Act of Aug. 10, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-1028, § 5702, 70A Stat.
337 (amended 1957 & 1967) (repealed 1980). Commissions in the Supply, Civil Engineer and
Chaplain Corps were statutorily restricted to males under the Act of Aug. 10, 1956, Pub. L. No.
84-1028, §§ 5575-5577, 70A Stat. 1, 322 (repealed 1980). Female officers in these three corps were
appointed under a separate provision, id., § 5590, at 327 (repealed 1980), considered for promo-
tion under a separate provision, id., § 5704, at 339 (amended 1967) (repealed 1980), and separated
for nonpromotion under a different provision as well, id. §§ 6398 (amended 1958, 1963, 1967 &
1980), 6399 (amended 1958 & 1963) (repealed 1967), 6400 (amended 1958, 1963 & 1980), 6401
(amended 1958, 1960 & 1962), 6402 (amended 1960), at 413-415 (repealed 1980).
138. Ballard, 419 U.S. at 510.
139. 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
140. 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953).
141. The dissent was equally unwilling to explore this issue. Justice Brennan's opinion argues
that the separate tenure provision for female line officers was not essential to military functions
and, in any event, had not been intended by Congress to compensate women for inferior promo-
tion opportunities arising from their exclusion from sea duty. Ballard, 419 U.S. at 511-21 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). He therefore found it unnecessary to explore the constitutionality of the
underlying restriction on women's opportunities, merely noting that the issue is "obviously impli-
cated" but not considered in the majority opinion. Id. at 512 n.l.
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Congressional power to determine military personnel needs was again up-
held against a claim of gender-based discrimination in the 1980 decision of
Rosiker v. Goldberg,142 which held that male-only draft registration did not
deny equal protection of the laws to registrants. Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion follows the Ballard analysis, finding that male-only registration bears
a rational relationship to the military need for combat troops which Congress
had concluded a future draft would fill. 143 The more detailed legislative his-
tory of the statute and developments since 1975 in the law of gender-based
discrimination, however, occasioned more extensive discussion of Congress'
calculations by both the majority and Justice Marshall's dissent.
Section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act empowers the President to
require, by proclamation, registration for the draft of "every male citizen."144
Draft registration had ceased in 1975. When President Carter revived it by
proclamation in 1980, it was necessary to obtain an appropriation to activate
the selective service machinery. At the same time, the Administration sought
statutory changes that would extend draft registration to women.' 45
There followed extensive congressional consideration of the problem,
during which military and civilian Defense Department witnesses testified in
favor of registering women. The military witnesses testified against actually
drafting women, but stated that the Army could absorb 80,000 female draftees
out of a hypothetical draft of 650,000.146 The Defense Department position
was that the purpose of a future draft would be to provide combat replace-
ments or noncombat replacements who could, if necessary, be transferred to
combat. 147 Women were barred by statute or regulation from combat service
in the armed forces.
148
The congressional response was to conclude that the Defense Depart-
ment's anticipated purpose of a future draft could be met without drafting
women, that registration was only a means to facilitate this anticipated draft,
that the armed forces anticipated need for female personnel could be met by
volunteers, and that there was therefore no military need to draft women.
149
Instead, the proposal to register women was inspired only by considerations of
"equity."' 150 The 80,000 potential female draftees were not essential, and the
legal and administrative difficulty of raising and assigning them made them
less useful than males. 151
142. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
143. Id. at 72-83.
144. Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, § 3, 62 Stat. 604, 605 (amended 1951 &
1971) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (Supp. V 1981).
145. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 60-61. See also S. REP. No. 789, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1980).
146. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 80-81; id. at 97-101 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147. See S. Rm. No. 826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 154-155, 157-158, 160 (1980).
148. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 6015, 8549 (1982); Army Reg. 611-201, ch. 4, at 4-1 (1976).
149. See S. REP. No. 826, supra note 147, at 157-59. The majority opinion considered this
report, which was endorsed by the Conference Committee, as the "finding of the entire Congress."
Rosiker, 453 U.S. at 73-74.
150. See S. REP. No. 826, supra note 147, at 158.
151. See S. REP. No. 826, supra note 147, at 159-61. The Senate report expresses apprehen-
sion about the legality of a predominantly male draft after both genders have registered. Id. at
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The majority deliberately muddled the standard of review of legislative
judgment exercised by the Court. After denigrating the entire concept of dif-
ferent levels of scrutiny for different types of discrimination,152 Justice Rehn-
quist disclaimed any intention to establish a special standard of review for
military equal protection cases. 153 He cited, however, the separate community
decisions in general 54 and Ballard'55 in particular as establishing the need for
"healthy deference" to Congress' judgment in military affairs, particularly
when Congress had fully considered the constitutional issue at hand.' 56 Given
that consideration in this case, he concluded, the constitutional power to raise
armies requires the Court to defer to its judgment.
157
Two new points emerge from the opinions in Rostker. The first is the
primacy of Congress over the executive in determining military need. The
second is the majority opinion's strong intimation that judicial deference to
legislative and executive judgment in this area is not merely prudent but is
required by the Constitution. 158 Otherwise, the opinion is merely the most
recent example of the majority of the justices' willingness to take claims of
military necessity at face value and the minority's corresponding skepticism.
These cases show that the separate community doctrine consists of four
propositions. First, as a matter of observation and history, the armed forces
are a distinct subculture in which the individual is subordinated to the organi-
zation in a manner unlike any other government activity. Second, the exist-
ence of this peculiar relationship is evidence that it rationally serves both the
armed forces' internal purposes and the larger society's interests. Third, when
158-59. It also states that political hostility to drafting women could place serious strain on na-
tional morale during a crisis. Id. at 159.
152. Rosiker, 453 U.S. at 69-70.
153. Id. at 70.
154. Id. at 66-67. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980); Middendorf v. Henry, 425
U.S. 25, 43 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743
(1974). In addition, the majority opinion cites Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973), for the
proposition that the Court is not competent to exercise its own judgment on the composition and
training of the armed forces. Rosiker, 453 U.S. at 65-66.
155. Rosiker, 453 U.S. at 65. See Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 508-10.
156. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 66.
157. Id. at 71-72.
Justice Marshall's dissent explicitly embraces the test for unconstitutional gender-based dis-
crimination established in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)---"substantial relation to an
important government interest"-and contends that male-only registration does not satisfy this
test. The opinion concedes that maintenance of the armed forces is an important government
interest, but it concludes that the government has failed in three respects to show a "substantial
relation" between it and not registering women for possible future draft. Rosiker, 453 U.S. at 87-
90 (Marshall, J., dissenting). First, Justice Marshall sees no necessary connection between regis-
tration and a combat-only draft, for Congress may decide in the future to draft for non-combat
positions that women concededly can fill. Id. at 92-95. Second, the Army's own witness before
Congress stated that even the type of draft Congress had in mind could usefully produce 80,000
women to fill noncombat positions and release men for combat. Id. at 95-101. Finally, there has
been no showing that drafting women in these proportions would create significant administrative
problems. Id. at 106-11. The dissent accuses Congress and the majority opinion of interpreting
military necessity to mean only that it is not necessary to draft women rather than that is is neces-
sary not to draft them. Id. at 103-105. This, the dissent asserts, is inconsistent with the Craig
standard. Id. at 94-95, 102-06.
158. Rosiker, 453 U.S. at 64-65, 71-72.
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individual rights appear to conflict with the smooth working of the armed
forces, the Court distrusts its own ability to reconcile them without harming
military effectiveness. Fourth, its exceptional reluctance to intervene on be-
half of judicially developed individual rights is justified because the purpose of
the armed forces, "to fight wars," is fundamentally different from any other
government activity.
The majority relies heavily on describing the nature of the armed forces
to justify challenged military practices. The Court first used description in
Levy to demonstrate that the General Articles of the U.C.M.J. are not uncon-
stitutionally vague. The long history of the General Articles was taken as evi-
dence that there is a distinctive body of military norms that a rational person
in Captain Levy's place would have known he was violating. 59 But the major-
ity also uses description to justify the substance of those distinctive norms.
Thus, Captain Levy's remarks were held unprotected "under the most expan-
sive notions of the First Amendment" because they advocated disobedience to
orders. 160 The summary court-martial was held not to be a criminal proceed-
ing in part because it is not conducted in an adversary manner.1 61 The first
amendment does not protect servicemen circulating petitions in part because
of the traditional norm of unquestioned obedience.' 62 In each instance, that
military personnel do not enjoy the same rights as civilians is advanced as a
reason why they should not.
Implicit in the first point is the second; these practices have not come
about by chance but represent a rational response, informed by experience, to
the needs of a military organization. The Navy has found providing counsel
in relatively minor disciplinary matters expensive in time and manpower. 163
Permitting open political association among military personnel may lead to
collective indiscipline, as may abstract advocacy of disobedience by commis-
sioned officers. ' 4 Assignment of female personnel to combat duty may cause
unknown difficulties. 165 Military courts, being familiar with military needs,
should have the first opportunity to consider the constitutional rights of court-
martial defendants. 16
6
To the majority, that a military practice exists outweighs evidence that it
may be unnecessary. It disregards the opinion of the Army's chief legal officer
that the General Articles are unnecessary. 167 Although the Army and Air
Force appoint counsel in summary courts-martial, the Navy and Marine
Corps remain free not to do so. 168 The majority presumes that Congress,
159. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752-57 (1974).
160. Id. at 761.
161. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 40-42 (1976).
162. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356-58 (1981).
163. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 45-47 (1976).
164. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 357-58 (1981); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 (1974).
165. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76-78 (1981).
166. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 759-61 (1975).
167. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 788-89 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Hodson, The
Manualfor Courts-Marial-1984, 57 MIL. L. REv. 1, 12 (1972).
168. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 66-67 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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when it expressly permitted individual servicemen to correspond freely with
members of Congress, did not intend to alter the long-standing military prohi-
bition of collective action.169 As the dissenting opinions of Justices Brennan
and Marshall point out, the majority is unwilling to compare the existing state
of affairs with alternatives closer to civilian norms.
170
The separate community doctrine, in other words, is not so much a set of
substantive rules as a standard of review. The majority of the Court disclaims
the knowledge necessary to examine military restrictions on servicemen's
rights with the same skepticism and attention to detail that meets other gov-
ernmental claims of necessity.'71 When Congress has acted, the majority de-
fers to its supposed special constitutional responsibility for military matters,
but it is equally willing, in the absence of statute, to yield to the conclusions of
the military authorities themselves that political activity must be restrained.
172
The majority does not articulate a reason for this distinctive unwillingness to
question legislative and administrative judgment where individual rights are
concerned. Instead, it consistently asserts, without further elaboration, that
the purpose of the armed forces is to fight wars, which requires a climate of
discipline and unquestioned obedience without parallel in other activities of
the government.1
7 3
These statements are made in support of the conclusion that particular
restrictions on servicemen's liberties are rationally related to the armed forces'
function. They further imply, however, that the function of the armed forces
is sufficiently different from all other government activity that its successful
performance justifies such restrictions as are apparently required to achieve it.
The majority does not, however, elaborate the distinctive characteristics of war
on which it bases its conclusion. Similarly, the particular competence of Con-
gress is merely asserted. While the opinions state that Congress has the power
to declare war and regulate the internal affairs of the armed forces, 17 4 they do
not explain why its decisions that affect servicemen's rights should be reviewed
with any more deference than the excercise of any other legislative power con-
ferred under article I, section 8 of the Constitution. Because the majority's
169. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 360 (1980). See 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (1982).
170. Cf. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 370 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (claiming that the
Court "reflexively bowed to the shibboleth of military necessity"); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S.
25, 63 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (claiming that the Court approved the denial of counsel in
certain circumstances without examination); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 856 (1976) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (claiming that the Court affirmed exclusion of all unapproved public expression
from military bases without examining the necessity for such action).
171. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1981) (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan,
413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)).
172. Compare Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) and Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25
(1976) and Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) with Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) and
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). In Rostker, the majority opinion speaks of "a healthy defer-
ence to legislative and executive judgments." Rostker, 453 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
173. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356-58 (1981); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S.
25, 46 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-44
(1974).
174. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420
U.S. 738, 757-58 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975).
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premises have been asserted rather than explained, the distinct, less assertive
standard of review provided under the separate community doctrine has been
vulnerable to criticism.
C Opposition to the Separate Community
In addition to a stable majority, each of the separate community decisions
shows a bloc of dissenters who would have applied civilian constitutional
norms and invalidated the military practice in question.175 Their cumulative
position consists of five parts. First, the actual separateness of the traditional
military community has ceased to exist. Second, the duties of most servicemen
can be performed without the subordination of the traditional military com-
munity. Third, the majority has not proved that the norms of the traditional
military community are necessary for the effectiveness of even combat person-
nel or, if so, legally justifiable. Fourth, nothing distinctive about the problem
of the constitutional rights of individual servicemen places it beyond the com-
petence of the courts. Finally, both military and civilian interests would be
bttter served by integrating the armed forces into the civilian society.
Critics of the separate community point out that the military society of
the past no longer exists. The hierarchical structure and traditional social
norms of the armed forces, established during the Revolutionary War in con-
scious imitation of contemporary British and other European models,' 76 were
preserved until this century largely by the small size and peripheral position of
regular Army and Navy. Except during Reconstruction, 177 the pre-Spanish-
American War peacetime regular Army numbered no more than 25,000 men
and 2,000 officers. 178 The Army and Navy officer corps were alienated from
the larger society by their quasi-aristocratic values. 179 Most civilians rarely, if
ever, had any contact with the military. 180 Except during the Civil War, mili-
tary activities had only a peripheral effect on the national life. The civilian
community therefore looked down on military men, both officer and enlisted,
as worthless in the meaningful activities of American life.' 81 The result was
an isolated, homogeneous society, voluntarily entered, in which strict disci-
175. Justices Brennan and Marshall have dissented in each of the cases, except that Justice
Marshall did not sit on Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), or Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348
(1980). Justice White joined the dissenters in both cases involving gender discriminiation, Schles-
inger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), and Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), but adhered to
the majority in the others. Justice Stewart has been erratic, dissenting on constitutional grounds in
Levy and in Greer, and adhering to the majority in Councilman and in Rosiker.
176. See R. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 33-34, 63-64 (1967). Cf. 4 D.
FREEMAN, GEORGE WASHINGTON 149-50, 210, 406-07, 426-27 (1951); T. Ropp, WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD 73-75 (1959).
177. R. WEIGLEY, supra note 176, at 190, 267.
178. See M. CUNLIFFE, SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS 119-20 (1968); R. WEIGLEY, supra note 176,
at 168, 270.
179. See R. WEIGLEY, supra note 176, at 157. See also S. AMBROSE, UvrON AND THE ARMY
129-32, 135 (1964); J. MERRILL, WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN 117-18, 126-27, 149-50 (1971),
180. See M. CUNLIEFE, supra note 178, at 102-03, 120-21; R. WEIGLEY, supra note 176, at 167,
271-72.
181. See M. CUNLIFFE, supra note 178, at 101-06; R. WEIGLEY, supra note 176, at 271.
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pline was needed to make marginal human material useful, within which cus-
toms and values were well known, and about which the larger society was
indifferent if not contemptuous. The armed forces were separate in fact, and
the rights of their members were of little concern to the public.
182
Since World War II, it is argued, these conditions have ceased to exist.
The armed forces number approximately two million, 8 3 they recruit from a
broad segment of the population, and conscription is always possible. Most
enlisted personnel and junior officers return to civilian life after fairly short
service.' 8 4 The cost and potential activities of the armed forces are of great
public concern, and their personnel are in frequent contact with the civilian
community. The modern armed forces, in brief, are not as isolated from
American society as the frontier army of the 19th century or the garrison army
of James Jones.
185
Two conclusions have been drawn from these changes. Most narrowly, a
"chrome plated civilian" like Captain Levy cannot be reasonably expected to
know the norms that give meaning to the General Articles in the same way as
can a career military man.'8 6 More fundamentally, the typical or common
member of the armed forces is not an alien outcast but is one of us. He comes
out of a civilian background, participates in civilian society when off duty,
enjoys and exercises political rights, and will probably return to civil life when
it is to his advantage to do so. Rather than being one of a distinct caste, he
merely holds an unusual job. He has neither isolated himself nor been ex-
pelled from American society. It follows, in this view, that he enjoys the rights
of any other member of society unless cause is shown to the contrary.'
8 7
That cause, certain critics of the separate community doctrine have ar-
gued, cannot be shown for the bulk of military jobs. The traditional norms of
military discipline were developed to insure that soldiers would perform relia-
bly in combat despite fear and danger. If they are still justifiable, it is because
they are still needed to produce efficient combat personnel. The great bulk of
servicemen, however, do clerical, maintenance, and service jobs that never ex-
pose them to combat conditions. The duties of a military computer program-
mer, truck mechanic, or cook are not intrinsically different from his or her
civilian counterpart, it is argued, and the full rigors of traditional military dis-
cipline are no more needed in these jobs than they would be in a civilian
corporation. If the business of the armed forces is to fight wars, it follows that
182. See Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 11, at 397, 409.
183. 1982 DEP'T OF DEFENSE ANN. REP. app. B, 3-4.
184. In fiscal years 1979 and 1980 the armed forces reenlisted approximately 95,000 service-
men at the end of their first enlistment. At the same time, they took in approximately 350,000 new
enlistees. See 1982 DEPr. OF DEFENSE ANN. REP. at 270; 1981 DEP'T OF DEFENSE ANN. REP. 268.
Reenlistment ratios were much lower towards the end of the Vietnam War. 1982 DEP'T OF DE-
FENSE ANN. REP. 268.
185. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 781-82 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Sherman, Legal
Inadequacies and Doctrinal Restraints in Controlling the Military, 49 IND. L.J. 539, 542-43, (1974);
Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 11, at 400.
186. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 781-83 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Accord Avrech
v. Secretary of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 676 (1974).
187. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 851-52 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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only those personnel who do so should be set apart from the larger society. 88
Whether even combat troops are outside the civilian community is a
proposition that opponents of the separate community regard as not proved. It
is not self-evident to the dissenting Justices that the relation of the serviceman
to the armed forces is intrinsically different from an individual's relation to
any other government authority. Justice Brennan, for example, cites decisions
governing first amendment rights in prisons, schools, defense employment,
and public debate on foreign policy 189 to demonstrate that the Court treats
skeptically claims of necessity both in disciplined institutions and in the area
of national defense. Beginning with the proposition that the Government
must demonstrate compelling need in order to infringe fundamental individ-
ual rights, the dissents demand a detailed showing that a specific military need
cannot be satisfied by a lesser restriction on individual rights than the particu-
lar practice in question imposes.190 They contend that the majority's generali-
ties about the armed forces neither meet this standard nor prove that a less
skeptical one should be applied. 191 Absent such proof, they will regard mili-
tary practices in the same light as those of any other government agency.
Proponents of this view also believe that the courts are fully competent to
balance claims of military necessity against individual rights. They begin with
the belief that professional military men often confuse their own comfort, con-
venience, and prestige with military necessity; claims of military necessity
should therefore be heard with skepticism. 192 They subject such claims to de-
tailed analysis and usually reject them. Moreover, they contend, even if the
military authorities accurately perceive their own needs, they are simply not
competent to balance the values embodied in individual constitutional rights
against even genuine military necessity. Only the courts are experts in consti-
tutional law, and their view of the proper constitutional balance must there-
fore prevail.
193
Finally, critics urge that greater judicial imposition of civilian norms on
188. See ZiUman & Imwinkelried, supra note I1, at 403-04. Cf. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S.
348, 370 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 852-56 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (prisons); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (public debate on foreign policy); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (schools); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (defense employment),
Cf. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970). See also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 365 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Mid-
dendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 57 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
190. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 364-68 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Middendorf
v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 63-69 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 858-61
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 786-89 (1974) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
191. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 368-69 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828, 851-53 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 370 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also N.
DIXON, ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITARY INCOMPETENCE 172, 178-79, 187-88 (1976); A.
VAoTS, HISTORY OF MILITARISM 13-15 (rev. ed. 1959).
193. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 370 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Schlesinger v.
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 763-65 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Zillmen & Imwinkeiried,
supra note 11, at 435-36.
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the armed forces would increase military effectiveness. Justice Brennan, for
instance, has contended that collective expression of grievances through peti-
tioning, regulated as to time, place, and manner, will improve discipline and
morale by revealing discontent before it can "flow into the more dangerous
channels of incitement and disobedience."' 194 A considerable body of nonle-
gal literature written in response to the defeat in Vietnam has suggested that
the effectiveness of the Army will be enhanced by decreasing the political and
cultural gap between the institution and its human raw material.19 5 This con-
ception has been endorsed by academic writers who believe that judicial pro-
tection of individual liberties in the military will make the rank and file less
alienated, and therefore more effective soldiers.
196
The separate community doctrine, then, has been criticized as being based
on a notion of military life that is not consistent with present reality and on
claims of necessity that are hardly articulated, much less demonstrated. Its
critics assume, until shown otherwise, that the courts are as competent to de-
termine the desirable balance between individual autonomy and organiza-
tional need within the armed forces as in any other situation. Some contend,
moreover, that greater judicial intervention, rather than harming military ef-
fectiveness, would increase it by bringing the armed forces into harmony with
the society from which their personnel are drawn.
II. WAR, THE ARMED FORCES, AND JUDICIAL ASSERTIVENESS
It is apparent that opinions of neither faction of the Court satisfy the con-
ditions for an adequate balancing analysis of servicemen's rights and military
needs. The majority does not discuss in any detail the demands imposed by
war, the distinctive nature of war as a government activity, or the conse-
quences of failure at war as opposed to failure at other activities undertaken
by the political branches. Similarly, it asserts judicial incompetence and supe-
rior competence of the political branches in military affairs without attempting
to distinguish decisions in this area from decisions with respect to other activi-
ties within the power of Congress. Instead, it resorts to what Justice Brennan
has characterized as "a series of platitudes about the special nature and over-
whelming importance of military necessity."'197 The minority, on the other
hand, refuses to explore the distinctive position of the armed forces at all. In-
stead, it argues that they are not distinct from agencies performing other gov-
ernment functions until proven otherwise, and it denies without explanation
194. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 371 (1980) (Brennan, J. dissenting). 4ccord Sherman,
supra note 185, at 541-42.
195. See, e.g., Z. BRADFORD & F. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN TRANSITION (1973);
W. HAUSER, supra note 3; S. LOORY, DEFEATED: INSIDE AMERICA'S MILITARY MACHINE (1973).
Cf. L. RADINE, THE TAMING OF THE TROOPS: SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY
(1977).
196. E.g., De Nike, The New "Problem Soldier"-Dissenter in the Ranks, 49 IND. L.J. 685, 696
(1974); Zillrnan & Imwinkelried, supra note 11, at 409-10, 414, 427, 435; Comment, Military Disci-
pline and Political Expression: A New Look at an Old Bugbear, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 525,
540-43 (1971).
197. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 368 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that any distinctive quantum of proof should be used. Although both factions
purport to be balancing individual interest against military need, none of the
opinions in the separate community cases cite any of the considerable body of
historical and social science literature on effective military discipline. We are
presented on the one hand with bugle blowing and on the other with ostensible
skepticism that implicitly denies the distinctiveness of the military situation,
neither of which appear to be informed by concrete knowledge of military life.
This portion of the Article sets out the principles, not discussed in detail
by either faction of the Court, that underlie a proper concept of individual
constitutional rights in the military. The first is that the Constitution permits
the United States an unlimited choice of ends in war, which necessarily im-
plies an unlimited choice of means. The second is that these ends can be effec-
tively pursued with safety to the political institutions of the Constitution only
by subordinating the personalities of members of the armed forces to the will
of the political authorities. The third is that this relation differs in kind, rather
than in degree, from the relation between the individual and the state on
which judicial protection of fundamental personal rights is premised.
A. The Military Necessities of the Constitution
The armed forces are those organizations composed of persons subject to
court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for crimes of ab-
sence, disobedience, and faulty performance of duty that have no civilian
counterpart. 19 8 As the Supreme Court has often stated, their primary purpose
is to fight wars, 199 ie., to inflict violence on persons subject to other govern-
ments in order to attain the objectives of the United States. While it is true
that waging war can involve the entire population and resources of a country,
blurring the distinction between the civilian and the military, the armed forces
have the peculiar function of directly applying violence to other nations. They
are the immediate instruments of war. It follows that a concept of their dis-
tinct position in relation to the courts must begin with an understanding of the
relation of war to the Constitution.
War is, as von Clausewitz defined it, an act of violence by which one
sovereign compels another to do its will.2°° To say that it is between sover-
eigns is to say that it is between entities that do not recognize a common supe-
rior authority and that command enough force to assert their independence
effectively. 20 1 As a result, the belligerent states are bound by no positive law
other than their own in determining the ends for which they wage war or the
198. E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 885 (desertion), 886 (absence without leave), 889-891 (insubordina-
tion), 892 (dereliction of duty), 899 (misbehavior before the enemy), 913 (misbehavior of a senti-
nel), 915 (malingering) (1982). See also 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1982); McElroy v. United States ex rel.
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (delineating persons subject to
and exempt from courts-martial).
199. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
200. C. VoN CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 75, 86-88 (1976).
201. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 667 (1863); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
253, 307-09 (1829); Q. WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 896-99 (1942).
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means they will use.202 Each sovereign is free to determine its internal law on
this and any other question insofar as it can prevent, by successfully waging
war, any other state from compelling a different determination.
203
In theory, wars can be fought for the unlimited end of completely over-
throwing the enemy state, using whatever resources are necessary. This has
been done on occasion, but it is more usual for states to fight for more limited
ends with more limited means. The objectives of war are limited by the avail-
ability of means to attain them. Two forces govern the selection of means: the
state's own willingness to bear their cost, and the resistance exerted by the
opponent. Only the first is within the control of the state's domestic institu-
tions; the state must take the enemy's will and resources as it finds them. It
follows that once a war has begun, an enemy with enough strength and the
will to use it can force the state to choose between abandoning its self-imposed
restrictions on means or abandoning the ends for which it fights.2°4 As long as
it desires the end, the state's choice of means is controlled by the enemy's
capacity to resist.
The total resources of a state are its population and economy. The pro-
portion of those resources available for war depends on the ability of the gov-
ernment to inflict hardship on its population by diverting people and goods
from their ordinary occupation to war. This depends in part on administrative
efficiency, but primarily on the acquiescence of the populace. The dynastic
202. In the absence of an authoritative statement to the contrary by the political branches, the
courts of the United States will apply rules of decision derived from either treaties or customary
international law, including the so-called laws of war, in cases involving private rights. See The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700-14 (1900); The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 39-40
(1826); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120 (1825); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 110, 122-23 (1814). See also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577-78 (1953); Wilson v.
McNamee, 102 U.S. 572, 574 (1881); 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 11
(1963). Once the political authorities have explicitly acted contrary to international law, as by an
inconsistent statute or by denunciation of a treaty, the courts must apply the rule of decision
resulting from that act even though the action may be regarded by other states as contrary to
international law. See The Adula, 176 U.S. 361, 371 (1900); The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11
Wheat.) 1, 39-40 (1826); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 122-23 (1814). The
Supreme Court stated in Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 60 (1878):
As war is necessarily a trial of strength between the belligerents, the ultimate object of
each, in every movement, must be to lessen the strength of his adversary, or add to his
own. As a rule, whatever is necessary to accomplish this end is lawful; and, as between
the belligerents, each determines for himself what is necessary. If, in so doing, he offends
against the accepted law of nations, he must answer in his political capacity to other
nations for the wrong he does. If he oversteps the bounds which limit the power of
belligerents in legitimate warfare, as understood by civilized nations, other nation's may
join his enemy, and enter the conflict against him.
In short, the President and Congress have between them the authority to determine how far
the domestic law of the United States will follow international law in the conduct of war. To the
extent that either customary international law or treaties, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, paras. 3-4;
Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War, July 24, 1929, 46 Stat. 2345, T.S. No. 796, prohibit
the United States from waging war for certain purposes, or with certain means, the highest author-
ities in the political branches may act in disregard of them without restriction by the courts.
203. The United States, of course, established itself as a state through successful war. Con-
versely, the United States fought both the Civil War and World War II with the object of recon-
structing the domestic institutions of its enemies in a way that would make them permanently
incapable of waging war against it.
204. See generally C. VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 200, at 90-99, 585-86, 605-08.
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warfare of the Eighteenth Century was limited by the inability of the ancien
regime governments to effectively tax or conscript their politically passive
populations. The mass wars since the French Revolution-the Napoleonic
Wars, the American Civil War, and the two World Wars-could be fought for
total victory with the full human and material resources of the societies in-
volved because the belligerent populations willingly embraced their objects.
Other things being equal, political sympathy between the government and the
population increases military effectiveness.
205
The population must bear more than material costs: the cost of war also
includes military service by individuals. Service has two costs. The possibility
of death or injury, though severe, is relatively remote. It does not exist in
peacetime, and, even in war, the human capacity to believe that the "other
guy" will be the casualty is notorious. The most immediate and galling indi-
vidual cost is the loss of freedom involved in becoming and remaining a
skilled soldier. The extreme case of willingness to bear this cost is perhaps
ancient Sparta, where the whole political nation devoted their entire lives to
military training. The extreme case to the contrary is the United States in the
Jacksonian era, when the system of a universal citizen militia collapsed under
general unwillingness to do one day of training each year.206 The military
capacity of a state, and thus the ends it can pursue through war, will depend in
part on its political ability to impose upon a given part of its population a
sufficient discipline to make them effective instruments of violence.
In a sense, the United States has the power to wage war because it is a
sovereign nation, and, in another, it is a sovereign because it waged war suc-
cessfully. The Framers of the Constitution never discussed whether to author-
ize the United States as a whole to fight wars. They knew from personal
experience that it had done so since before the adoption of the Declaration of
Independence, when the Continental Congress appointed Washington to com-
mand the army besieging Boston. Their efforts were concentrated instead on
allocating the authority to begin, conduct, and provide for war among the
states and the branches of the federal government. 20 7 Except for the raising
and training of the militia, which is left to the states, they vested the war pow-
ers of the Constitution in either the President or Congress.208 Between them,
the political branches were given all of the explicit authority provided by the
Constitution to determine ends and means in such wars as the United States
would fight.20
9
The military clauses of the Constitution do not prescribe detailed rules for
205. See C. VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 200, at 218-20, 588-93; T. RopP, supra note 176, at
40-59, 107-12, 132-33.
206. See M. CUNLIFFE, supra note 178, at 186-92, 205-12.
207. See 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 318-20 (1937); THE
FEDERALIST No. 41, at 269-70 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See generally Lofgren, War
Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 683-88 (1972).
208. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Cf. Id art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
209. The question of the distribution of these powers between the President and Congress is
not considered here.
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the conduct of national defense. As pointed out below, their authors clearly
realized that in this area, above all, they were dealing with unforseeable con-
tingencies and must provide powers rather than limits. Nevertheless, four gen-
eral policies can be deduced from the enumeration and allocation of these
powers.
The Constitution authorizes Congress "to declare war"2 10 and to exercise
the concomitant powers of raising, training, and financing military forces.
2 11 It
does not expressly restrict either the ends for which the United States may
make war or the means that it may employ. With respect to ends it is silent.
Experience has shown, though, that the power to wage war goes beyond mere
defense. The first regular army created under the Constitution was established
for the purpose of compelling the Indians of Ohio to cede their lands, which it
accomplished by force.2 12 In 1812, 1846, and 1898 the United States initiated
foreign wars-twice successful-with the intention in part of acquiring addi-
tional territory.2 13 Even if it were conceded that the "common defense" 2 14 is
the only legitimate purpose for which war may be fought under the Constitu-
tion, there remains the question of how threats shall be judged and how proxi-
mate they must be to justify "defensive" war. If there is any issue on which it
can be said that the Constitution provides no standard for judicial review, it is
the substance of a decision to make war in which the President and Congress
together have acted in accordance with the Constitution's apportionment of
the decision-making power among them.
215
210. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
211. Id art. I,§8, cls. 12-16.
212. See H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD 91-127, 141-57 (1975).
213. See 6 H. ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 133-42 (1921); T. WILLIAMS, A HIS-
TORY OF AMERICAN WARS 94-97, 145-49, 152-54, 319-22 (1980). Several portions of Florida were
acquired from Spain between 1810 and 1819 either by military occupation or through a treaty
prompted by the threat of military occupation. See A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS: THE ORIGINS 291-326, 336-57 (1976).
214. U.S. CONST. preamble. But see THE FEDERALIST, supra note 207, No. 25, at 160-61 (A.
Hamilton).
During the War of 1812, one member of Congress argued that the Constituiton gave the
United States the power to fight only defensive wars and did not permit Congress to declare war
for the purpose of conquest. 25 ANNALS OF CONG. 650-53 (1812) (Rep. Wheaton). The argument
was not sympathetically received. See A. SOFAER, supra note 213, at 268-69.
215. See Da Costa v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1154-55 (2d Cir. 1973); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451
F.2d 26, 33 (Ist Cir. 1971); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 705-09 (E.D. Pa. 1972), af7'd, 411 U.S.
911 (1973). Cf. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5-12 (1973) (holding that control of the National
Guard is reserved by the Constitution to the executive and legislative branches); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (holding that recognition of the sovereign of a foreign state
by the executive and legislative branches is binding on the courts); Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 73, 88 (1874) (holding that the President and Congress have the power, acting concurrently,
to permit limited commercial intercourse with the enemy in time of war); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 19, 29-31 (1827) (holding that the President alone has authority to determine the
existence of the conditions under which he may call out the militia). See generally Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 211-14 (1962); L. HENKEN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 211-25
(1972). This must be distinguished from the more difficult question whether the courts may deter-
mine that the procedures prescribed by the Constitution have not been followed. See Massachu-
setts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 891-900 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See generally L. TRUE,
AMERICAN CONSTUTIONAL LAW, 173 nn.5 & 6 (1978).
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With respect to means, the Framers explicitly rejected the idea of consti-
tutional limit. As Hamilton bluntly stated in The Federalist, No. 23:
These powers ought to exist without limitation: Because it is impossi-
ble to foresee or dfne the extent and variety of national exigencies, or
the corresponding extent of the means which may be necessary to satis/y
them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infi-
nite; and for this reason no constitutional shackle can wisely be im-
posed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power
ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such
circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same coun-
cils which are appointed to provide for the common defense.
2 16
The same point is repeated whenever The Federalist discusses the war
powers. It is particularly urged in response to the argument that a peacetime
standing army was inherently dangerous to liberty and that the Constitution
was defective because it did not prohibit or restrict the size of one.2 17 More-
over, both Hamilton and Madison argued, constitutional limits on means of
war were a danger to constitutional government. Such limits, they contended,
would be disregarded when necessity required. These violations would invari-
ably bring into contempt the entire idea of restricting the powers of govern-
ment when inconvenient.21 8 As long as the United States was one nation
among many, each of which might use as much force as it could to pursue any
end that it chose, its continued independence, and thus its ability to pursue the
other ends for which the Constitution was established, required the same pow-
ers of action despite the domestic dangers involved.
2 19
The Framers were fully sensitive to these dangers. They knew and were
part of the Anglo-American tradition of hostility to standing armies that arose
from the excesses of Cromwell and James 11.220 The possibility that a military
establishment might prove a means of oppression or overthrow the system of
government was admitted by the proponents of the Constitution.22 1 Their re-
sponse was to point out that control of the declaration of war and the size,
discipline, and financing of any military establishment was vested in Congress.
As the representative branch, that body would be restricted from adventurism
in ends and excessiveness of means because the cost of war would be borne by
its constituents. Its collective self-interest, as well as that of its constituents,
would lead it to deny the President the military resources for oppression. Con-
216. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 207, No. 23, at 147 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original).
Cf id No. 34, at 210-14 (rejecting arguments favoring constitutional limitations on the federal
government's power of taxation).
217. See id Nos. 24, 26 (A. Hamilton); id No. 41 (J. Madison). See also 2 M. FARRAND,
supra note 207, at 329-30.
218. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 207, No. 25, at 163 (A. Hamilton); id No. 41, at 270 (J.
Madison).
219. Id No. 41, at 270-71 (J. Madison); cf. id No. 24 (A. Hamilton) (outlining potential
threats to American security).
220. See generally M. CUNLIFFE, supra note 178, at 31-43; H. KOHN, supra note 212, at 1-17,
81-85.




versely, its representative character would ensure that general consent would
be forthcoming for such means as it authorized.
22 2
One primary and two secondary policies can be discerned here. The first
is simply that the independence of the United States-its freedom from exter-
nal coercion in its internal affairs-is the foundation on which rest all of the
other values implicit in the Constitution. If the nation cannot defend itself, it
cannot pursue whatever other concerns its people may have. The first secon-
dary policy is, therefore, that the war powers must be as broad as potential
threats, which are potentially unlimited because they come from outside the
political system. The second is that the inherent danger to the other principles
and policies of the Constitution that unlimited war power creates can be
guarded against as far as possible by making the public's representatives
supreme judge of both needs and resources in war. Consistent with these doc-
trines, the Supreme Court has permitted the armed forces to use against bel-
ligerents whatever measures the political branch has authorized. 223 It has also
spoken of the war power of Congress as a broad, practically unlimited power
to control the nation's economy and manpower to prepare for, wage, and re-
pair the effects of war.
224
The Framers assumed that the military establishment would be small:
Madison stated that no country could afford a standing army of more than one
percent of the population,225 which has proved true of the United States in
peacetime.226 Carried to their logical conclusions, however, the policies of un-
limited choice of ends and means and representive control would permit a
congressional majority to subject the entire population to military discipline.
The Supreme Court consistently has refused to permit this. It has rejected the
argument that the war power justifies the exercise of military or martial law
222. See id No. 26, at 168-70 (A. Hamilton); id No. 41, at 270-74 (J. Madison).
223. See, e.g., Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39 (1877)
(upholding the authority of a presidential order subjecting enemy saboteurs to the jurisdiction of
military tribunal); Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404 (1864) (upholding the authority
of the army to confiscate private property found within enemy territory). The Court has consid-
ered this unlimited choice of means, subject only to political enforcement of the norms of interna-
tional law, to be within the power of any recognized belligerent. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (South American revolutionaries); Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 605-08 (1878)
(Confederate officer).
224. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 754-65, 778-83 (1948) (upholding the
constitutionality of statutes providing for the confiscation of excessive wartime profits); Woods v.
Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 141-46 (1948) (upholding the constitutionality of congressional
regulation of rents after termination of hostilities); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 92-
93, 99-102 (1943) (upholding the constitutionality of a wartime curfew order applicable to Japa-
nese-Americans living on the West Coast); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co.,
251 U.S. 146, 161-63 (1919) (upholding the constitutionality of a ban on liquor sales for the pur-
pose of increasing war efficiency); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 377 (1918)(upholding
as constitutional the power to compel military service). But cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641-46 (1952) (holding President Truman's seizure, without congressional
concurrance, of domestic industries during the Korean War unconstitutional).
225. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 207, No. 46, at 320 (J. Madison). See also 2 A. SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 186 (Everyman's Library
ed. 1910).
226. The 1982 complement of the armed forces, 2,094,000, is approximately 1% of the popula-
tion. 1982 DEP'T OF DEFENSE ANN. REP. 270; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF POPU-
LATION AND HOUSING, ADVANCE REPORT, at 4. See also supra text accompanying note 183.
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over persons who are not members of the armed forces performing military
duty: civilian residents of the United States, 227 civilians accompanying the
armed forces abroad, 228 discharged servicemen, 229 and active servicemen
whose offenses are not related to the military community.230 While the Court
might recognize an exception to this rule for an active theater of military oper-
ations, it exercises independent judgment regarding when that situtation ex-
ists. 231 Only the limited class of persons who actually belong to the armed
forces are subject to the full force of the war power.
This doctrine is usually justified by the inferior procedural rights suppos-
edly provided under military jurisdiction.232 But more importantly, it pre-
serves the existence of political responsibility as the essential check on the war
power. There is always the risk that the political branches will use the force
provided by popular consent to overawe the population or overthrow the
political process.2 3 3 A military establishment has at its command physical
force beyond the resources of any police agency, and, unlike the civil authori-
ties, it normally employs force against hostile societies without regard to the
individual fault of any member of the society.234 Both its strength and its
doctrine make it able, in effect, to wage war against its own people in disregard
of law. Civilian political control, and the restriction of military discipline to a
distinct segment of society, restrict its will and ability to misuse that power.
There is no perfect security against this, but the best available is to keep legal
sanctions against members of the general community under the direct control
of the branch most able to protect individual rights-the judiciary. As long as
the civil courts control the government's power of coercion against the individ-
ual, the war power cannot be used to destroy the public consent which re-
strains and legitimates it.235 To preserve the supremacy of the public as a
whole over the excercise of the war power, the Constitution therefore contem-
plates that its full rigor can only be employed within a distinct group who
perform characteristic functions-the armed forces.
In the light of these policies-unlimited choice of ends and means, civil-
227. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866).
228. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
229. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
230. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). Cf. Relford v. Commandant, United States
Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U.S. 355 (1971) (approving trial by a court-martial of a serviceman
charged with committing rape inside a military base).
231. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 329-30 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring); d at
335-37 (Stone, C.J., concurring); Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 126-27 (1866).
232. See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 262-65 (1969); United States ex rel Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22-23 (1955).
233. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 207, No. 26, at 170 (A. Hamilton). Cf. id No. 46, at
320-22 (J. Madison) (discussing the possibility of the federal government using force to control the
states).
234. See The Benito Estenger, 176 U.S. 568, 571 (1900); Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39,
58-60 (1877); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (I 1 Wall.) 268, 305-06 (1870). This follows from the
nature of war as a contest between political wills. Young, 97 U.S. at 60.
235. Cf. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 322-24 (1946); Exparle Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 120-26 (1866).
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ian political control, and military segregation-there are three goals that the
political branches must keep in mind in the organization and discipline of the
armed forces. The first, ability, speaks for itself. The armed forced are merely
a useless burden on the public if they cannot effectively exert or threaten force
against other states for the purposes chosen by the President and Congress.
Before anything else, the political branches must provide themselves with a
military establishment whose members can do what will be asked of them.
The second goal is "passive subordination"-freedom of the civil govern-
ment from direct military coercion. It has been more than 300 years since
Pride's Purge, but the career of Cromwell and the New Model Army still
haunts the Anglo-American political imagination. There have been too many
melancholy examples since of armies that, under their own officer corps or at
the behest of a single leader, have imposed their will by force on the nation
they supposedly defended. In addition to the outright coup, moreover, armies
have tolerated unofficial military terrorism, like that of Japanese junior officers
in the 1930's, which reduced the civil governments to subservience while re-
taining the facade of civilian rule.236 Commanders, like the Japanese com-
mander in Manchuria, have also used force against foreign countries without
authority to commit the government to a policy it had opposed.237 Moreover,
once the military has demonstrated the will and resources to apply force to the
civilian government, the mere threat often suffices to impose its will.238 The
policy of a "politically neutral military establishment under civilian con-
trol"239 requires, at a minimum, a system of discipline that will prevent the
armed forces from using or threatening force to induce action by their civilian
superiors.2
40
Civilian control, however, requires more than the absence of military
236. See S. FINER, THE MAN ON HORSEBACK 90-92, 146-48 (1962); S. HUNTINGTON, THE
SOLDIER AND THE STATE 137-38 (1957); J. TOLAND, THE RISING SUN 3-33 (1970); C. YANAGA,
JAPAN SINCE PERRY 508-18 (1966).
237. See S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 236, at 433-34; J. TOLAND, supra note 236, at 6-9; C.
YANAGA, supra note 236, at 498-99.
238. See S. FINER, supra note 236, at 141-51; Springer, Disunity and Disorder: Factional Poli-
tics in the Argentine Military, in THE MILITARY INTERVENES (H. Bienen ed. 1968).
While the direct use of military force against the government has usually been instigated by
officers who control the levers of military authority, there are instances of enlisted men attempting
it. The sailors of the Royal Navy who mutinied at The Nore in 1797, for example, attempted to
gain their demands by blockading London. See J. DUGAN, THE GREAT MtrINY 261-65 (1965).
The enlisted men of the German Navy also played an active role in the overthrow of the Kaiser in
1918. See D. HORN, THE GERMAN NAVAL MUTINIES OF WORLD WAR I 198-266 (1969). Al-
though the political assassinations in Japan were exploited by the higher army authorities for their
own ends, they were carried out by junior officers and cadets who belonged to a political faction
opposed to the army's high command. See S. FINER, supra note 236, at 90-92; S. HUNTINGTON,
supra note 236, at 137-38.
239. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976).
240. While the general political culture of a country influences the strength of civilian
supremacy, one of the principal protections of the civil government is the internalization of values
of subordination by the armed forces. See S. FINER, supra note 236, at 28-30. Huntington has
classified two distinct approaches to this subordination: "objective" and "subjective" civilian con-
trol. The first aims for an officer corps that considers it a positive good to obey the orders of any
civilian group exercising authority through lawful procedures. In contrast, "subjective" civilian
control is attained by inculcating the military establishment with the political values of the current
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force used against the will of the legal authorities. The armed forces can also
impose their will on the civilain goverment by refusing or threatening not to
use force in support of policies that officers or enlisted men do not support.
The most familiar instance of this is the more or less spontaneous passive mu-
tiny in response to personal hardship.24' But calculated withholding of serv-
ices can also be used as a method of political coercion. During the Civil War,
for example, General McClellan attempted to control Lincoln's policy on slav-
ery by threatening that his troops would not fight for emancipation,2 42 and a
large number of British officers, supported by the opposition party, did prevent
the grant of Home Rule to Ireland in 1914 by threatening to resign rather than
fight against Ulster Protestants. 243 One school of thought in the anti-Vietnam
civilian regime. See S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 236, at 80-85. This raises obvious difficulties in
the event of political change.
The opinions in Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) reflect these opposing concepts. Justice
Powell advocates an abstention of the armed forces, as such, from even the appearance of concern
with partisan political outcome. Id. at 846 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, to the con-
trary, believes that the armed forces are inherently politicized and advocates "moderating" their
distinctive attitude by permeation with civilian political ideas. Id. at 868-69 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
Justice Brennan, however, misconceives the "political" activity of the American military.
Pirt of the function of the armed forces is to advise the political branches, on request, on questions
of military policy. The dispersal of power over military affairs between the President and Con-
gress, its further dispersal within Congress, and the American custom of public discussion make it
likely that opposing viewpoints in the armed forces will be requested by one of the dispersed
centers of political power and thereby brought to public attention. These views, like all other
policy preferences, will contend for the approval of Congress. This activity, however, is a process
of advocacy through constitutional channels, as part of official duties, often at the request of some
portion of Congress. It carries no actual or implicit threat of coercive action by any group in the
military if their advice is disregarded. See S. FINER, supra note 236, at 142-44; S. HUNTINGTON,
supra note 236, at 377-84, 400-23.
241. The enlisted men of half the divisions in the French Army mutinied in 1917 after a
bloody fiasco, and the men of the Russian Army simply walked away en masse that summer. See
J. BUNYAN & H. FISHER, THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION 24-27 (1934); R. WATt, DARE CALL IT
TREASON 115-205, 211 (1963). The French Army has never disclosed the full extent of the muti-
nies of 1917. R. WATr, supra, at 308-10. Similar incidents on a much smaller scale happened in
the United States Army in Vietnam. See D. CORTWRIGHT, supra note 3, at 28-49; W. HAUSER,
supra note 3, at 98-102; C. MosKos, THE AMERICAN ENLISTED MAN 143 (1970).
242. See 2 A. NEVINS, THE WAR FOR THE UNION: WAR BECOMES REVOLUTION 1862-63, at
159-60 (1960). There is some reason to believe that McClellan's staff would have been willing to
use the Army to impose their own policy on Lincoln. See id. at 231 n.38. The administration
suspected that some of McClellan's senior officers were more loyal to him and his policies than to
the government. See id. at 330 n.19, 400. Cf. M. CUNLIFFE, supra note 178, at 322-24, 326-27.
243. This so-called "Curragh Mutiny" of 1914 is an extraordinary episode in English history.
Asquith's Liberal Government, needing the votes of the Irish Nationalist members of Parliament
to stay in power, had passed a "Home Rule" act giving all Ireland a single Parliament of its own
with authority over domestic matters. See Government of Ireland Act, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 90
(1914). This government would have been dominated by the Catholic majority of the Irish popu-
lation. The Protestants of Ulster formed a paramilitary organization, the Ulster Volunteers, to
resist the home rule government by violence. They were supported by the leading figures of the
Conservative Party and by the conservative press. The Volunteers were officered by retired army
officers, many of Anglo-Irish background. Both Conservative leaders and generals hostile to
home rule urged officers to resign rather than suppress an Ulster rebellion, and the commander
and officers of a calvary brigade at Curragh did resign. This pressure forced the government to
offer to exclude Ulster from home rule. The crisis was aborted only by the outbreak of World
War I. Seegeneraly F. BIRKENHEAD, F.E. 224-39 (1959); K. CHORLEY, ARMIES AND THE ART OF
REVOLUTION 91-96 (1943); G. DANGERFIELD, THE STRANGE DEATH OF LIBERAL ENGLAND 342-
47 (1935). The decision of a substantial number of Southern officers to fight for the Confederacy
provides an interesting parallel. See S. AMBROSE, DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY: A HISTORY OF
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War movement also advocated refusal of service by military personnel as a
way to end the war.244 It is evident that the civil government cannot be said to
control policy if the armed forces, separately or in alliance with political mi-
norities in the civilian community, can collectively veto measures that they
oppose. As long as the Constitution gives the President and Congress the au-
thority to determine the ends for which military force will be used, civilian
supremacy requires a system of military discipline that inculcates all ranks
with an attitude of active subordination, te., the will to carry out the instruc-
tions of their civilian superiors despite their own disagreement.
Both forms of civilian supremacy must be maintained even though the
members of the armed forces come from a civilian society in the throes of
political conffict. The opposition to the Vietnam War was the norm in Ameri-
can history. With the possible exception of World War II and the Korean
War, every major war the United States fought since 1789 has been opposed
by a vocal and articulate minority. The vehement and telling opposition to the
Mexican War by members of Congress, including Lincoln, and antiwar intel-
lectuals such as Thoreau and Lowell, compares favorably to their counterparts
in the Sixties, 245 and the arguments of the anti-Imperialists during the Phil-
lipine Insurrection prefigure those used against the war in Vietnam.246 During
the Civil War, the opposition impeded recruiting, obstructed conscription, en-
couraged desertion, impaired public credit, and, until two months before the
1864 election, appeared likely to defeat Lincoln on a peace platform. 247 Simi-
lar activities by New England Federalists during the War of 1812 brought the
federal government to the point of collapse.248 On the basis of history, it must
WEST POINT 169-71 (1966); M. CUNLIFFE, supra note 178, at 328-37, 373-75; 1 D. FREEMAN,
ROBERT E. LEE 410-68 (1934); S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 236, at 212-13. Refusal to defend the
government against groups with whom the military sympathizes is not an uncommon mode of
military intervention in politics. See S. FINER, supra note 236, at 151-53. For a contemporary
American example, one might imagine the Chief of Staff of the Army, with the support of South-
ern members of Congress, telling President Kennedy that the Army would not support the admis-
sion of James Meredith to the University of Mississippi.
244. See generally D. CORTRIGHT, supra note 3, at 9-16, 50-75, 106-16, 123-26; H.R. REP. No.
301, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 54, 59-73 (1973). The House Report summarizes the testimony in Investi-
gation of ,4ttempts to Subvert the United States Armed Services, pts. 1, 2, & 3, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972), three volumes of hearings by the House Internal Security Committee. The prevalence and
military effect of politically conscious refusal of duty is a matter of some doubt. Both its advo-
cates, see, e.g., D. CORTRIGHT, supra note 3, and its more extreme opponents on the House Inter-
nal Security Committee were interested in playing up its scope and effect. Other observers, e.g., L.
RADINE, supra note 195, at 17-29, believe that the armed forces were able to develop systems of
social control that effectively neutralized politically motivated resistance.
245. See generally Merk, Dissent in the Mexican War, in DISSENT IN THREE WARS (1970).
246. See generally Freidel, Dissent in the Spanish American War and the Philippine Insurrec-
tion, in DISSENT IN THREE WARS (1970).
247. For a discussion of the draft riots in New York, see 3 A. NEVINS, THE WAR FOR THE
UNION: THE ORGANIZED WAR 1863-64, at 119-27, 377-78 (1971).
248. The War of 1812 was declared only by a vote of 79-49 in the House of Representatives
and 19-13 in the Senate, with substantial defections from the majority party. 6 H. ADAMS, HIS-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 227-29 (1921). It was extremely unpopular in New
England, where the financial community boycotted government debt, preferring to lend to Eng-
land. 8 id. at 15-19. An element of the Federalist Party in New England, with popular support,
seriously considered secession. Id. at 7-11, 287-310.
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be assumed that the opponents of any future war will attempt to use the polit-
ical process to alter the government's choice of ends or means.
Political opposition to an ongoing war, moreover, is an essential aspect of
the constitutional system. The legitimacy of the decision to use military force
derives solely from the consent of the public through their representatives, and
its withdrawal, expressed through the political process, terminates the gover-
ment's authority. The logic of the war power itself, as well as the first amend-
ment, should preclude its use to preserve a fictitious consent through
suppression of civilian criticism of ends and means. While this principle has
been too often honored in the breach,249 it should strictly limit the political
branches' power to preserve military willingness to obey by silencing civilian
opposition. At the same time, the principle of civilian supremacy requires the
armed forces to execute the previously chosen policy of the political branches
unless and until the political process induces a change. Reconciling the two
requires the members of the armed forces to dissociate their job performance
from their own political values as influenced by the civilian community.
To say that the purpose of the armed forces is to fight wars, then, is to say
that the Constitution contemplates them as a means through which the United
States applies force for whatever reasons and to whatever degree the elected
branches of the government decide that the exigencies of international rela-
tions require. To say that the armed forces are subject to civilian control is to
say that the threat to use or withhold force as a means of imposing the will of
members of the armed forces on the elected branches is repugnant to the Con-
stitution. The fundamental military policy of the Constitution, underlying
both unlimited exigency and civilian supremacy, is that the members of the
armed forces are to be the instruments, and only the instruments, of policies
arrived at and legitimated by the public's perceptions of the world developed
through an ongoing and vigorous political process.
B. Military Necessity and the Individual
The position of the armed forces under the Constitution requires the indi-
vidual serviceman to subordinate his own preferences to the demands made on
the organization by the political branches of the government. The techniques
of achieving that subordination have been widely reflected upon by social
scientists and military theorists. As presented below, they consist of a combi-
nation of psychological manipulation and formal sanctions, which induce the
serviceman to identify his own self-esteem and well being with the success of
the organization to which he belongs.
The armed forces are an example of a rational bureaucracy: a hierarchi-
249. The prewar opposition to World War I, for example, was thoroughly repressed after the
outbreak and had little effect on majority opinion at the time. See R. MuRAY, RED SCARE 19-39
(1955). See also United States ex rel Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burlesrn,
255 U.S. 407 (1921) (upholding revocation of a newspaper's mailing privilege for advocating dis-
loyalty to the United States); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1918) (sustaining the conviction
of an antiwar socialist for obstructing recruiting and enlistment efforts of the armed forces).
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cal organization characterized by a specialized division of labor according to
system and authority based on role rather than personality, in which each in-
dividual's role is to pursue goals established by the heads of the hierarchy
through methods that they have calculated will attain these goals. In any such
organization the needs and desires of an individual member may conflict with
the demands of his role; if he chooses to follow the former, the functioning of
the organization is impeded. A rational bureaucracy therefore needs a system
of discipline that will induce the individual to fulfill the demands of his role
even when they are inconsistent with his own interests.
250
Methods of discipline can be classified into two general types: direct (su-
pervised) and indirect (internalized). The first consists of rules governing indi-
vidual behavior, sanctions for noncompliance or rewards for compliance, and
application of sanctions by superiors in the hierarchy who scrutinize individ-
ual behavior. Since it works by deterring deviant behavior through fear of
sanctions, it depends on effective surveillance by a sufficiently numerous and
motivated group of superiors, who in turn require a discipline of their own.
251
Direct discipline does not meet the organization's needs if the nature of the
task or the lack of enough competent supervisors requires the individual to
function without pervasive surveillance.
Indirect or internalized discipline brings the individual to identify his
own emotional well being with the goals of the organization so that he will
consider it in his own interest to fufill his role even when there is no prospect
of scrutiny by superiors. It dissolves the conflict between organizational and
individual interest by submerging the individual ego in the well being of the
group. It is initially achieved by depriving the new member of the group of
self-esteem and permitting him to regain it by successfully conforming to the
group's norms, and it is reinforced by devices such as paternalistic concern for
the individual, participation in symbolic activities that demonstrate the impor-
tance of the group, and isolation of the individual from alternative sources of
moral judgment and self-esteem. 252 Indirect discipline, therefore, requires
that the individual be directly compelled to do certain things not because they
themselves affect the organization's goals, but because they psychologically
condition him to act in the future with only the supervision of his "organiza-
tional conscience."
Organizations with either system of discipline commonly have a discon-
tinuous hierarchy: management-labor, staff-inmates, officers-enlisted men.
The upper group uses substantial judgment and discretion to determine the
goals of the organization, while the lower group at best exercises the skills of
250. See generally A. ETZIONI, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS
(1961). See also S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 236, at 7-18.
251. See A. ETZIONI, supra note 250, at 27-31. The use of a reward for individual perform-
ance, e.g., promotion or piece-work wages, is merely the reverse of a sanction in that it requires
that performance be observed, and it leaves the individual with the incentive to obtain the benefit
without the prescribed effort.
252. See E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 14-35, 63-64 (1961); B. MOORE, INJUSTICE: THE SOCIAL BA-
SES OF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT 64-75 (1978); L. RADINE, supra note 195, at 38-43.
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craftsmen under upper group supervision and at worst, as in a prison, are mere
objects for the upper group's control. The upper group considers its directive
function the most important and assigns itself most of the material and emo-
tional benefits of the organization's success. 253 Greater discretion requires,
and great benefit permits, the discipline of the upper group to depend more on
internalization and less on surveillance than that of the lower group. Its mem-
bers must identify strongly both with the goals of the organization and with
the status of their group within it, for their performance, including the supervi-
sion of the lower group, depends primarily on their organizational
conscience.
254
The armed forces are peculiarly dependent on internalized discipline.
Like any other rational bureaucracy, they need reliable performance by indi-
viduals despite fatigue, boredom, indifference, venality, and distraction by
competing rewards. Direct discipline is of limited use to them. Their ultimate
organizational goal is successful combat,255 which, for the servicemen who ac-
tually do the fighting, has drastic disincentives that outweigh most normal co-
ercive sanctions. The role of the armed forces also presents moral and
political justifications for any serviceman to refuse military requirements that
he finds burdensome. Finally, those in a position to direct the behavior of
large portions of the armed forces for their own ends may have enough power
to disregard formal legal sanctions. Despite the common concept of military
authority as rigid and formal, the armed forced therefore depend heavily on
internalized restraints to assure effectiveness and civilian supremacy.
The most distinctively military activity, and the one that places the great-
est strain on the serviceman, is ground combat. The combat infantryman faces
the continuing prospect of death, maiming, or injury while tired, hungry,
thirsty, and exposed to the worst extremes of climate. He is isolated from his
normal sources of esteem, affection, and sexual gratification, and suffers con-
stant, debilitating uncertainty about the intentions of the enemy and his own
253. See A. ETZIONI, supra note 250, at 16; E. GOFFMAN, supra note 252, at 7-9.
254. See E. GOFFMAN, supra note 252, at 84-92; L. RADINE, supra note 195, at 63-55; Little,
BuddyRelations and Combat Performance, in THE NEW MILITARY 213-15 (M. Janowitz ed. 1964).
The elite often work and live apart from the members of the organization, and therefore depend
for immediate supervision on "straw bosses"-non-commissioned officers, foremen, Kapos, trust-
ees-drawn from the population of the lower group. See, e.g., L. RADINE, supra note 195, at 63-
65, 75-76.
255. This is true even when combat is not intended to occur, because the usefulness of a threat
of force depends on both sides' belief that the threat could actually be carried out. As von Clause-
witz puts it:
Combat is the only effective force in war;, its aim is to destroy the enemy's forces as a
means to a further end. That holds good even if no actual fighting occurs, because the
outcome rests on the assumption that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be de-
stroyed. It follows that the destruction of the enemy's force underlies all military actions;
all plans are ultimately based on it, resting on it like an arch on its abutment. Conse-
quently, all action is undertaken in the belief that if the ultimate test of arms should
actually occur, the outcome would be favorable. The decision by arms is for all major
and minor operations in war what cash payment is in commerce. Regardless how com-
plex the relationship between the two parties, regardless how rarely settlements actually
occur, they can never be entirely absent.
C. VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 200, at 97.
[Vol. 62
SER VICEMEN'S RIGHTS
superiors. The situation bluntly confronts him with the fact that he is a mere
means to his superiors' ends, of no intrinsic human worth to them, caught in
circumstances beyond his control. He must overcome his own fear, and he
must routinely commit acts that would be grossly immoral by his prior civilian
standards.2 56 Modem firepower compels troops to disperse and take cover for
protection, and the infantryman is often alone, unable to see what is happen-
ing around him and out of contact with his superiors. 257 To perform effec-
tively, the infantryman must display both endurance and initiative while
frightened, exhausted, disgusted, and beyond the direct supervision of officers.
How men from industrialized Western societies are brought to do this is
the subject of a considerable body of literature which agrees on one central
point: the soldier's behavior under combat stress is mainly determined by the
standards of his "primary group." The primary group is the small number of
persons, usually a squad or less, with whom the individual shares the immedi-
ate hardships of military life and on whom he depends for safety and success
in combat. Each member of the group gives essential help to the others in
minimizing risk while meeting the army's demands. Because of this mutual
dependence, the group also provides the principal source of personal affection
and esteem for the individual. Primary group standards are developed by a
consensus dominated by a few "hard core" members whose performance the
others admire. Group disapproval and consequent isolation from mutual sup-
port is the most powerful sanction the individual faces. As long as the primary
group's members are mutually dependent, the soldier will see his main obliga-
tion as earning its esteem at the expense of both self-indulgence and the for-
mal goals of the Army. Each will do what he thinks those closest to him
expect him to do.258
"Primary group solidarity does not automatically ensure that an organiza-
tion will perform effectively. . . . Studies of industrial organizations have
noted that cohesive primary groups can at times supply the basis for group
256. See S. MARSHALL, MEN AGAINST FIRE 44-50, 70-78 (1947); C. MosKos, supra note 241,
at 140-41; 2 S. STOUFFER, A. LUMSDAINE, M. LUMSDAINE, R. WILLIAMS, M. SMITH, I. JANIS, S.
STAR, & L. COTTRELL, THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: COMBAT AND ITS AFTERMATH 76-89 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as AMERICAN SOLDIER: COMBAT). Cf. C. VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 200, at
113-21 (danger a part of the friction of war).
257. S. MARSHALL, supra note 256, at 123-37.
258. See AMERICAN SOLDIER: COMBAT, supra note 256, at 135-49; George, Primary Groups,
Organization, and Military Performance, in HANDBOOK OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONS 293 (R. Little
ed. 1971); Little, supra note 254, at 204-07; Shils & Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration in the
Wehrmacht in World War II, 12 PUB. OPINION Q. 280 (1948).
The experience with the Army's rotation policy in Vietnam demonstrates that the strength of
the primary group comes from the mutual dependence of its members. During the Vietnam War,
soldiers served a 12-month tour in that country, and every man knew his rotation date. Towards
the end of their tour, individuals tended to withdraw from involvement in combat out of concern
for surviving until their certain escape from danger. Since survival through rotation did not de-
pend on any particular outcome of the war, the result for the "short-timer" was "a perspective that
is essentially private and self-concerned." C. MosKos, supra note 241, at 141-44.
Moskos also points out quite clearly that engagement in the primary group comes from the
individual's belief that his self-interest depends on the support of his fellows, which can only be
obtained by reciprocal support. The transaction, at bottom, is a pragmatic, self-interested one,
limited at the point where the individual sees his contribution as excessive. Id at 144-46.
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opposition to the goals of management." 259 The group acts for its own mutual
interest, which may not be the same as the organization's. While the "dud"
who doesn't pull his own weight is despised, the "hero" who is overeager to
court danger is equally disliked.260 Combat units are therefore most effective
when the moral standards of the group move in the same direction as the
formal demands of the organization,261 and any effective system of military
discipline influences the primary group to this end.
The first influence on the primary group are certain values its members
bring from the larger culture. One is respect for competence; most Americans
want to be thought good at their jobs by knowledgeable observers. All of the
mummery of decorations, distinctive insignia, and esprit de corps bestows
praise to this end, within the larger military community, on individuals and
groups who meet or surpass its formal standard of performance. 262 A more
potent source of approval within the group is the attitude of "aggressive mas-
culinity" that emphasizes the importance of "being a man" and identifies
manhood with participation in violence, endurance of pain and hardship, and
control of fear in the face of danger. Shame at not "being a man" is a power-
ful sanction within the combat primary group; esteem from outsiders for such
manhood is one of the principal rewards available to combat personnel within
the military community.263 It is in the interest of any military organization to
reinforce these values and thereby inculcate the belief that those who display
competence in the face of danger and hardship deserve and get esteem.
The second influence on the primary group is the leadership of junior
officers and noncommissioned officers (N.C.O.s). The company commander
and platoon leaders are the only officers who have regular direct contact with
enlisted men, and their principal function, supported by the N.C.O.s, is to
transmit to the men the demands of the organization and to represent the in-
terests of the men in dealing with higher authority.264 The formal sanctions
available to the immediate leaders will not exact more than minimum combat
performance.265 To obtain the willing cooperation of the primary group, of-
ficers must demonstrate prestige and exercise paternal authority. Prestige re-
quires the officer to justify his formal status in the eyes of the men by
demonstrating solidarity in hardship plus superior skill and military virtue.
Paternalism requires him to use his formal authority to provide the best avail-
259. Little, supra note 254, at 195.
260. See T. ASHWORTH, TRENCH WARFARE 1914-1918, at 157-68 (1980); Little, supra note
254, at 202-04.
261. Little, supra note 254, at 205-07; Shils & Janowitz, supra note 258, at 281-82.
262. See L. RADINE, supra note 195, at 61 nn.28-30; I S. STOUFFER, E. SUCHMAN, L. DEVIN-
NEY, S. STAR, & R. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT DURING ARMY LIFE 166-
68, 309-12 (1949) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT]; AMERICAN SOLDIER:
COMBAT, supra note 256, at 309-12.
263. See AMERICAN SOLDIER: COMBP.T, supra note 256, at 131-35, 309. Cf. Shils & Janowitz,
supra note 258, at 292-94. But see Little, supra note 254, at 205.
264. See AMERICAN SOLDIER: COMBAT, supra note 256, at 118-19; Little, supra note 254, at
208-1 1.
265. See S. MARSHALL, supra note 256, at 22, 40-41; AMERICAN SOLDIER: COMBAT, supra
note 256, at 100-118; Little, supra note 254, at 208-09; Shils & Janowitz, supra note 258, at 297.
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able material comfort and protect his subordinates from unnecessary danger
and harrassment insofar as possible. The exercise of superior skill and pater-
nal care demonstrates "status potency"-the officer's power to decrease uncer-
tainty and control the environment in the interest of the primary group. This
creates a relation of dependency in which the officer is an important source of
esteem and security for the group and in which the demands of higher author-
ity which he transmits are accepted as legitimate because they come through
him. Loyalty is returned for care.2 66 It follows that the junior officer or
noncommisioned officer's personal authority will be increased to the extent
that he actually has greater power to control the environment of the primary
group than its members do.
The junior commissioned officer has conflicting loyalties that raise diffi-
culties for the higher authorities. On the one hand, his informal authority over
his subordinates increases as he identifies with their interests and protects
them from the Army's demands. On the other, his informal authority is useful
to the Army only because it makes him better able to enforce its demands. It
is not uncommon for company-grade officers, and even higher-ranking leaders
of combat formations, to identify with the well being of "their" men and resist
the demands of the organization. The organization, however, requires that
they see the "necessity" of hardships and danger for subordinates primarily in
terms of its contribution to the organization's success. It therefore uses the
privileges and conventions of rank to segregate officers into a distinct primary
group in which committment to the goals of the organization is the principal
group value.267
Manipulation of the primary group to obtain willing compliance with the
Army's demands in combat has its limits. The group is attempting to make the
best of a bad situation for its members by cooperative action. Military com-
petence and aggressive masculinity are virtues in combat, but almost all mem-
bers of the group, given the choice, wouldn't be in combat.2 68 Successful
paternal leadership is much less common than officers like to think;2 69 it is
also hampered by rotation of officers because of casualties or personnel pol-
icy.27 0 In any event, successful paternalism depends on having authority to
meet or exceed expectations; it doesn't explain the level of those expectations.
The group will do as much or as little as it thinks necessary, perhaps more for
a particularly good leader. But the question remains: why do they think it
266. See L. RADINE, supra note 195, at 60; AMERICAN SOLDIER: COMBAT, supra note 256, at
118-27; George, supra note 258, at 303; Little, supra note 254, at 208-11; Shils & Janowitz, supra
note 258, at 297-300. See generally B. MOORE, supra note 252, at 17-23 (analysis of authority
relationships in terms of social contract theory). For an example of the exact opposite of this
pattern of leadership, and the consequent collapse of military authority, see D. HORN, supra note
238, at 27-49.
267. See Little, supra note 254, at 213-15. See also H. MELVILLE, WHITE JACKET 202-04
(1952) (contrasts effects of news of war on officers and common seamen).
268. See AMERICAN SOLDIER: COMBAT, supra note 256, at 22-23, 244-50, 336; AMERICAN
SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT, supra note 262, at 524.
269. There was a wide gap in World War II between officer's self-perception and enlisted
men's attitudes. See AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT, supra note 262, at 394-98, 410-23.
270. See Little, supra note 254, at 220-21; Shils & Janowitz, supra note 258, at 299.
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necessary? Why do members of the group accept the basic situation and
forego individual or collective escape from it?2
71
One reason is the apparent power of formal authority. By the time that
servicemen reach the combat situation, their experience with formal military
discipline should have accustomed them to obedience by demonstrating that
the Army does have the power to detect and punish overt resistance or non-
compliance by individuals.272 One of the principal purposes of basic training,
for example, is to show the trainees just how easily they can be made to submit
to the Army's authority.273 Moreover, pervasive authority does not merely
condition the individual to compliance; it also causes the primary group to
protect itself from organizational sanctions by turning against members who
are conspicuous deviants.2
74
A second reason is that formal authority can be used to define the limits
of the serviceman's environment and thus his expectations. A military organi-
zation is what Goffman called a "total institution": work, subsistence, and
recreation are all under the control of a single authority.275 Once such an
organization has shown its power to completely withhold esteem, comfort, and
leisure, it can establish a baseline of expectation from which any increase will
appear to be an act of benevolence by the individual responsible.276 Paternal-
ism and its fruits therefore depend in part on the power to isolate the service-
man from sources of well being not under military control.
A third reason is moral legitimacy. It is common knowledge that patriot-
ism or devotion to the "cause" provides little positive motivation in combat.
277
Nevertheless, there is no ground for willing cooperation with the organization
unless the members of the group at least accept the basic rectitude of their
social system and the justice of its subjecting them to their present hardship.
78
Similarly, principled opposition to the government's demands is rarely
the direct cause of the group's rejection of military authority. As the exper-
iences of the French Army and the German Navy in World War I demon-
strate, resistance first coalesces around nonideological threats to the group's
well being--danger, poor material conditions, degrading use of military au-
271. In combat, the alternatives for escape are desertion, active surrender, passive surrender,
or collective mutiny. See Shils & Janowitz, supra note 258, at 282-83.
272. See M. JANOWITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER 43 (1960); AMERICAN SOLDIER: COM-
BAT, su pra note 256, at 112-14.
Conversely, organizational control is on the verge of collapse when a number of individuals
are seen to conspicuously defy formal authority without any penalty. If enough disobey at the
same time, the resources of formal authority are overwhelmed by numbers. See R. WATT, supra
note 241, at 180-83, 186-87.
273. See L. RADINE, supra note 195, at 8, 40-42.
274. See B. MOORE, supra note 252, at 72; L. RADINE, supra note 195, at 42, 45-46.
275. See E. GOFFMAN, supra note 252, at 4-7; cf. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974) (The
Army is a soldier's "employer, landlord, provisioner, and lawgiver in one.").
276. See L. RADiNE, supra note 195, at 38-42. Cf. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 252, at 14-52;
AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT, supra note 262, at 389-91.
277. See T. ASHWORTH, supra note 260, at 205; AMERICAN SOLDIER: COMBAT, supra note
256, at 149-51; Little, supra note 254, at 205.




thority. Only then is it rationalized by principled criticism of the government's
right to place the group in its situation. 279 Moreover, acceptance or rejection
of legitimacy by the "hard core" of the primary group, those individuals who
give the other members examples of effective behavior, is particularly impor-
tant.280 As Moore points out, individuals are far more likely to assert their
own tentative moral objections to an apparently strong authority when they
see someone else do so or know they are supported by others.2s 1 Continued
acceptance, then, depends on the absence of persuasive reasons to believe that
the situation should not be endured, especially when expressed by individuals
around whom primary groups can form.
In conclusion, the combat infantryman from a Western industrial society
overcomes the stress of combat because it is expected of him by those on
whom he is mutually dependent and because he and his fellows believe they
have no choice but to meet the demands of the Army, transmitted through
leaders on whom he is emotionally and physically dependent, and from which
he does not fundamentally dissent. As far as the expectations of the primary
group can be manipulated into harmony with the Army's demands, its mem-
bers will internalize those demands and fight effectively without direct super-
vision. On the other hand, when the perceived interests of the group lie in
resistance, the Army will lose effectiveness or even disintegrate. Effective ma-
nipulation therefore requires the use of formal, coercive authority to place the
soldier's environment under the control of his superiors.
282
279. See D. HORN, supra note 238, at 68-93, 98-101, 123-26; L. RADINE, supra note 195, at 9-
10, 34-38, 78-79, 115-16; R. WATT, supra note 241, at 175-78, 180-83, 188-96, 201-05. A critical
role in this process is played by members who have pre-existing political convictions. These indi-
viduals emerge as the new "hard core" of the group and exercise informal authority within it.
See, e.g., D. HORN, supra note 238, at 77-78, 101-02; R. WArr, supra note 241, at 204-05. Cf. B.
MOORE, supra note 252, at 69-70 (prisoners with strong religious or political convictions most
likely to survive concentration camps). As Radine puts it:
The organizer has the dual task of battling authority and minimizing internal conflict; he
must get these alienated men to trust each other, to cooperate, to defend each other, and
to be committed to the goals of the resisting organization. (It is interesting that the resist-
ance organizer faces the same problem of morale that military commanders do).
L. RADINE, supra note 195, at 78-79.
280. See L. RADINE, supra note 195, at 12-13, 78-79, 115-17; Shils & Janowitz, supra note 258,
at 286-87.
281. B. MOORE, supra note 252, at 92-100.
282. The origin and suppression of the great French Army mutiny of May-June 1917, in
which at least half of the Army's divisions refused to return to the trenches and several units
attempted to march on Paris, illustrates the interaction of these elements. The troops rejected
control after a much heralded "win the war" offensive failed with appalling casualties. The ap-
parent futility of further suffering led to spontaneous refusals of duty by several infantry units.
These, when on a large scale, could not be punished, and the example led to a collapse of formal
authority in the divisions that had suffered worst. Some mutineers then began to express political
opposition to the war in the same terms as the active French antiwar movement. The cavalry
divisions, which had not suffered serious losses, remained obedient and were often used to repress
infantry mutineers.
General Petain, appointed Commander in Chief in May 1917, restored control through a
combination of placation, paternalism and repression. He first let it be known that he would
adopt a new strategy that would minimize French loss of life; his reputation among the troops
made this a credible promise, and he kept it. He also improved food, increased leave, and pro-
vided rest facilities for men coming out of the trenches. At the same time, though, he encouraged
subordinate commanders to shoot a proportion of mutineers, either known informal leaders, or, in
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These same considerations apply to noncombat military personnel. As a
preliminary matter, the distinction between combat and noncombat is not ab-
solute but a continuum. The infantry rifleman is the extreme case of physical
hardship, isolation and danger. Members of combat crews-machinegunners,
artillerymen, tankers, sailors and aircrew, for example-typically act in groups
with close contact, less exposure to enemy fire, and divided responsibility for
the act of killing.283 Frequently their living conditions are more comfortable
and their danger more intermittent. Behind them come the staff, supply, and
maintenance personnel who may be the targets of enemy fire but whose own
duties do not involve applying violence. Behind them are the totally safe ech-
elons who neither fight nor are fired upon, but whose individual members may
be reassigned forward. Finally, there are those servicemen who, for physical
or other reasons, will never be exposed and who are in no more, or less, danger
than civilians. In peacetime, of course, even "combat" personnel do not face
combat stress. At all stages of the continuum, however, the same process of
resistance to military demands occurs, and the military demand for a disci-
pline is the same.
Concededly danger, hardship, and moral stress are lower in noncombat
positions. Deprivations do exist, however. The rear-echelon serviceman is
still removed from his chosen surroundings, cut off from family and friends,
required to perform work he often does not find satisfying (not to mention
casual labor and "chicken"), subjected to seemingly arbitrary authority, lim-
ited in his access to sexual gratification, and forced to accept a lower standard
of food, accomodation, and recreation than he knew in civilian life. His own
hardships may appear worse by contrast if officers have superior access to the
limited supply of comforts and there is no common experience of danger to
mitigate the resentment this produces. He lacks the esteem given combat
troops and he knows it. The rear-echelon or peacetime enlisted man is there-
fore likely to be alienated from the armed forces. Even during World War II,
the collective attitude of American enlisted men favored a low level of effort,
tolerated "gold-bricking" that did not make more work for other members of
the group, believed that good work was not rewarded, and disapproved of
individuals who conspiciously tried to meet the organization's require-
ments. 284 Attitudes have hardly improved since. While the incentives to
resistance may be less, the armed forces face significant problems of individual
alienation from organizational requirements among noncombat personnel.
The military's interest in overcoming alienation among noncombat per-
some cases, a random selection. Many of the shootings were contrary to French military law. By
September 1917 the French Army was again an effective military instrument, and it retained its
cohesion to the end of the war. The surviving mutineers, however, won a partial victory: Petain
left the main burden of offensive combat for the rest of the war to the British and Americans, See
generally R. WATT, supra note 241, at 146-246.
283. The task structure of the crew strengthens both the group control of the individual and
organizational control of the group. See S. MARSHALL, supra note 256, at 75-76; L. RADINE, supra
note 195, at 138-41.
284. See AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT, supra note 262, at 155-68, 186-89, 211-16, 219-
29, 337-61, 364-75, 410-29.
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sonnel does not depend on the skills the serviceman uses in his job. The pur-
pose of noncombat personnel is to provide reliable support services to combat
units. An army must be fed, clothed, housed, supplied, transported, paid, and
administered in order to fight, and its ability to fight depends in large part on
how efficiently and reliably these services are performed.28 5 A mechanized
army away from its own country must have available for support a miniature
version of the industrial society that produced it; it cannot live off the country
for fuel, ammunition, and parts.286 If the support components of an army are
not as subject to the commander's will as are the combat components, they
may withdraw whenever they find their situation to be too far from home, too
dangerous, or not remunerative enough. Military history between the Renais-
sance and the nineteenth century is full of instances of civilian supply contrac-
tors, teamsters, and even artillery drivers disappearing when most needed.
The commander whose supporting personnel were under military obligations
of obedience and attendance had an advantage over an opponent with only an
army of combat troops. The result has been the steady militarization of sup-
ply, transport, and maintenance since the late seventeenth century.2 87 Regard-
less of the particular duties he performs, the noncombat serviceman is a means
to the same end as the combatant. He may not face as much danger, but the
armed forces have the same reason to induce him to comply willingly with the
requirements of his job.
288
From the viewpoint of the government, then, the ideal serviceman is one
who has mastered the skills of his particular assignment and has internalized
enough of the values of the armed forces to do his job without direct supervi-
sion despite fear, hardship, or moral or political disagreement with the ends he
serves or the means he employs. The ideal is, of course, hypothetical; a real
discipline for the armed forces will fall short of it because a rational military
organization must adjust to the basic values of the society from which it draws
its personnel. An individual enters the armed forces with his convictions
about his own dignity already formed by the first 18-20 years of his life. In the
United States, he comes from a society that has taught him to think of himself
as a person of independent worth, entitled to a fairly high minimum of dignity
and identity, able to exercise independent judgement without regard to hierar-
chy or tradition. By entering the armed forces he has not, unlike a religious
novice, for example, renounced this self-concept. Nor is it possible to isolate
him completely enough and long enough to eradicate it. He retains his civilian
285. See C. VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 200, at 95, 128-29.
286. Every rule has an exception. During the 4nschluss of Austria, the German supply ar-
rangements broke down, and the tanks got to Vienna only by filling up at civilian gas stations. H.
GUDERIAN, PANZER LEADER 51 (1953).
287. See generally C. BARNETT, BRITAIN AND HER ARMY 1509-1970, at 96-97, 127, 144-45,
178, 213-14, 239, 260 (1970); L. MONTROSS, WAR THROUGH THE AGEs 179, 273, 350, 402 (3d ed.
1960); T. Ropp, supra note 176, at 42; M. VAN CREVELD, SUPPLYING WAR 5-13, 18-19, 21, 26-27,
30, 34, 37, 42-43, 49-53, 77-80 (1977).
288. This is not to say that the means of inducing effective compliance will not be more "man-
agerial" and less coercive than those used for the combat soldier. See L. RADINE, supra note 195,
at 88-142. It merely asserts that the armed forces have the equivalent interest in exercising how-
ever much authority is needed to induce willing compliance.
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associations, family and friends, desires to communicate with them and to re-
tain their esteem, and has his attitudes reinforced by them. He wants access to
the civilian community in his leisure time; temporary release on pass or leave
is one of the more valuable amenities his superiors can give him.289 When in
the civilian community, he has access to civilian values through the media and
through personal contact. Depriving him of the dignity and identity he had
been raised to expect will tend to make him hostile to the armed forces. There-
fore, a rational military organization, once it has demonstrated its basic au-
thority over the serviceman during initial entry, would avoid needless friction
and hostility by allowing him as much of his preexisting rights as are consis-
tent with social control.290 The armed forces are not always rational; superiors
frequently develop emotional attachment to military practices that do not en-
hance efficiency but do alienate the men subject to them. 291 Nevertheless, a
military organization concerned with effective performance rather than the
comfort and emotional well being of its senior officers would tend to adopt its
discipline to the culture from which it recruits. It would do so, however, as a
manipulative device, providing whatever degree of "civilian" liberties and
amenities would best induce its members to submerge themselves in its tasks.
C. Judicial Protection of Individual Rights
At this point it is useful to summarize. The first, and fundamental propo-
sition is that under the Constitution the President and a majority of each
House of Congress may, if they use the proper procedures, lawfully employ
any degree of military force against any foreign state, for any purpose, so long
as they retain the acquiescence of a majority of their voting constituents.292
The individuals who comprise the armed forces are their instruments with
which to accomplish this force. As such they must be made technically effi-
cient.293 They also must be made subordinate to the result of the civilian
political process, unwilling both to turn their proficiency in violence against
their own government and to control policy by withdrawing their services.
Moreover, in the United States, this must be accomplished without repressing
the civilian political activity on which the legitimacy of the use of military
force rests. Accordingly, the individual members of the armed forces must be
induced to carry out the will of the political authorities for the time being,
despite personal hardship or political or moral disapproval. This is accom-
plished by a system of psychological manipulation, backed by coercion, that
289. See L. RADINE, supra note 195, at 38, 122-23, 131.
290. See generaly L. RADINE, supra note 195, at 88-142.
291. See infra text accompanying notes 358-59.
292. The effective conduct of war on a substantial scale requires, as a practical matter, the
assent of far more than half the voters in half the congressional constituencies. It would be unwise
for a government that could only command bare majority support to commit the country to war,
See, e.g., supra note 248. Such a war, however, would be legal.
293. A military organization as a whole is efficient to the extent that it can apply or threaten
force for the purposes chosen by the political authorities at the minimum cost to its own society in
life and property. See A. VAGTS, supra note 192, at 13. A serviceman is efficient to the extent that
his technical abilities and attitudes contribute to the organization's efficiency.
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detaches the serviceman from his civilian associations to make the proper
filling of his role in the organization his principal source of self-esteem.
From the viewpoint of the Constitution's war power, then, the individual
serviceman is simply a tool for achieving ends that the effective political ma-
jority may select as it sees fit. This relation is at first sight inconsistent with the
existence of judicially protected individual constitutional rights that may not
be overridden by majority action. To determine the extent of the inconsis-
tency and the degree to which either relation should prevail over the other, it is
necessary to set out the rationale for judicial development of antimajoritarian
rights.
When the political branches act within the limit of their constitutional
authority, they are generally free to decide whether to pursue a particular
course of action. A basic assumption of the American political system is that
this decision should be influenced by democratic responsibility, le., fear of
losing the next election if the total of any actor's decisions offends a majority
of his voting constituents. 294 The system consists of multiple actors represent-
ing separate constituencies, and the constituencies consist of many groups with
diverse preferences. Since each actor runs on his entire perceived record, the
voters must determine whether he has been, on the balance, a desirable repre-
sentative. To the extent that the President and Congress respond correctly to
anticipated voter reaction, the aggregate of their decisions will reflect the ag-
gregate balance of cost and benefit to the voting public as a whole, even
though various components of the voting public will oppose particular deci-
sions with varying intensity.2 95 To the extent that they are responsive, then,
the political branches will decide whether to pursue a course of action on some
approximation of the greatest aggregate good to the represented population.
The political branches are considered to be democratic to the extent that each
adult citizen of the population is equally able to have the nature and intensity
of his preferences reflected in that calculation.296 Political branch decisions
are legitimate, which is to say that the individual has a moral obligation to
obey those that affect him adversely, because the decisions are based on a
responsible democracy which has included his interests in the calculation of
the general good.
297
294. There may be more noble reasons for an elected official to serve what the public considers
its interest, but the desire to be re-elected is a check on even the most venal. See THE FEDERAL-
IST, supra note 207, No. 57, at 385-86 (J. Madison); id. No. 72, at 487-90 (A. Hamilton).
Subordinate executive officials, though not directly responsible to the electorate, are subject
to the direction of and can be discharged by the politically responsible President. U.S. CONST. art
II, § I, cl. 1; id art II, § 3, cl. 3. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Cf. Humphrey's
Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (limiting Myers to removal of purely executive officers).
295. See Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 405-
08 (1978).
Intensity may be defined as the individuals tendency to vote for or against a candidate on the
basis of his performance on a single issue. Id. at 407. See also R. DWORIUN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 90-92, 277 (1977) (discussion of collective goals).
296. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-67 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-18
(1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1963).
297. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 81-87 (1980); H. MAYO, INTRODUCTION TO
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 79-85 (1960).
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The political effect of a claim that an action is beyond the constitutional
power of the political branches is to transfer from them to the judiciary the
final authority to decide whether it may be done.298 On occasion the courts
may decide that a course of action is unconstitutional because the end it pur-
sues, such as de jure segregation, is itself forbidden.299 More often, the courts
must determine whether a means chosen by the political branches in pursuit of
a concededly lawful end must be forbidden because it infringes an institu-
tional or individual interest protected by the Constitution. When a court de-
termines that a particular means is unconstitutional, it leaves the political
branches free to pursue the end by other feasible means. Insofar as the polit-
ical branches have chosen the means through calculation of the highest aggre-
gate general good, constitutional protection of the conflicting interest requires
them to either impose greater costs on unprotected interests or, if that is not
politically feasible, to forego the end. If the means held unconstitutional is the
only technically or politically feasible one, the courts have in effect precluded
the political branches from pursuing an end which is itself permitted by the
Constitution.
In adjudicating a claim that an individual has a constitutional right not to
be subject to a government action taken in pursuit of a lawful end, the courts
decide whether they will allow an individual not to bear a cost that the polit-
ical branches, have determined he should bear for the benefit of the society as
a whole. To determine that the individual has a constitutional right to be free
of the government action is therefore to determine that the interest he asserts is
important enough that it should not be infringed even when the general good
would benefit from doing so.3°° Moreover, the courts receive only limited
assistance from the text of the Constitution itself in determining the nature
and gravity of the individual interests worthy of protection.
301
To decide an individual constitutional claim, then, a court must perform
three tasks. The first is to define the individual interest involved. It must then
determine the effect which protecting that interest will have on the attainment
of the ends chosen by the political branches. Having done so, the court must
finally decide whether the individual interest is sufficiently important that it
should be protected despite the effect. Because of the open ended nature of the
constitutional text, defining the scope of the individual interest is predomi-
nantly a question of values, as is deciding whether the individual interest out-
weighs the general goal that will be thwarted. The intermediate step of
calculating how far the general interest will be thwarted, however, is a ques-
tion of fact, or rather, a fact-based prediction of the future behavior of institu-
tions and large numbers of people. The willingness of a court to decide in
favor of the individual depends on its confidence that it is superior to the polit-
ical branches in defining and weighing individual interests, and that it can
298. See J. ELY, supra note 297, at 4.
299. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
300. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 295, at 4, 92, 270-7 1.
301. See id,supra note 295, at 135-36, 147, 272-74; J. ELY, upra note 297, at 11-41; T. EMER-
SON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, 3-20 (1970); Ely, supra note 295, at 412-15.
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predict with acceptable accuracy the consequences of preferring the
individual.
When the political branches decided to act, they necessarily weighed the
affected individual interests; a judicial decision constitutionalizing the individ-
ual interest rejects that balance.302 Since the federal courts are not politically
responsible, there has been great disagreement about how far they should sub-
stitute their own perception of the relative values involved for that of the more
democratic organs of government. The school of thought least willing to defer
to the judgment of the political branches has argued that the individual rights
protected by the Constitution are the fundamental moral values on which our
society rests, that the courts are best able to determine the nature and scope of
these values, and that, in the event of conflict, other objectives that the polit-
ical branches may pursue must defer to the maintenance of these values.
303
These views display the greatest confidence in the court's ability to adjust cor-
rectly the relation between individual autonomy and institutional interest;
they are characteristic of the dissenting position in the separate community
cases.3°4 If the power of the political branches to pursue military efficiency at
the expense of servicemen's interests can be defended against this strongly
judicialist approach to constitutional rights, it can withstand any theory of ju-
dicial review that gives greater deference to legislative judgment.
305
The judicialist position, as set forth primarily by Professor Dworkin, be-
gins with the distinction between "rules," "policies," "principles," and
"rights." A rule is an "if-then" statement about government action: if condi-
tion A exists, then the government must make consequence X happen.306 Poli-
cies and principles are the two justifications for rules. A policy is a reason for
acting to further a goal, i.e., some other social, economic, or political purpose.
A principle, on the other hand, is a reason for acting that states the result of
the action to be "fair, just, or otherwise moral in itself. '30 7 Policies are identi-
fied with the utilitarian pursuit of the collective well being, while a right is by
definition a situation in which the individual interest trumps the collective well
being. One has a right to a result if one must obtain that result despite its
effect on the collective good.308 Rights are based on the superiority of a moral
principle to the policy in question.
Rights may be either "background" or "institutional." A background
302. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 295, at 277; Ely, supra note 295, at 407-08.
303. See, e.g., R. DWORKdN, supra note 295; Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, Foreward:
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1979); Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, Foreward-
Equal Citizenship Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1977); Wellington, Com-
mon Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J.
221 (1973). But cf. J. ELY, supra note 297, at 43-72. See generally Dorsen, Book Review, 95
HARV. L. REv. 367, 385 nn.100 & 103 (1981) (reviewing H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX
FRANKFURTER (1981)).
304. See supra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
305. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 295, at 138-40.
306. Id, supra note 295, at 24.
307. Id, supra note 295, at 22; Wellington, supra note 303, at 222-27.
308. Id, supra note 295, at 4, 85, 90-92, 137.
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right is one that permits, though it does not compel, a political decision. An
institutional right is one that entitles the individual to a specific decision from
a particular institution.30 9 An institutional right, then, is a principle reduced
to a rule that entitles an individual in a particular situation to a favorable
decision despite a policy to the contrary.
In the judicialist view, the portions of the Constitution, notably the Bill of
Rights, that establish fundamental individual rights are not in themselves
rules. Instead, they are statements of principle from which the courts as an
institution must derive rules to fit particular situations. The courts have a duty
to interpret and apply the principles as an internally consistent body despite
the accidents of the particular situation. The common core of these principles,
by which they may be made to approach consistency, is the moral conception
that "government must treat those whom it governs with concern, that is, as
human beings who are capable of suffering and frustration, and with respect,
that is, as human beings who are capable of forming and acting on intelligent
conceptions of how their lives should be lived. 310 This is said to be the ruling
principle of the system of government established by the Constitution; it justi-
fies both democracy and the use of judicial review to check the tendency of
democracy to violate fundamental rights.311 The protection of the right to
equal human dignity and concern, as elaborated in free expression, personal
privacy, procedural fairness, and freedom from invidious discrimination, is
thus the primary purpose of the government. Other principles and policies are
subordinate to it.
The courts, in this view, are superior to the political branches in defining
and applying these moral principles. This process is ideally one of deriving
general principles from history, precedent, text, and philosophy through rea-
son and then applying them to the case at hand.3 12 The political branches,
insofar as they are responsible to the electorate, reflect the popular desires of
the moment on any particular issue. The public may not reflect on the relation
of a policy to fundamental principles, or if it does, it may lack the "dialectical
skill" to correctly relate the particular policy to the whole body of principle. 3 13
Moreover, calculations of individual good, which when aggregated produce
the political system's view of the general good, are invariably tainted with in-
difference or hostility to the equal dignity of disfavored groups.314 The judici-
ary, on the other hand, cannot refuse to consider questions of principle placed
on its agenda by parties, must respond to the arguments presented, and must
justify its decisions with reasoned explanations. Its members are free of polit-
ical responsibility and the concomitant pressure to submit to unreflective pub-
309. Id, supra note 295, at 93.
310. Id, supra note 295, at 135-37, 272; Fiss, supra note 303, at 11, 16-17; Karst, supra note
303, at 5-11, 39-42.
311. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 295, at 274-77.
312. See id, supra note 295, at 85, 279-90; Fiss, supra note 303, at 12-14; Vellington, supra
note 303, at 246-48. But cf. J. ELY, supra note 297, at 43-72.
313. R. DWORKIN, supra note 295, at 129.
314. Id, supra note 295, at 277.
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lic opinion. They can be neutral among the contentions presented, and we
expect them to be. The institutional position of the courts therefore makes it
possible for willing judges, properly trained in moral philosophy, to reason
their way to correct conclusions about the meaning of constitutional principle
and its weight relative to political branch policy.
31 5
Concededly, judges may reach incorrect conclusions about the nature and
importance of the principles involved, but in this view they have a better tech-
nique for deciding and are at least as likely to decide correctly as the political
branches.31 6 Once having valued the relative importance of principle and pol-
icy, though, judges might also decide incorrectly that recognizing the individ-
ual right in question will only interfere with the policy to an extent
proportionate with their relative values.3 17 They may, in other words, impose
upon the political branches a cost which they would not if they had perfect
knowledge of consequences. Alternatively, they may overestimate the adverse
effect on policy and needlessly infringe on principle. While exacerbated by the
uncertainty of prediction, this problem is basically the same one faced by a
trier of fact: determining which of two proffered versions of reality is the more
correct.
When the law favors one type of outcome over another, the direction of
the trier's likely error is skewed by imposing a higher burden of proof on the
disfavored party. For example, criminal defendants who may be "actually"
guilty are acquitted for lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt because the
consequence of this type of error is more desirable than the mistaken convic-
tion of those not guilty.318 If furthering the moral principles incorporated in
the Constitution is the primary purpose of government, then error in that di-
rection is more tolerable than the other.3 19 Accordingly, when the individual
appears to have a fundamental interest, the court must recognize it as a right
unless the government can demonstrate that its infringement is no greater than
required to serve a policy of an importance proportional to the infringement.
In sum, the judicialist position is that the Constitution contains the com-
ponents of a moral imperative that each member of the society must be treated
as a human being having an intrinsic value in himself, that the primary pur-
pose of our system of government is to protect this core of humanity, that the
institutional structure of the courts makes them the government agency best
able to translate this moral imperative into rights applicable to specific situa-
tions, that other objectives of the government must give way to the protection
of these individual rights when they conflict, and that, in case of doubt, it is
315. See Fiss, supra note 303, at 30-34; Wellington, supra note 303, at 246-48.
316. See R. DWoRKIN, supra note 295, at 130.
317. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) with Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 347-48 (1976) and Kelly, 397 U.S. at 278-79 (Black, J., dissenting).
318. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970). Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
423-29 (1979).
319. See Speiser v. Randall 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958). See also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.
477, 492-95 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275-77
(1971); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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preferable to err on the side of protecting the individual rights. Elements of
this doctrine underlie the "compelling interest," "strict scrutiny" standard of
review that the opponents of the separate community doctrine contend is the
Supreme Court's normal approach to claims of fundamental individual rights.
The court's asserted superior competence to balance individual and govern-
mental interests320 springs from the nature of the process for defining individ-
ual rights. Judicial skepticism about claims of governmental necessity derives
not only from suspicion of the government's motives, 32 1 but also, more impor-
tantly, from a willingness to accept the possible failure of the institution to
carry out its policies rather than to infringe needlessly individual rights. If the
primary purpose of the state is to further fundamental individual rights, it
follows that the institutional interests of prison administrators, welfare admin-
istrators, school officials, and the national security authorities include an over-
riding interest in operating their organizations to minimize nonessential harm
to those rights.3 22 We must now consider why this doctrine of judicial-polit-
ical relations should not apply to the control of the political branches over
servicemen's rights within the armed forces.
. The Limits of Judicialism
From the viewpoint of the political branches the serviceman should be
permitted only those rights that, because they cater to his preexisting expecta-
tions that cannot be readily effaced, induce him to be a more willing, and
therefore more effective, instrument of the organization's purposes.323 This
concept is completely opposed to the humane equality that, in the judicialist
view, underlies both the democratic political process established by the Consti-
tution and the individual rights that the Constitution raises above democratic
ofitcomes. The individual as a means contradicts the individual as an autono-
mous personality who believes in his own intrinsic worth.
The desire, or even the need of the armed forces to operate from this
assumption does not self-evidently justify itself. The war power is but one of
the substantive powers of the national government that can be carried out
through complex organizations. The management of any hierarchical organi-
zation would find it in the institution's interest to submerge its members in
their roles: those who manage total institutions, such as prisons, may have the
320. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
323. This must be distinguished from two similar views of the relation: that the serviceman
should have no legal rights at all, or that the judgment of his military superiors of what rights he
should be given always serves the armed forces' best interest. The first is inconsistent with the
utility of certain rights as a manipulative device. See supra notes 289 & 290 and accompanying
text. The second ignores the tendency of supervisory personnel in the armed forces, as discussed
below, to confuse their own comfort and prestige with the goals of the organization unless
checked. See infra notes 350-59 and accompanying text.
It should also be noted that the operation of the political system tends to prevent the political
branches from carrying the relation to its logical extreme. See infra notes 366-77 and accompany-
ing text. Cf. C. VON CLAuSEWITZ, supra note 200, at 80-81, 579-81, 589-93,
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physical capacity to do it.324 Judicial deference to the military concept of indi-
vidual rights against the armed forces must be justified by the unique function
that they perform, the equally unique consequences of erroneous interference
with that function on behalf of the individual, the likelihood of unacceptable
judicial error, and the superior ability of the political authorities to accommo-
date individual interests to the armed forces' unique needs.
The distinctive aspect of the armed forces is that they are the govern-
ment's instrument of coercion against entities that are entirely outside the sys-
tem of domestic law. In. its relations with residents of the United States, the
government acts only through legal authority and the persons against whom it
acts are under a reciprocal obligation to obey its legal commands.325 This is
not to say that every resident always agrees with and obeys the law, but rather
that the United States commands sufficient force and the acquiescence of
enough of the population that it can secure obedience through procedures reg-
ulated by preexisting law. The limits of its capacity to control the behavior of
its residents are self-imposed in the sense that the "self' includes the constitu-
tion-making and constitution-applying authority. The system of law is a pyra-
mid, in which the obligation of the resident to the government and his
institutional rights against it both derive from the apical Constitution. All re-
lations within the system are governed by the distribution of authorities at its
summit. Individuals and the government receive their rights against one an-
other from what they recognize as a common superior, the political will em-
bodied in the Constitution. Conversely, the permissible goals of all actors
within the system are limited by that political will.
The limit of legal action is reached when enough people deny their obli-
gation to obey the government and command enough collective physical force
to resist coercion by legal procedure. The authors of The Federalist considered
the essential difference between a government and a mere association of states
to be the distinction between the "coertion of the magistracy, or. . .the coer-
tion of arms."' 3 2 6 In the first, a government meets disobedience through legal
process against individuals subject to its authority; in the second, it acts against
the will of an independent political body by violence carried to any necessary
324. See A. ETzIONI, supra note 250, at 3-22; E. GOFFMAN, supra note 252, at 5-12.
325. The term "resident" is used in the sense of an individual who, because of United States
citizenship or physical presence in the United States, is obliged to obey United States law and,
concomitantly, is protected by the Constitution. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (U.S. citizen
abroad); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (U.S. citizen abroad); Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (illegal alien in U.S.); The Schooner Exchange, II U.S. (7
Cranch) 116 (1812) (alien vessel in U.S.). Cf. Johnson v. Eisentraeger, 339 U.S. 763, 771-73
(1950)(enemy alien abroad); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfield, 410 F. Supp. 144, 152-53
(D.D.C. 1976) (friendly alien abroad).
The reciprocal relation of obedience to law and protection by it, based on the permanent
status of nationality or the temporary accident of physical presence in the jurisdiction, derives
from the common law concept of permanent or temporary "allegiance" to the King and ultimately
from the reciprocal nature of political obligations in the feudal system. See 0. PHILLIPS, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 363-64 (5th ed. 1973); E. WADE & G. PHILLIPS, CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAW 193-94 (4th ed. 1955); 1 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *366-71.
326. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 207, No. 15, at 95 (A. Hamilton).
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extreme.327 The limits of legal authority, and the contrasting relation of war-
fare, are illustrated clearly by the reaction of the Supreme Court to the mas-
sive disobedience that resulted in the Civil War.
The Court had to determine the relation to the government of pro-seces-
sion individuals within the loyal states and of allegedly loyal individuals in
territory that had been under the control of secessionist governments. It classi-
fied them, not by individual attitude, but by the collective attitudes of the in-
habitants to legal obedience. In Ex parle Milligan, the Court held that the
petitioner, accused of disloyal conduct in Indiana, retained the rights of a per-
son under the legal authority of the United States because the "courts were
open."328 This is to say that no sufficient body of people had denied the au-
thority of the United States in the area involved and prevented its normal
institutions from functioning by legal process. On the other hand, when the
population of an area had withdrawn its collective assent to federal authority
and set up an effective de facto government, the Court consistently held that
individual residents were subject to whatever force the United States political
authorities considered necessary to subdue the hostile body, without regard to
its personal loyalty or disloyalty to the United States. Because the United
States and the hostile de facto government recognized no common superior,
the only way in which the United States could assert its authority was to over-
come the force and break the will of the other through war. Its effect on indi-
vidual residents of the belligerent area was only incidental to its effect on the
hostile government. Given the desire to destroy the Confederacy, the means
that the United States had to use depended not on its self-imposed priorities
but on the strength behind the hostile will. They were imposed, in effect, by
the resistance of the other belligerent.
329
War, the activity for which the armed forces exist, thus differs from any
other activity in which the United States imposes its will. When acting inter-
nally, the political branches of the government act within a hierarchy of values
that applies both to it and the persons it acts against. The goals which the
government pursues are attained through means derived from the legal sys-
tem. Therefore the ability to attain them is limited by the higher goals of the
system, which are to further the fundamental principles found in the individ-
ual guarantees of the Constitution. When seen from the perspective of the
system as a whole, a government institution is most effective when it attains its
particular purpose with the least infringement of fundamental principles. An
effective prison is one that immobilizes and, one hopes, corrects prisoners
without unnecessary infringement of their intellectual and personal privacy;
330
327. Id No. 16, at 99-101 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 8, at 44-46 (A. Hamilton).
328. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 122-27 (1866).
329. See Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 58 (1877); Lamar v. Browne, 92 U.S. 187, 194
(1875); Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404, 417-20 (1864); The Venice, 69 U.S. (2
Wall.) 258, 274 (1864); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666 (1862); id. at 686-87 (Nelson, J.,
dissenting). See also supra note 234 and accompanying text.




an effective welfare system is one that provides benefits to those legally enti-
tled without arbitrary indignity;331 an effective school is one that maintains
orderly instruction without preventing students from expressing their political
views. 33 2 What is true of those on whom the government acts is equally true
of those, its officers and employees, through whom it asserts itself.333 An insti-
tution that seeks to submerge the individual in his role takes too narrow a view
of its proper function, and it is the office of the courts, as spokesmen for the
political will, to enforce the wider perspective that underlies the Constitution.
When acting in relation to another state, however, the United States is not
limited by principles made binding upon it and its adversary by a political will
superior to both. Unless it can reach agreement, it can assert its own will only
by force. The exercise of that force is limited only by the will and resources of
its antagonist. Because war is directed externally, against entities that have no
legal relation to the United States government under the Constitution, no goal
for which it is fought and no injury that is inflicted is inconsistent with the
constitutional principles governing the relation of the United States to its own
residents. Since the objects on which the armed forces act are outside the con-
stitutional system, the effectiveness of the armed forces cannot be defined in
terms of the system's higher purposes. In this they differ from all other coer-
cive organizations within the government.
It follows that the consequence of judicial intervention in the relation be-
tween the armed forces and its members is different in kind. Given that the
policy the government pursues is itself permissible,334 a court that recognizes a
claim of individual constitutional right limits the means by which the policy
may be pursued to the extent necessary to protect a principle from collateral
harm. If the court underestimates the effect that recognizing the right will
have on the government's ability to pursue the policy, its mistake may prevent
the government from attaining its goal. While the accomodation of policy and
principle in that case is imperfect, the direction of error assures protection of
the higher values of the legal system.335 The court hinders attainment of a
lesser goal to further the higher purpose of the system.
That is not the case when the armed forces are involved. A personnel
practice that contributes to military efficiency fosters the attainment of the
goals set by the political branches at the least human and material cost to the
armed forces.336 A court may determine that the practice is inconsistent with
constitutional principles as applied to civilian authority-this is not unlikely in
the light of the assumptions underlying military discipline. If there is an
equally effective technique that does not infringe these principles, the court
331. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970).,
332. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1969).
333. See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979); Pickering
v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-70 (1968).
334. This, of course, is not always the case. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-64
(1982); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969).
335. See supra text accompanying notes 316-22.
336. See supra note 293.
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may protect individual rights without loss of military efficiency. If no such
alternative exists, the court's intervention raises the cost in lives and material
of reaching the government's goals. At some point, the increase will deprive
the government of the will or the means to overcome the adversary. If the
political branches realize the loss of efficiency, the judicial decision will deter
them from pursuing ends they otherwise would. If the loss of efficiency goes
unnoticed until war is undertaken,3 37 military failure, incomplete success, or
success at a higher cost result. In either case, judicial preclusion of military
personnel practices based on an incorrect belief that military effeciency will be
unimpaired decreases the ability of the political branches to impose their will
on another state. At the worst, it permits the imposition of the will of another
state on the United States.
These consequences cannot be justified by their service to the higher prin-
ciples of the legal system. The goals that the United States chooses to pursue
as a nation among nations are wholly independent of the principles that con-
trol the relation of its government to those subject to its laws. 338 As long as the
constitutional process is complied with,3 39 the courts have no basis to deter-
mine that any decision to use force internationally is substantively improper.
Moreover, the decision to use force depends in part on the actions of other
states, which are entirely outside the control of the legal system. The armed
forces are the government's instruments of international coercion. Since the
courts cannot assign values to the purposes for which the armed forces will be
used, they cannot decide that the United States' inability to reach any particu-
lar military goal is outweighed by the enhanced rights of members of the
armed forces.34° A mistaken judicial conclusion that servicemen's individual
rights can be protected without impairing military efficiency has the court do
inadvertently what it has no standard for doing deliberately. Because the uses
to which the armed forces are put cannot be judged by the principles of the
legal system, mistaken balancing that impairs those uses is not offset by vindi-
cation of the hierarchy of values within the system.
The consequence ofjudicial error is even more serious with respect to the
secondary function of military discipline-protection of civilian supremacy.
The armed forces, as practitioners of international violence, have the ability
both to physically coerce their own society and to dictate its foreign policy by
337. The political branches undertake war either when they initiate the use of force or when
they refuse to accept the will of the adversary on a point despite the adversary's possible use of
force. See L. HENKEN, supra note 215, at 100-02; A. SOFAER, supra note 213, at 100-03, 207-09.
338. See supra notes 202-15 and accompanying text.
339. That process includes the existence of a system of political liberty which constrains the
choices of the President and Congress. See supra text accompanying notes 232-35, 245-49.
340. Moreover, military efficiency is neutral with respect to the purposes that the government
pursues. Positive ideological commitment, as opposed to mere acceptance, has little to do with
motivating effective performance by servicemen. See supra text accompanying notes 277-78. Most
manipulative techniques within the armed forces are based on factors independent of the purpose
of any particular war. See supra notes 254-88 and accompanying text. For the courts to deny the
armed forces the constitutional authority to use a particular method of discipline because of sub
rosa aversion to the present war they are involved in is to deny them the power to use it to prepare
for any other conflict, including future conflicts which might be more favorably received.
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refusing to act. As noted above, active coercion and obstruction have been
used both by officers and by enlisted personnel to impose their views on civil-
ian governments. These military usurpations have one common characteristic:
they consist of collective action, either under the control of existing leaders
who misuse their position in the institution or of ad hoc leaders who derive
their authority from the assent of the disobedient group. They are an expres-
sion of political views through collective action in the capacity of soldiers
rather than as members of the political system.341 The effect on civilian
supremacy is obvious when a segment of the armed forces attempts to impose
its political will on the remainder of society by force. It is equally serious when
it occurs through inaction. If a substantial segment of the military refuses to
execute a policy with which it disagrees, the political power to make that pol-
icy has been transferred from the President and a majority of Congress, acting
through the political system, to the armed forces. Both are a direct contraven-
tion of the principle of civilian supremacy. A judicial decision that mistakenly
weakens restraints on collective action in a military capacity therefore does
more than frustrate a legitimate policy without corresponding enhancement of
principle; it leads to the direct overthrow of the democratic political system
established by the Constitution.
Not only are the consequences of judicial error uniquely serious; it is pe-
culiarly likely to occur when the courts assess the effect of a practice on mili-
tary effectiveness. Three possible reasons suggest themselves for this: inability
to understand the technical aspects of the problem, aversion to the basic as-
sumptions of military discipline, and absence of feedback from military expe-
rience. The first can be dismissed: there is no basis to conclude that judges are
distinctly less able to comprehend the technical aspects of military discipline
than any other complex scientific or economic -issue with which they are
presented.342 Moreover, as explained below, no one else can be certain of
superior knowledge. The second reason is somewhat more substantial. The
moral assumptions that underlie military discipline are opposed completely to
those which are embodied in the Bill of Rights, and it might well be difficult
for judges thoroughly imbued with the latter system to view sympathetically
the needs of the armed forces from the perspective of the former. This, how-
ever, is speculative; it cannot be said that judges who know their own predis-
positions will not make a conscientious effort to overcome them once they
341. See supra notes 241-43. See also D. HoRN, supra note 238, at 214-25.
342. Notwithstanding the language of Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1973), the subject is
no more intrinsically difficult than the scientific and economic predictions that the courts must
make in the review of adminstrative rulemaking. See, e.g., United Steel Workers v. Marshall, 647
F.2d 1189, 1288-1311 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The distinction is rather in the consequences of a mistake
and the inability to detect it.
It should be noted, however, that the majority of the Burger Court has become increasingly
modest about judicial ability to review "expert" decisions on points of fact and predicton. See,
e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, (1982); Parham v. United States, 442 U.S. 584, 607
(1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544 (1979); Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435
U.S. 78, 90 (1978).
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have been made aware of the armed forces' singular needs.343 The principal
reason why judicial error is uniquely probable is the inability to measure the
effect of any decision against the reality of military performance.
One of the distinctive virtues of judge-made law is its ability to adjust the
application of a rule in the light of its practical consequences. If it turns out
that the court's understanding of social conditions was incorrect or has
changed, the application of the rule in subsequent cases generates incorrect,
undesirable, or unjust consequences that provide a basis for modifying it.
When the court, in a constitutional case, has decided that an individual right
can be protected at an acceptable cost to some other government policy, the
continuing experience of the institution responsible for pursuing that policy
will demonstrate the actual cost. If it turns out to be excessive, doctrine can be
changed.344 The process depends, though, on the ability of the affected insti-
tution to produce results that can be judged in terms of its policy goals.
The armed forces cannot do this. The primary function of a military or-
ganization is to wage war, and the only true measurement of its effectiveness is
how well it performs in war. Anything else is an approximation: training and
exercises cannot approach the actual danger, dislocation, fear, and uncertainty
of war itself. Wars, particularly major ones against a relatively equal enemy,
occur only infrequently. The activity of a rational military organization in
peacetime is directed toward preparing for the uncertain outbreak of war, but
all thinking in the interim about the effects of changes in doctrine, discipline,
and equipment is speculation. Much of it will turn out to be grossly wrong.345
If judicial intervention does impair the effectiveness of military discipline,
there is no way to determine and correct the mistake until it has produced the
substantial and sometimes irreparable cost of failure.
To conclude, the conditions which justify the creation of individual con-
stitutional rights that impede the attainment of other policies by government
institutions are not present in the relation between the serviceman and the
armed forces. Unlike the other agencies of government, their function cannot
be defined to include implicitly furthering the moral principles implicit in the
Constitution. Impairment of their functions carries consequences that hinder,
rather than assist, the attainment of those principles. Mistaken impairment is
particularly likely because they exercise their true function only sporadically.
Without the assistance of overriding moral principle, the courts are badly situ-
ated to mediate between the institutional needs of the armed forces and the
individual autonomy of the serviceman.
343. But see Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 766 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); benShalom v.
Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
344. Compare Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) with Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976).
345. In a particularly notorious example, all the best professional thinkers before World War I
were convinced that it would be a short war dominated by the offensive. See T. Ropp, supra note




III. R-viEw OF POLITICAL RATIONALITY
Because of the unique nature and function of the armed forces, the mode
of judicial review that gives primacy to individual rights is unsuited to over-
seeing the relation between the serviceman and the military organization.
This, though, is hardly the end of the matter. The peculiar status of members
of the armed forces as instruments of the political branches is justified only by
the two constitutional principles of unrestricted choice of military means and
civilian political supremacy. To the extent that a military practice does not
further these principles, it is subject to civilian constitutional standards.
346
The courts must still determine, therefore, whether a decision by the military
authorities or their political superiors to depart from civilian constitutional
norms does further instrumental effectiveness or subordination. In evaluating
the military or political decision, the courts require a conception of the confi-
dence that can be placed in other authorities' judgment and a standard of
review that will skew the direction of judicial error to reflect this confi-
dence.347 Finally, the courts must preserve the free functioning of the civilian
political process, on which the legitimacy of politico-military decisions de-
pends, by protecting it from even rational military practices that have the col-
lateral effect of distorting it.
A. The Competence of Nonjudicial Decision Makers
A military departure from civilian constitutional norms necessarily in-
volves a judgment, however inarticulate, that the loss of liberty or entitlement
to the serviceman is outweighed by the gain in effectiveness or subordination.
The decision may have been made overtly by Congress, 348 or it may have been
delegated, through general statutory provisions, to the executive-in practice,
the military-authorities. 349 The confidence that can be placed in the ac-
comodation of civilian liberties to military needs differs markedly between the
two.
Neither the legal responsibilities nor the institutional behavior of the
armed forces gives confidence that they can properly balance individual and
institutional interests. Their formal mission is, of course, to apply military
force effectively. 350 Their internal authorities, recruited from those trained in
the pursuit of effectiveness, are not directly responsible to those who assert the
346. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); O'Caflahan v. Parker, 395 U.S.
258 (1969); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
347. See supra text accompanying notes 320-322.
348. See, e.g., Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976); 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1982).
349. There are two types of delegation to the military authorities. The first is the general
statutory authority of the three services to make all necessary regulations. See 10 U.S.C.
§§ 3012(g), 6011, 8012(0 (1982). The access regulations at issue in Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828
(1976), for example, arose from this authority. The second is specific statutory authority to de-
velop more detailed standards on a particular subject. The power to punish conduct "to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces" is conferred by statute, 10 U.S.C.
§934 (1982), while the definition of such conduct is left to the military and the courts of military
review. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
350. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3062, 5012-5013, 8062 (1982).
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claim of individual liberty. Accordingly, their institutional bias is toward
what they believe will maximize their effectiveness; they are not concerned
with furthering other values by accepting less than what they consider effective
performance.351 Even from the viewpoint of maximizing effectiveness, more-
over, the armed forces are not always competent judges of how to attain what
they consider their own best interests. Instead, senior military authorities not
infrequently emphasize the authoritarian aspect of discipline over the pater-
nalistic or manipulative, even when the hostility produced in their subordi-
nates by "chicken" outweighs any gain in control over performance.
Three reasons might be assigned for this. The first, isolation from civilian
values, is the converse of the possible judicial phenomenon mentioned above.
The underlying moral premise of military discipline is the abnegation of the
needs of the individual before the needs of the organization, and the moral
code in which the officer is socialized denigrates the value of self as against
duty.352 Even if this code is honored in the breach, the ideal of putting the
performance of the task and the well being of subordinates ahead of personal
benefit remains.353 One who believes himself bound by and complying with
this code of self-denial and subordination cannot be expected to completely
sympathize with contrary values of diversity and autonomy.
354
The second is a reaction to the uncertainty inherent in the armed forces'
functions. The essence of the commander's job in wartime is to make deci-
sions with dangerous consequences, using inadequate, conflicting, and mis-
leading information, under physical and mental stress imposed by the enemy's
initiative. 355 In peacetime there is no adversary, but uncertainty arises from
the lack of feedback from actual performance. Many of the distincitve aspects
of military society can be explained as attempts to alleviate or repress uncer-
tainty by creating the appearance of order and control. 356 One aspect of this is
the tendency of senior military personnel to insist on the outward appearance
of conformity and subordination as an end in itself. Increasing the service-
man's automony, even when it produces more intelligent and enthusiastic per-
formance, may be resisted because it decreases the appearance of control.3 57
Linked with the concentration on externals rather than performance is the
351. Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 302 n.41, 309-10 (1978); Hamp-
ton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103-05, 114-15 (1976).
352. See N. DixoN, supra note 192, at 189-207 (1976); S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 236, at 63-
64; M. JANOWITZ, supra note 272, at 215-16 (1960).
353. See L. RADINE, supra note 195, at 54-56, 67-68; AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT,
supra note 262, at 382-88.
354. See N. DIXON, supra note 192, at 185-86, 261-62; M. JANOWITZ, supra note 272, at 248-
49.
355. See C. VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 200, at 117-18; N. DixoN, supra note 192, at 27-34;
S. MARSHALL, supra note 256, at 85-93, 101-09.
356. See N. DIxON, supra note 192, at 186-87, 189-94; M. JANOWITZ, supra note 272, at 51. As
sympathetic a commentator as Huntington has noted the tendency of military professionals to
view risk with comprehensive pessimism and, therefore, to ask for as much of all resources as they
can get. S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 236, at 66-67.




degeneration of military discipline into militarism, which Vagts has defined as
the ideology that values, ideas, and practices associated with armies as ends in
themselves, without regard to the effective use of military force as a means to
rational ends. 358 One aspect of militarism is that, without feedback from per-
formance in war, the superiors in a military organization tend to promote their
own comfort, self-esteem, and prestige at the expense of effectiveness. Con-
spicious among those aspects of military life that are vulnerable to militaristic
degeneration is the structure of subordination and deference, which directly
feeds the self-esteem of those in its upper reaches.
359
Experience abroad and in the United States has demonstrated the possib-
lity that the military authorities will not adjust their practices to changing so-
cial conditions. The Prussian Army of 1806 and the British Army of 1916 are
familiar examples of armies that could not make the most effective use of their
societies' military potential because they would not modify training and disci-
pline to accomodate the intelligence and enthusiasm of segments of the popu-
lation from which they had not previously recruited.360 In the United States,
the senior officers of the Army and Navy resisted the statutory abolition of
corporal punishment during the 19th century, despite the fact that flogging
deterred higher quality personnel from enlisting.36 1 During the Second World
War, the Army's system of discipline, which emphasized formal rather than
manipulative control, antagonized large numbers of enlisted men. Their of-
ficers, however, generally believed that it was fair and satisfied the troops.
362
The Army persisted with segregated units of black personnel even after com-
bat experience in World War II demonstrated that racial integration used
them more effectively; a direct order of President Truman was needed to end
the practice. 363 Both services opposed the post-World War II revision of the
military justice statutes in the direction of more legal rights for the court-mar-
tial defendant; this resulted from civilian initiative both inside and outside of
the Defense Department. 364 While these instances are not determinative,
365
they demonstrate a resistance by senior military personnel to outside values,
even those which enhance effectiveness, that justifies skepticism about the bal-
358. See N. DIXON, supra note 192, at 172; A. VAGTS, supra note 192, at 11-13. The classic
statement is that of the Russian grand duke who "hated war because it spoiled the armies." Id at
13.
359. See N. DIXON, supra note 192, at 182-84; M. JANOwrTz, supra note 272, at 50-51.
360. See W. GOERLiTZ, HISTORY OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 1657-1945, at 23-32
(1953); J. KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE 215-27 (1976); B. LIDDELL-HART, THE REAL WAR
1914-18, at 224-25 (1930).
361. See H. LANGLEY, SOCIAL REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY 1798-1862, passim
(1967).
362. See AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT, supra note 262, at 374, 391-97, 410-23.
363. See Ambrose, Blacks in the Army in Two World Wars, in THE MILITARY AND AMERICAN
SOCEITY 177-91 (S. Ambrose ed. 1972).
364. See W. GENEROUS, SWORDS AND SCALES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIFORM MILI-
TARY CODE OF JUSTICE 16-18, 22-29, 34-47, 50-53 (1973).
365. Since the end of the Vietnam War, the Army has systematically adjusted its disciplinary
procedures in the light of social science research about enlisted personnel. See generally L.
RADINE, supra note 195.
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ance they will draw between military effectiveness and the individual auton-
omy that characterizes civil society.
Both the structure of Congress and its actual performance, on the other
hand, demonstrate that it can effectively mediate between military claims for
subordination and the principles of individual autonomy that are current in
civilian society. As the representative branch of the government, Congress
presumably is competent to balance the cost and benefit of conflicting policies
according to the number of represented persons who desire diverse goals and
the intensity of their conflicting desires. 366 This is particularly true when war
and preparation for war are concerned. The cost of pursuing any given mili-
tary policy includes the number of people who will be subjected to the burden
of military service, their identity, the incentive or compulsion needed to make
them available, and the strictness of the discipline under which they will serve.
If it is assumed that any particular size, composition, recruitment, or discipline
of the armed forces does contribute to the effective attainment of some objec-
tive by military means, it is Congress which must decide whether that end is
worth the cost it will impose on the particular segment of society that bears
it. 3 6 7
It is true that in making this decision, Congress receives much profes-
sional advice from the armed forces and political input from those who see
their self-interest in supporting the military establishment. 368 This is input,
however, not direction. Those who are burdened with military service and
discipline are by no means underrepresented. They and their families are dis-
persed throughout the congressional districts and form a racially and ethni-
cally diverse group.3 6 9 Any attempt to enlarge their number, through more
active recruitment or through conscription, only increases the constituency of
persons interested in the internal condition of the armed forces. Moreover,
since most members of even the all-volunteer services tend to leave after a
single enlistment, 370 there are substantial numbers of ex-servicemen. They do
not always retain fond memories: organized veterans groups exerted signifi-
cant pressure for military justice reform after World War 1I.37 1 These political
forces have led Congress, over military opposition, to modify disciplinary and
personnel practices in the direction of civilian norms, exercising its own judg-
ment on both the effect of the changes on military efficiency and their desira-
bility despite potential harm.
366. See generally Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 483 (1980); id. at 498 (Powell, J., con-
curring); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978); Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103-05 (1976); supra notes 294-97 and accompanying text.
367. The primacy of Congress was clearly brought out by the majority's treatment of the De-
fense Department testimony in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 73-78 (1981). But cf. Id. at 97-
102 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasizing testimony adverse to Congress' judgment).
368. See S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 236, at 400-27; M. JANOWITZ, supra note 272, at 353-60,
372-92, 401-12. But cf. A. YARMOLINSKY, THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 38-68 (1971).
369. In 1981 the enlisted strength of the armed forces was 21.6% black, 4.4% Hispanic, 4%
other minorities and 70% white. The Army had the highest proportion of minority personnel,
41%, and the Navy the lowest, 20%. 1982 DEP'T OF DEFENSE ANN. REP. 278.
370. See supra note 184.
371. See W. GENEROUS, supra note 364, at 23-24, 29.
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An early instance is the abolition of flogging in the Navy over the opposi-
tion of most senior naval officers. The political opponents of flogging within
and without Congress raised arguments that combined moral principle and
military expediency. Flogging was criticized as contrary to the moral spirit of
the time. Its existence, it was argued, therefore deterred from enlisting the
kind of intelligent, self-respecting Americans who would make the best
sailors.372 The same blend of pragmatism and principle has been appled in
subsequent controversies. Thus, the unhappy experience of large numbers of
citizen-soldiers with military justice during the two World Wars led Congress
to revise the Articles of War in 1920 and to replace them with the Uniform
Code of Military Justice in 1949. In both instances the change was in the
direction of the legal norms of civilian criminal procedure; in both it was sup-
ported by the argument that a relatively arbitrary system of discipline harmed,
rather than aided, military effectiveness, because it would not be tolerated by
the men who had to live under it.373 More recently, Congress has responded
to changing attitudes on gender, at the same time increasing the population
available for recruitment, by increasing the promotion prospects of female of-
ficers,374 decreasing restrictions on sea duty for women,37 5 and opening the
military academies to female students.376 Congress' refusal to apply draft re-
gistration to women, on the other hand, reflects in part that a substantial and
vocal segment of the population apparently believed that gender roles had not
changed quite that much. Therefore, it considered that any military gain from
registration would be offset by the legal and political resistance anticipated
from these people.
377
Both the military and political authorities, then, will require those depar-
tures from civilian individual rights that, in their judgment, will maximize the
efficiency and responsiveness of the armed forces to the extent tolerable to
civilian political opinion. While the military authorities have, through train-
372. See H. LANGLEY, supra note 361, at 136-93.
373. See W. GENEROUS, supra note 364, at 9, 29.
374. See Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-
485, § 820, 92 Stat. 1627 (1978); Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-130, § 1(19), 81 Stat. 378.
In 1980 Congress enacted the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act which, inter alia,
provided gender-neutral appointment and promotion procedures for officers, removed gender re-
strictions on command authority and flight training, and repealed the statutory authorization for
regulations requiring discharge based on pregnancy. See Pub. L. No. 96-518, §§ 104, 105, 107,
212, 236, 237, 373, 94 Stat. 2835 (1980) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 532, 619-21, 6911, 8257 (1982));
H.R. REp. No. 1462, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34-36, 40-211 (1979); S. RaP. No. 357, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9, 36-37, 41 (1979). The Department of Defense supported these changes. S. REP. No. 395,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1979).
As one result, the statutory dual promotion system at issue in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498 (1975), has been abolished. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
375. See Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-
485, § 808, 92 Stat. 1623 (1978) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1982)).
The Department of Defense has requested the repeal of the remaining restrictions on women
for duty on combat vessels and aircraft. 1982 DEP'T OF DEFENSE ANN. REP. 280; see 10 U.S.C.
§ 6015 (1982), 10 U.S.C. § 8549 (1982).
376. See Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
106, § 803, 89 Stat. 538 (1975).
377. See S. RE. No. 826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 159 (1980).
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ing and experience, specialized professional knowledge of their technical re-
quirements, their professional judgment may be clouded by institutional
irrationality, and they are not directly responsible to civilian opinion, which is
willing to accept less than technical perfection for other reasons. Congress, on
the other hand, has available to it as much military professional advice as it
desires (and perhaps more), offset by direct responsibility to civilian opinion
that has been able to impose its views about the limits of military discipline on
its representatives. Not only the text of the Constitution, but also institutional
structure and historical performance, make the political authorities the supe-
rior nonjudicial balancers of military needs and civilian values.
B. Reviewing Military Rationality
The problems raised by the Supreme Court's balancing technique in the
separate community cases have been considered, and it is now possible to state
the appropriate judicial role in reconciling servicemen's claims of individual
constitutional right with the needs of their organization. From the peculiar
function of the armed forces and the concomitant consequences of judicial
error, it follows that the proper standard of judicial scrutiny favors organiza-
tional claims of necessity over individual claims of autonomy. Since utility
within the scope of the substantive power is the limit of the government's pow-
ers in this area, it follows that a military practice which restricts servicemen's
autonomy with respect to their organizational role is "militarily necessary" if it
meets the standard of rational relation to governmental purposes used by
Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.378 In part because of the
technical problems involved in reviewing the substance of military discipline,
but primarily because of the consequences of judicial error in the individual's
favor, the courts should not find military departures from civilian standards of
individual rights within the armed forces to be unconstitutional unless mani-
festly irrational in terms of successful military performance. Irrationality,
however, takes distinctly different forms with respect to practices generated by
the armed forces themselves, using delegated authority, and those initiated or
clearly ratified by Congress.
With respect to the practices generated by the armed forces, the court
should remain aware of the difference between military rationality and ratio-
nalizing militarism. The tendency of senior military officers, in common with
the staff of institutions generally, to redefine the institution's function in terms
of their own well-being has been remarked upon, as have the peculiarities of
the military situation that exaggerate this fault. The recurrent failure of mili-
tary leaders effectively to adapt disciplinary systems to the social and psycho-
logical background of their human material is notorious. That a practice has
proven militarily effective, or a least not downright harmful, in the past, is not
conclusive evidence that it remains so in present circumstances. While the
Army itself relies on extensive sociological research to modify its disciplinary
378. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416-19 (1819).
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system, 379 it is difficult to argue that the reasons a practice is effective cannot
be understood except by experienced military authorities. Military discipline
can be rationally criticized in terms of military effectiveness, but the armed
forces are not necessarily rational self-critics. Therefore, the courts, while con-
scious of their own technical limitations, should insist on an explanation, in
the light of the criticisms raised by the serviceman, of the need served and how
the practice relates to it. The burden of persuasion would remain on the ser-
viceman, but the armed forces would have to provide a rational articulation of
the usefulness of the practice.
Review by this standard presents no insuperable burden to the parties
concerned and offers the additional benefit of explicit judgment by the polit-
ical branches. As long as they remain sufficiently modest about their substan-
tive knowledge, the federal courts have proven able to judge the rationality of
government decision making in quite complex technical fields.380 Moreover,
when the problem is one of adjustment of discipline to changed mores, it must
be borne in mind that the professional heads of the armed forces are neither
equipped by training nor competent by law to respond to extra-military
changes in values.381 If they are unable to explain the rational basis, for ex-
ample, of a requirement that pregnancy is a disqualification per se for military
service,382 a judicial finding of irrationality would require Congress to ex-
pressly consider the extent to which traditional thinking on the point should be
changed.383 Given the nature of the subject and the consequent presumption
of rationality, it would be a rare instance in which armed forces could not
meet their burden,384 but in that rare case the courts will have done the service
379. See, M. JANOWiTZ, supra note 272, at 44; L. RADINE, supra note 195,passim.
380. See, e.g., Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The
experience of the District of Columbia Circuit in reviewing administrative decisions on complex
scientific and economic points for rationality has produced considerable judicial discussion of the
problems of overseeing substantive decisions in areas in which the judges lack specialized techni-
cal training. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 650-51 n.66 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34-38 (D.C. Cir. 1976); id. at 68-69 (Statement of Leventhal, J.); id., at
97-99 (Wilkey, J., dissenting); Portland Cement Ass'n. v. Ruckleshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). See also Levental, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REv. 509, 511-12 (1974); Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of
JudicialReview, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 375, 391-93 (1974). While the procedural requirements of 5
U.S.C. § 553 would not apply to congressional or military decisionmaking, see 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(a)(1) (1982), the approach of the D.C. Circuit to future uncertainty in a complex technical
situation might provide useful guidance to courts evaluating questions of military necessity.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 351-65.
382. See, e.g., Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1976).
383. See, e.g., supra note 374.
384. The military practices involved in Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976); and Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), satisfy this standard of review when
viewed in the light of a system of discipline that works by manipulating primary group solidarity
through pervasive control of the environment. The critical connection between the group's inter-
est and the organization's needs are the immediate leaders: the "hard core" within the group and
the noncommissioned and junior officers above it. The organization is especially concerned to
prevent the development of alternative groups or alternative leadership; the particular danger of
collective activity is that it develops leaders, communicates sympathies, and informs individuals
that they are not alone in their opposition to the organization. See supra notes 279-82 and accom-
panying text. Thus, the vice of the activity repressed by the Air Force in Glines was not so much
the content of the material but its unauthorized circulation among the troops by an officer, which
represents the beginning of collective activity outside the control of the organization. Cf. Glines,
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of placing the matter on the political agenda.
Congressional decisions do not warrant the same skepticism. When Con-
gress decides that a military practice is useful and that its departure from civil-
ian constitutional norms is acceptable, it has calculated the cost of a level of
military effectiveness and imposed it upon the military. A statutory system of
military practice is rational in the same sense that a tax increase to pay for
weapons is rational. It derives its legitimacy from the representation of the
affected interests in the calculation of ends and means. Given its receptivity to
political input and its constitutional responsibility for the size and the struc-
ture of the armed forces, Congress is particularly competent to exercise polit-
ical judgment in this area.385 It follows that the reviewing court has but three
roles to play: to determine that congressional judgment has been exercised, to
confine the power of Congress to deal with constitutional liberties in a utilita-
rian way to its proper sphere, and to prevent utilitarian decisions from being
made on the basis of a defective process of representation.
C. The Limits of the Separate Community
These restrictions on the review of constitutional claims by servicemen
derive from the proposition that subordinating the serviceman is a cost of mili-
tary effectiveness which, because of the function of the armed forces as instru-
ments of international coercion, can only be measured against standards of
utility and acceptability developed by the political process. To state the prop-
osition is to state its limits. First, it applies only to those military practices that
concern the serviceman's performance of his organizational role. Second, and
more importantly, it assumes a properly functioning, representative political
process. If benefits and burdens in the armed forces are allocated through an
unconstitutional flaw in the civilian society, the resulting decision lacks both
the institutional and technical credibility it would otherwise have. Moreover,
to the extent that the government's powers over the armed forces are used to
control the civilian political process, they destroy the existence of the free pub-
lic consent, which is the foundation of political judgment. In each of these
situations the courts should exercise their heightened standard of review to
444 U.S. at 356-58. A second concern is to preserve the organization's control over its junior
officers on whom it depends for detailed control of the men. A junior officer who identifies with
his subordinates cuts the organization's lines of control over them; moreover, his status and ability
to develop informal loyalty to himself make him a particularly effective leader of collective action
against the organization. See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text. Captain Levy was
hardly Fletcher Christian, but the Supreme Court correctly viewed him as a member of the same
genus when it held his advocacy to enlisted men of disobedience to be unprotected by the first
amendment. See Levy, 417 U.S. at 761. Finally, instilling internalized discipline requires that the
serviceman be isolated from conflicting sources of values during the initiation period. See supra
text accompanying notes 272-76. As a training base, Fort Dix was, therefore, a particularly un-
suitable forum for political appeals addressed to the troops. See Greer, 424 U.S. at 848-49 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring).
385. Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,497-99 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); Hampton




confine the broad authority of the political branches to the relation between
the serviceman and the demands of the organization upon him.
Since the questions first were presented in the early 1950's, the Supreme
Court has always used its independent judgment to determine which persons
and activities could constitutionally be subject to military discipline. By re-
quiring that servicemen's crimes be "service-connected" to confer court-mar-
tial jurisdiction, it has explicitly recognized that not all off post, off duty
behavior by servicemen affects military authority, the performance of military
duty, or the safety and well-being of others within the military community.
386
In holding that a gender-based difference in dependents' allowances denied
female officers equal protection, the Court applied the prevailing test for gen-
der discrimination after noting that the difference was not related to officers'
duties or responsibilities.387 Similarly, in a decision that avoided the constitu-
tional point, the Court held that the Army lacked statutory authority to give a
less than honorable discharge because of the serviceman's preenlistment polit-
ical activity.38 8 The common element in these decisions is the Court's in-
dependent determination that the claimed power of the government did not
relate to the serviceman's present subordination to the armed forces for the
purpose of performing his duties.
The role of the reviewing court in determining whether Congress has ex-
ercised its judgment is minimal. A congressional decision to authorize a prac-
tice concerning individual roles in the armed forces has two components: a
technical conclusion that the practice will increase military effectiveness and a
political conclusion that the increase is worth any accompanying departure
from civilian constitutitonal norms. A court is in no position to believe that its
technical judgment is superior to Congress'. That body has equal or greater
access to technical advice and such adversary input as the political process
generates; moreover, Congress is free of the temptations of self-interest in mili-
tary prerequisites to which the military authorities may be prone. Because of
the unique function of the armed forces, the court has no exterior standard
against which to measure the balance of interests Congress has struck. What
remains is the determination that Congress followed the political process that
legitimates its balance--that it actually did consider the necessity of its
decision.
38 9
The primary source of information on this point is, of course, the pub-
386. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
387. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973).
388. See Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); id. at 585-86 (Clark, J., dissenting).
389. Cf. Wright, supra note 380, at 391-93 (arbitrary, capricious standard for review of agency
rulemaking).
In the light of Congress' constitutional responsibility for the organization and discipline of
the armed forces, it should be noted that the majority of the Supreme Court has consistently
declined to bind Congress to the opinion of the military authorities that a practice was not essen-
tial. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79-83 (1981); cf. Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 65-
67 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (equity and justice above military necessity); Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 517 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (without need, military policy is not
overriding).
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lished legislative history, but the courts are not confined to that. As Justice
Powell has observed in a related context, Congress, as a representative body, is
not bound to support its decisions from a formal record but may rely on its
collective knowledge and experience to make policy judgments. It follows, in
his view, that the thought process of Congress is to be found not merely in the
formal legislative history but in "the total contemporary record. ' 390 This
would include the historical, legal, and cultural context that provided those
facts or policy considerations which were so uncontroverted that they did not
have to be discussed.391 The result is that Congress' accomodation of individ-
ual and organizational interests must be accepted by the courts when it ap-
pears from the entire context that Congress had not acted inadvertently but
had deliberately subordinated the serviceman's autonomy to what it considers
to be military needs.
The political process malfunctions with respect to the armed forces when
exclusion from the political process affects a group's participation in military
service and when exclusion from military service results in exclusion from full
participation in political life. Military service, particularly combat service, is
plainly considered a severe burden by many. If that burden were deliberately
limited to members of an identifiable racial minority, whether willing or not, it
would plainly show, first, that the remainder of the political nation consider
this group expendable pariahs, and, second, that the group is so isolated from
the political process that it cannot defend itself against such a severe loss by
coalition building.392 Paradoxically, deliberate exclusion of an identifiable ra-
cial or ethnic minority from military positions would also stigmatize it and
would result from the same isolation. Defending the state's existence is its
most important function, on which all others depend. Exclusion of a group
from that responsibility is both a statement that it cannot be relied upon and
the occasion to reproach it with not being directly concerned in decisions in-
volving war and peace.393 Since classical times, the right to perform military
390. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502-03 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
391. See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,238-39 (1978); Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196-206 (1978); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 91 U.S.
72, 79-82 (1875); Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612, 615-23 (2d Cir. 1980).
The decisions in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1974), and Middendorf v. Henry, 425
U.S. 25 (1976), satisfy this standard of review. The legislative history of the disparate promotion
systems in Ballard indicates that Congress was aware of the different promotion and retention
prospects for male and female officers under those statutes and considered it to satisfy the Navy's
needs. See Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508 n.12. Similarly, Congress had twice, at the time of Henr,,
considered and refused proposals to abolish the form of court martial at which counsel is not
required. See Henry, 425 U.S. at 44 n.21.
It should also be noted that even the dissent considered the statutory system of nonjudicial,
nonadversary punishment provided by article 15 of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1982), to be
acceptable despite the fact that it permits confinement without benefit of counsel. See Henry, 425
U.S. at 58, 64 (Marshall, J., dissenting); ef. Note, The Unconstitutional Burden of Article 15, 82
YALE LJ. 1481 (1973) (procedural inadequacy of article 15 punishments).
392. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 295, at 234-38; J. ELY, supra note 297, at 102-04, 136-48.
393. See M. JANOWrrZ, MILITARY CONFLICT 74-76 (1975); Goodman, Women, War and
Equality: An Examination of Sex Discrimination in the Military, 5 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 243,
246_49 (1979). Cf. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 415 (1856) (members of African race
not treated as citizens of the state).
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service has been a sign of full membership in the political community.394 This
has been equally true in the United States. The consistent demand of black
political leaders from the Civil War until the Truman Administration, first for
the right to perform military service at all and then for the right to perform it
without discrimination came from the desire to be recognized as full Ameri-
cans; opposition was motivated in part by the desire to deny recognition.
395
Racial segregation in the armed forces was finally ended through an executive
order in 1948 because discrimination in civilian society made it impossible to
get legislation through Congress. 3 96 Statutory arrangements within the armed
forces that intentionally discriminate against an identifiable racial, ethnic, or
religious minority in imposing military service, or in denying the opportunity
to serve, would arise from a manifest failure of the political process and would
reinforce the minority's inferior position in civilian society. Both their causes
and their principal collateral effects are outside the armed forces. It follows




The problem of how the courts should respond to restricting of individual
liberties and access to opportunity in the armed forces is not likely to disap-
pear. The experience of the Vietnam War era makes it likely that future polit-
ical opposition to any controversial war will include efforts by disaffected
servicemen to resist military authority and by civilians to support them. Even
in peacetime, the basic value differences between the military and civilian cul-
tures will continue to produce litigation to bring the one into harmony with
the other. Present changes in cultural attitudes toward gender roles and sexual
preference can only increase the conflict between the aggressive, paternalist,
394. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1265a 27, 1297a 29-35, 1297b 1-27, 1329a 2-19 (Loeb ed. 1972); W.
FORREST, THE EMERGENCE OF GREEK DEMOCRACY 87-97, 111-14, 215-18 (1966).
395. See D. CORNISH, THE SABLE ARM: NEGRO TROOPS IN THE UNION ARMY, 1861-1865
(1966); U. LEE, THE EMPLOYMENT OF NEGRO TROOPS 3-15, 51-88, 108-09 (United States Army in
World War II, Special Studies Vol. 8 pt. 8 1966); 2 A. NEVINS, supra note 242, at 515-19.
396. Exec. Order No. 998, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1948); see Ambrose, supra note 363, at 189-91.
397. Whether the collateral effects of gender-based discrimination should be met with equal
judicial hostility depends on whether the disparate treatment of women in the military is consid-
ered to have the same derogatory effect as racial or religious discrimination. See, e.g., Goodman,
supra note 393, at 250-55, 258-64; Karst, supra note 303, at 53-56; cf. Note, The Equal Rights
Amendment and the Military, 82 YALE L.J. 1533, 1547-52 (1973). If, on the contrary, one postu-
lates that women as a class are so numerous and so interpenetrate society that they are not in the
permanent jeopardy faced by racial or religious minorities, then it is arguable that a contemporary
political decision to limit their participation in the armed forces does not have the same stigma-
tizing effect. See J. ELY, supra note 297, at 164-70, 253 n.75.
It should be noted that the response of the political branches to lower court decisions finding
unconstitutional gender discrimination in statutory restrictions on women's sea duty and exclusion
of women from the military academies was not to seek Supreme Court review but rather to amend
the statutes to conform. See Waldie v. Schlesinger, 509 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Owens v.
Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978); Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 95-485, § 808, 92 Stat. 1623 (1978); Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-106, § 803(a), 89 Stat. 537 (1975). Thus, we lack the benefit of the Supreme Court's
views on the subject.
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authoritarian armed forces and individuals who want the benefits of a military
career without fitting the traditional model of a serviceman.
398
The Supreme Court's discussion of the judicial relation to such claims has
not provided an intellectually satisfying conclusion for the guidance of the
lower courts. The minority position implicitly, and sometimes overtly,39 9 re-
jects the entire idea of a justifiably distinct, self-contained military culture. In
the process it ignores the historical experience of the United States and other
Western societies with effective and ineffective military organizations. The
majority, on the other hand, accepts the validity of this experience, but it
presents as self-evident conclusions that are not intuitively obvious to those for
whom World War II is not even a memory. This Article has attempted to
articulate the basis of those conclusions.
The conclusions rest on the proposition that the substantive power of the
United States to wage or threaten war is not limited by the Constitution, which
merely allocates the authority to determine the ends for which war will be
fought and the means available between Congress and the President. The war
power is exercised against sovereign entities whose response is not limited by
American domestic law. As a sovereign entity itself, the United States has
under its domestic law the authority to use against other sovereigns however
much force appears necessary to attain its chosen ends despite the resistance of
its adversaries. The only check on this unlimited choice of ends and means is
the distribution of power between the President and Congress that subjects
their choices to the control of the political process.
These basic propositions lead to three conclusions about the constitu-
tional claims of individual members of the armed forces. The first is that the
Constitution permits, if it cannot be said to require, such measures of individ-
ual control as will make the armed forces, as an organization, responsive in-
struments of the political will. In individual terms this means using the
techniques of coercion and manipulation that will make the serviceman both
technically effective and unwilling to use the resources of his position to ac-
tively or passively thwart the decisions of the elected authorities. The second
is that the political nature of the war powers, in addition to the first amend-
ment, severely limits, if not precludes, attempts to preserve military effective-
ness and subordination by controlling public discussion as it affects the
civilian political process. The third is that the primary purposes for which the
armed forces exist, the successful use or threat of force against other sover-
eigns, is outside the constitutional system, and the courts therefore have no
basis on which to decide that a military practice which rationally furthers that
purpose is less important than its cost to servicemen's liberty interests. Finally,
the consequences of a mistaken conclusion that a military practice serves no
398. See, e.g., Beler v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denledsub nom. Beller
v. Lehman, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis.
1980). See generally Comment, Employment Discrimination in the Miitary. An Analysis o/Recent
Decisions Affecting Sexual Preference Discrimination in the Military, 27 ViLL. L. REv. 351 (1981).
399. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 368-71 (1980); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 868-69
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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rational purpose may be so severe that the courts should exercise considerable
self-skepticism about such conclusions.
The result is an approach to judicial review that accepts the segregation of
a relatively limited class of persons from the constitutional norms of civilian
society. It accepts that the "separate community" is one in which, both for
reasons of efficacy and political supremacy, individuals exist not as ends in
themselves but as means to their superiors' ends. While bearing in mind the
inherent flaws in military judgment, it views the rationality of military claims
of necessity from this perspective. Finally, this approach leaves to the political
process the chief responsibility for balancing military efficacy against individ-
ual autonomy and dignity, for it recognizes that only the political branches are
competent to weigh both sides of the balance.
It will be objected that the courts, from this perspective, must sit idly by
while the military, the military authorities, and Congress inflict corporal pun-
ishment, denial of the right against self-incrimination, overt racial discrimina-
tion, and similar outrages upon helpless servicemen. Though perhaps
possible, like any reductio ad absurdum, this argument ignores the continuing
tendency of the political process to ameliorate the condition of the serviceman
and assimilate his rights, insofar as practical, to the civilian's. This tendency
has been continued by the recruitment needs of the volunteer system; it would
be furthered by a new draft that imposed military discipline on a cross-section
of the nation's young people. Though possible, it is hardly plausible that Con-
gress will return the armed forces to the conditions of 1915, or even 1945.
Moreover, the separate community doctrine as interpreted by this Article con-
tains safeguards against such abuse. In the first instance, it subjects the mili-
tary authorities to substantive review of their practices in which they must
articulate the rational basis for departing from civilian norms. It tends to force
the more serious departures from civilian norms to the express consideration
of Congress. Once there, it leaves in place the strict judicial review of political
decisions based on grounds that are presumably irrational and
unrepresentative.
The separate community doctrine presented here has two additional vir-
tues. Because it emphasizes the free political process as the foundation of the
war powers, it reinforces the first amendment's doctrinal support for uninhib-
ited civilian political activity in precisely the circumstances when there is the
most temptation to repress it.4 0o Because it emphasizes the primary activity of
the armed forces, foreign war, as one that takes place against persons outside
the system of domestic law, it clearly separates their functioning from the op-
eration of prisons, schools, the police, the civil bureaucracy, and other hierar-
chical, goal-centered institutions that might otherwise be analogized to the
military. By distinctly drawing the boundaries of military society, it insures
400. Compare Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
with Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 213-15 (1919) and Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919). See also supra note 249.
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that the departures from individual liberty required by the international use of
force are confined there.
What does remain, it must be admitted, is alien to our basic concepts of
humanity and law-an aggregation, now numbering two million people,
whom Congress, in accord with the political process, may treat as if they exist
only to be used. This cannot be helped. As long as war remains available to
the independent national state, the Constitution must provide for effective war
in whatever exigencies arise. As Madison pointed out nearly 200 years ago,
legal restraints on the size and discipline of military forces will be disregarded
whenever the political system perceives a genuine danger.401 The power is
made necessary by a world without higher authority; the only effectual check
on war is our own reluctance to submit ourselves and our children to it except
for the gravest causes.
401. The means of security can only be regulated by the means and danger of attack.
They will in fact ever be determined by those rules, and by no others. It is vain to
impose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in
vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurptions of power, every
precedent of which is the germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions.
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 207, No. 41, at 270 (J. Madison); accordid. No. 25, at 163 (A. Hamil-
ton). In confirmation, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court has rarely picked up a hot potato
in this area until the war was safely over. Compare Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946),
andExparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), and Exparte Vallandingham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863). See also supra note 215 and
cases cited therein. But cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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